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A Cross-Cultural Study of Noncompliant Behaviors in 
Japanese and United States Hospitals;
Noncompliance as a Response to Perceived Threats of 
Shame. Embarrassment, and Management Sanctions
Abstract
Extending the concept of deterrence, emphasized in the rational choice decision­
making theory of crime, to an organizational context, the present research examines 
empirically cultural differences in the perceived levels o f punishment threats o f shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions, and, subsequently, the prevalence of 
noncompliant workplace behaviors in Japanese and U.S. university hospitals. Secondarily, 
the present study assesses the interaction effects for cultural difierence (Japanese and 
American) and the three sanction threats on noncompliance.
In the research reported here, comparable measures are created of the perceived 
threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions for three categories of 
occupational deviant conduct (taking a long lunch or break without approval, coming to 
work late or leaving early without approval, and using sick leave when not really sick).
The effects of three punishment threats on people's intention to violate three 
organizational rules are then examined in merged samples o f employees in Japanese and 
U.S. university hospitals. Compared to American employees, Japanese employees 
perceive greater threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions and, 
subsequently, are less likely to commit each o f the three offenses. The lower likelihood of 
Japanese employees to take a long lunch or break without approval or use sick leave when 
not really sick is primarily attributable to their greater threat o f shame. Despite their lower 
intention to commit the future offenses, the analyses indicate that all three sanction threats 
have less of a deterrent impact for Japanese employees than for American employees, and
xii
these findings tor interaction effects are not consistent with the predictions o f the current
research.
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A Cross-Cultural Study of Noncompliant Behaviors in 
Japanese and United States Hospitals:
Noncompliance as a Response to Perceived Threats of 
Shame, Embarrassment, and Management Sanctions
Chapter I :
Introduction
A societal emphasis on "collectivity" and perceived threats of shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions are presumably the main characteristics which 
have given Japanese companies a contemporary advantage in making the best use of 
talents of their employees to maximize conformity in a post-industrial society (Brahhwaite, 
1989; McMillan, 1982; Pascale & Athos, 1981). In the postwar period, it is, at least to 
some extent, Japanese managerial usage of the three types of sanction threats as 
deterrents that has secured employee compliance with organizational norms and, thus, 
produced the strongest economic growth. Focusing on the two dominant and competitive 
forces in the world market, the present research explores cultural differences in 
noncompliant workplace behaviors among employees in Japanese and U.S. organizations 
as a result of the perceived threats o f shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions.
Every day we confront a variety of norms and rules and are expected to conform 
to them, ranging from severe sanction-captive legal ones (e.g., prohibition of homicide and 
stealing) to sanction-free moral ones (e.g., obedience to parents and teachers). 
Nevertheless, it is quite natural that we, as creatures with emotional motives to gain 
rewards, should feel tempted to engage in ill^ai and/or immoral behaviors. Eventually, in 
the face of temptations, some individuals violate norms while others do not. Some are not 
deterred from wrongdoing while others are.
This is a central issue which has been addressed by criminologists with their 
emphasis on the concept of deterrence in social control process. Recently, scholars have 
articulated a "rational choice decision-making theory of crime," attempting to answer the 
question: "Why do some people not engage in criminal behaviors?" (Grasmick. Blackwell, 
Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev,
1993). Grounded in the utilitarian perspective, this theory assumes humans are rational 
thinkers who act on the basis o f  their estimates of potential costs from projected behaviors 
(Geerken & Gove, 1975).
Typically, researchers have focused on the three potential costs of shame, 
embarrassment and legal sanctions that emanate from three different 
sources—conscience, significant others, and state legitimacy—and possess two 
dimensions of certainty and severity of the punishment. Shame, or guilt-feelings, is a self- 
imposed informal cost individuals might experience when they offend their conscience by 
engaging in an act they consider morally wrong. Embarrassment is a socially imposed 
informal cost individuals might experience when they lose respect from significant others 
by violating norms supported by those people (e.g., teachers, parents, employers). Legal 
sanctions are a state-imposed formal cost individuals might experience in the form of 
material and physical deprivations (e.g., fines and incarceration). Evidence is 
accumulating that these three punishment threats (shame, embarrassment, and legal 
sanctions) operate independently as deterrents which individuals take into account in their 
decision to commit or not to commit a crime (e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, 
Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993).
From the sociological point of view, these three perceived punishment threats have 
been restricted to U.S. society. The rational choice decision-making theory of crime gives 
no account of why people in some societies might perceive higher threats of these 
punishments and, therefore, be less noncompliant than people in other societies. Since 
scholars and researchers have exclusively examined the utility of the theory for explaining
crime among adults in the U.S., t h ^  have failed to speculate about the relationships 
between societal conditions and perceived sanction threats.
Besides, the examination o f the deterrent effects of these punishment threats has 
been confined to the domain o f criminality. The sole focus o f attention has been on 
projected criminal acts or "noncompliance with legal norms. " In view of ubiquitous norms 
in all social settings, however, there is no theoretical reason why these perceived sanction 
threats cannot be extended to other types of noncompliant behaviors. In particular, 
deterrence in the workplace is an important area of inquiry. It is important because it 
fosters employee compliant behaviors—and compliant behaviors, as a central element of 
organizational structure, subtly but directly af&cts the achievement of corporate profits. 
Organizations, in fact, have a vested interest in minimizing employee noncompliant 
behaviors (HoUinger & Clark, 1982).
During the past 30 years, a plethora of studies of occupational compliance have 
been conducted in the field of communication. Since two influential studies by Marweli 
and Schmitt ( 1967a, b), much eflbrt has been devoted to developing classification schemes 
of compliance-gaining strategies and identifying the rationales behind selection of 
strategies (Seibold, Cantril, & Meyers, 1985). The emphasis has been on superiors, with 
hardly any theory and research concerning why and how employees reach the decision to 
comply and act accordingly. Communication scholars and researchers have failed to 
seriously explore the deterrent efikcts of shame, embarrassment, and management 
sanctions that employees might take into account in their decision-making process about 
compliance with organizational norms across cultures.
Purposes o f the Study
As a first step to productive theorizing about deterrence in the workplace, the 
present research conceptualizes the deterrent effects of perceived threats o f shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions on noncompliance with organizational norms. 
These three types of sanction threats are theoretically important in predicting and
explaining rational choices made by employees and their subsequent behaviors. Drawing 
on the rational choice decision-making theory of crime (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990), 
shame, or guilt-feelings, refers to a self-imposed informal cost employees may experience 
when th ^  oifend their conscience by involvement in a noncompliant act they consider 
morally wrong. Embarrassment refers to a socially imposed informal cost employees may 
experience when they lose interpersonal respect for violating norms endorsed by 
significant other employees (e.g., supervisors and colleagues). Management sanctions 
refer to an administratively imposed formal cost employees may experience in the form of 
material and physical deprivations (e.g., fines, discharges).
As a second step toward theorizing about deterrence in the workplace, the current 
research empirically examines cultural differences in noncompliant workplace acts as a 
result of cultural differences in the perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and 
management sanctions. Culture, as a crucial factor in programming our perceptions 
(Gudykunst & Kim, 1991), would seem to wield a powerful influence on the extent to 
which each o f the three sanction threats is perceived in the workplace (c.f, Brahhwaite, 
1989) and, subsequently, determine the prevalence of noncompliant behaviors. The 
present study explores, therefore, the extent to which cultural differences in noncompliant 
tendencies are linked to cultural differences in the perceived levels of punishment ttueats 
o f shame, embarrassment, and formal management sanctions for employees in Japanese 
and U.S. organizations.
Four hypotheses are posited concerning cultural differences in the noncompliant 
behaviors. The first three hypotheses to be tested are that Japanese employees perceive 
higher levels o f threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions than do 
American employees. It is argued that "collectivity" is a central fector in creating these 
expected cultural differences in the perceived levels of sanction threats. It logically 
follows, then, that cultural differences (American vs. Japanese) may indirectly affect 
overall workplace deviance tendencies through perceived threats o f shame,
embarrassment, and m aniem ent sanctions in a direction suggesting that employees in 
Japanese organizations are less noncompliant than are those in U.S. organizations. The 
theoretical reasons to expect less noncompliance among Japanese than American 
employees are summarized as follows: (a) noncompliance is a function o f all three sanction 
threats and (b) all three threats are perceived as more likely among Japanese employees 
than among American employees. To justify these theoretical links, two major theories 
are integrated: (a) cultural variability on the individualism-collectivism dimension of 
Hofstede ( 1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) and (b) rational choice decision­
making theory of crime by Grasmick and his colleagues (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & 
Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993).
A third step toward theorizing about deterrence in the workplace is to realize that 
culture may affect not only the perceived level of but also the magnitude of the deterrent 
effect of each of the three sanction threats. To explain employee noncompliant behaviors, 
a theory is required which recognizes that the deterrent efifects of the three sanctions might 
vary in magnitude across cultures. Secondarily, therefore, the present research explores 
statistical interaction efifects for culture and the three sanction threats. It is predicted that 
the threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions are stronger deterrents 
for employees in Japanese organizations than for those in U.S. organizations. Again, 
cultural variability on the individualism-collectivism dimension of Hofstede (1980, 1983, 
1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) is intertwined with the rational choice decision-making 
theory of crime by Grasmick and his colleagues (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 
1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993) to ofifer rationales 
for the predictions.
Significance of the Study
The implications o f the current research are significant theoretically and practically. 
Theoretically, the present study will enrich rational choice decision-making theory 
(Grasmick & Bursik, 1990), expanding it beyond the study of crime in U.S. society. The
theory will become richer because, along with the generalizability o f conclusions from 
previous studies, many new statements regarding contextual and cultural "specifics" will 
be added to the statements of presumably "universal" deterrent effects o f informai and 
formal sanctions. The deterrent effects observed among employees in Japanese 
organizations will help demonstrate generalizability and, perhaps, will provide a 
perspective for integrating contextual and cultural "specifics" into the theory in a way that 
strengthens its predictive and explanatory power.
Equally important, the present study will offer communication scholars 
theoretically vital information not only about why, but also how employees, as active 
information processors, reach the decision to comply or not to comply with organizational 
norms. The emphasis on perceived sanction threats as deterrents will advance our 
knowledge of noncompliance from the influencée or compliance-providers' perspectives.
The pragmatic significance o f the study lies in its utility for specialists interested in 
multinational and international organizational development, as well as for management 
practitioners who are losing to foreign competition even on their home ground. If the 
hypotheses that the three types o f perceived sanction threats operate as deterrents are 
confirmed, it follows that to secure compliance, specialists and practitioners should focus 
more on emotional pains of shame and embarrassment, as well as material and physical 
deprivations o f management sanctions. Specifically, findings about the hypothesized 
cultural variabilities in the perceived levels of and in the m^nitudes o f deterrent effects of 
three sanction threats will help practitioners and organizational leaders become aware of 
their culturally programmed assumptions (Etzioni, 1975), increase cultural knowledge 
(Gudykunst & Kim, 1991), and aid the development o f managerial persuasive strategies. 
Indeed, these can become managerial strategic advantages.
Chapter 2:
Compliance Theory in the Field of Communication:
Theory, Research, and Criticism
Theory
The communication model o f compliance draws on the elements o f social influence 
and control to make predictions concerning individual differences in the use of 
compliance-gaining strategies. It is assumed that the accuracy of our predictions of 
compliance-gaining behavior may be furthered, at least to some degree, by joining it with 
the notion of social control and influence—a view supported by Marweli and Schmitt 
(1967a, b).
The assumptions of Marweli and Schmitt ( 1967a, b) established a solid basis for 
current compliance-gaining theory and, as the theoretical stimulus, sparked a flurry of 
empirical research in the field of communication. Their argument is built on the social 
psychological perspective that all behavior is goal-oriented. They argue that all actions are 
attempts to restructure the environment to satisfy some desire. As people try to get others 
to act in ways they desire, they vary in the ways they exercise interpersonal influence or 
control. Thus, Marweli and Schmitt conclude that individual usage of social and 
interpersonal control in pursuit o f compliance should be translated into selection of 
compliance-gaining strategies.
A key insight that Marweli and Schmitt (1967a, b) brought to this topic is the idea 
o f a behavioral "repertoire" o f compliance-gaining strategies. They directly investigate 
how people strategically vary in their attempts to gain compliance of others. As they 
acknowledge (1990), findings restricted to specific fi)rms of compliance-gaining behavior 
had already existed. For example, French and Raven (1960) had published a very 
influential research piece concerning the bases of social power. Jones (1964) had 
introduced the notion of "ingratiatioiL" Weinstein and Deutchberger (1964) had described
the effects of "altercasting" in interactions. Learning theories had predicted the effects of 
reward and punishment. However, no systematic attempt had been made to generate a list 
of potential compliance-gaining behaviors.
Marweli and Schmitt's attempts to create an inclusive list of compliance-gaining 
strategies are apparent in their two articles published in 1967. In their often overlooked 
Sociological Quarterly article. Marweli and Schmitt ( 1967a) drew on "interpersonal 
control" exemplars from general social influence literature (e.g., Etzioni, 1961; French & 
Raven, I960; Goffman, 1969; Skiimer, 1953) to offer a synthesis that consists o f six 
compliance-gaining strategies: physical force, aversive stimulation, punishment, reward, 
pointing up reward contingencies, and manipulating situational stimuli. Although they 
were aware that this list was preliminary, they nonetheless felt comfortable in asserting 
that "most, if not all, actors will be able to use each strategy to at least some minimal 
degree" (1967a, p. 326).
In their widely cited Sociometrv article. Marweli and Schmitt (1967b, p. 351) 
presented "clusters of compliance-gaining techniques that empirically covary through 
actors in terms o f their perceived probability of enactment" to derive strategies. They 
reviewed a wider set of power and influence literature (e g., Etzioni, 1961; French & 
Raven, 1960; Goffman, 1969; Kelman, 1961; Parsons, 1963; Weinstein & Deutchberger, 
1963) and deductively selected 16 potential compliance-gaining behaviors: promise, 
threat, positive expertise, negative expertise, liking, pregiving, adverse stimulation, debt, 
moral appeaL positive self-feeling, negative self-feeling, positive altercasting, negative 
altercasting, altruism, positive esteem, and negative esteem. To generate clusters of 
techniques that covary, they then provided a sample of college students with a list o f the 
16 techniques. The college students were asked to indicate the likelihood that they would 
use each of the 16 techniques in four situations: job, family, sales, and roommate.
Factor analysis indicates five categories o f compliance-gaining behaviors. The first 
factor consists of three techniques—pregiving, liking, and promise. Since these three
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represent active manipulation o f the target's environment in a positive way, Marweli and 
Schmitt ( 1967b) define this factor as a "rewarding" strategy. The second factor includes 
two techniques—threat and aversive stimulation. According to Marweli and Schmitt, 
these two refer to explicit negative manipulation of the target's environment and, 
therefore, are labeled a "punishing" strategy. The third factor consists o f both expertise 
techniques, positive and negative, and, accordingly, is titled an "expertise " strategy. The 
fourth factor includes four techniques—negative self-feeling, positive altercasting, moral 
appeal, and positive self-esteem. These are defined as "activation of impersonal 
commitments." The last factor consists of fi)ur techniques that appear, at least on the 
surface, in sharp contrast to the techniques involved in the fourth factor—altruism, 
negative esteem, debt, and negative altercasting. These are characterized as "activation o f 
personal commitments."
Avoiding any reference to strategies or techniques in the taxonomy proposed in 
their 1967a article, Marweli and Schmitt (1967b) conclude that these five factors 
correspond with the bases of power identified by French and Raven (I960) as follows: 
"rewarding activity" with "reward" power; "punishing activity" with "coercive" power; 
"expertise" with "expert " power, "personal commitments" with "referent" power, 
"impersonal commitments" with "legitimate" power. They argue that the observed 
differences in technique usage by their respondents probably reflect strategic differences in 
the use o f interpersonal "power" the respondents believe t h ^  possess in the four 
situations. In their view, exercise of interpersonal power underlies selection of 
compliance-gaining strategies.
Much of theory and research on compliance-gaining in the field of communication 
follows assumptions by Marweli and Schmitt (1967a, b). Communication scholars and 
researchers support the view that attempting to gain the compliance of another is one sort 
of purposeful behavior. Seibold, Cantril, and Meyers (1985) elaborate this view as they 
state that theories and research on compliance-gaining in the field of communication start
with the following assumptions that;
( I ) messages are generated from persons' intentions to communicate something 
about themselves, others, and the world they experience; (2) communication is 
instrumental in that sense, and may be fimctionaiiy organized by the conscious and 
unconscious purpose; and (3) actors' behaviors reflect intentionally directed 
and deliberately organized efforts to accomplish specific, personally meaningful 
interactional goals (p. 554).
To achieve these goals, communication scholars and researchers maintain people 
must get others to act in ways they desire. As people decide how they want others to act, 
they go about wielding influence over the others—and the influence attempts are 
translated into the selection of compliance-gaining strategies. Thus, the interactional 
quality of compliance-gaining is control-oriented in nature. As Seibold. CantriL, and 
Meyer emphasize ( 1985, p. 551). it is especially control-oriented in terms of "strategic and 
tactical features of actors' regulative and persuasive communication influence attempts."
Indeed, there has been an extensive focus on anticipated and/or actual strategies— 
strategies that subsume specific (often multiple) message tactics appropriate to the 
compliance-seekers' instrumental purposefs) (Seibold, Cantrill, & Meyers, 1985). 
Communication scholars and researchers concentrate on situations in which compliance- 
seekers' communication is strategically organized in the service o f their instrumental 
objectives, especially inducing or persuading another to behaviorally comply with a 
specific recommendation or request.
Miller, Boster, Rolofl^ and Seibold (1977) are among the first scholars to extend 
Marwell and Schmitt's studies into the field of communication. They rely on the Marwell 
and Schmitt's (1967b) taxonomy of 16 compliance-gaining techniques as an aid in 
conducting the following trifold research: (a) identifying clusters o f techniques, and 
classifying communication compliance-gaining strategies available for potential 
persuaders, (b) examining the effects of situational differences on choice of compliance- 
gaining strategies, and (c) assessing the relationships between individual differences of
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potential persuaders and their selection of compliance-gaining strategies.
To achieve this. Miller et al. (1977) provided 168 college students with lists of the 
16 strategies identified by Marwell and Schmitt ( 1967b). Respondents were asked to rate 
on eight-point Likert-type scales how likely they would be to employ each o f the 16 
strategies in each of four hypothetical situations. The situations varied in the extent to 
which they were interpersonal or noninterpersonal in nature and whether the outcomes in 
each influence situation carried short-term or long-term consequences for the 
persuader/persuadee relationship depicted. In accord with Miller and Steinberg's (1975) 
conceptualization, noninterpersonal situations refer to transactions where an interactant's 
ability to predict the probable outcomes of alternative message strategies is based solely 
on sociological and cultural data about another. Interpersonal situations, on the other 
hand, are defined as transactions organized on the basis o f more discriminating predictions 
about another's unique, psychological characteristics and probable reactions to specific 
messages. The terms "long-term consequences" and "short-term consequences" refer to 
the longevity of the relational effects created by un/successful social influence.
Cluster analysis reveals that strategy selection is situationally determined and that 
no reliable smaller typology of strategies can be obtained across situations to serve as a 
basis for a taxonomy of compliance-gaining message strategies. Although a general 
preference for socially acceptable, reward-oriented strategies is found in all situations, 
considerable diversity is uncovered in the selection of other strategies across situations. 
For instance, while a greater reliance on threat tactics is reported in noninterpersonal 
situations, a greater variety in choice of other strategies is also observed in those 
situations. In conclusion. Miller et al. (1977) encourage others to more systematically 
analyze situational contexts, as well as roles o f source characteristics in message selection 
and effects o f situation-by-person interactions on compliance-gaining strategy choices.
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Research
Much of research on compliance-gaining in the field of communication is an 
outgrowth of research by Marwell and Schmitt ( 1967a, b) and Miller et al. ( 1977). The 
most visible line of communication research on compliance-gaining is to systematically 
explore the range of compliance-gaining message strategies and tactics and to elaborate 
factors involved in their enactment. Researchers also have attempted to reduce the 
multitude of possible behaviors into meaningful clusters or strategies and, in so doing, to 
examine different rationales behind the selection of clusters.
Broadly, communication researchers emphasize (a) situation perception and 
categorization, (b) personality traits and attitudes, and (c) demographic characteristics as 
potential rationales for the choice of compliance-gaining strat%ies (see Boster, 1990). 
Cody and McLaughlin (1985), for example, offer a number of situational dimensions 
which seemingly are relevant across various kinds of interpersonal persuasive situations. 
Among these are intimacy (Baxter, 1984; Clark, 1979; Fitzpatrick & Winke, 1979; Miller, 
Boster, Roloff & Seibold, 1977), relational consequences (Clark, 1979; Cody, Greene, 
Marston, Baaske, O'Hair, & Scheneider, 1985; Cody & McLaughlin, 1980; Miller,
Boster, Roloff & Seibold, 1977; Miller & Steinberg, 1975; Roloff & Bamicott, 1978), 
right to persuade (Cody, Greene, Marston, Baaske, O'Hair, & Scheneider, 1985; 
McLaughlin, Cody, & Robey, 1980), personal benefits (Cody et al., 1985), resistance 
(Cody et al., 1985; Sillars, 1980), and situation apprehension (Cody et al., 1985).
There is considerable evidence that when the parties o f the compliance-gaining 
transaction are close (characterized as an encounter of high intimacy), individuals are more 
inclined to employ emotional appeals and positive interpersonal strategies, and are more 
willing to negotiate. Clark (1979), for example, reported that when persuaders have a 
high desire for liking from target persons, they are more likely to rely on the strategy 
"offer assistance in solving problems" than when the persuaders have a low desire for 
liking from the target persons. These findings are supported by Fitzpatrick and Winke
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( 1979), as they observe that married individuals are more likely to use emotional appeals 
and personal rejection, while the casually involved are more likely to use a manipulative or 
non-negotiation strategy. Miller et al. ( 1977) also discovered that people are more apt to 
utilize a positive manipulation stra te^  in interpersonal situations, while they are more apt 
to utilize a justifying strategy in noninterpersonal situations.
Source characteristics, or personality traits and attitudes, function as another 
potential rationale for the selection of compliance-gaining strategies. Extensive research 
has been devoted to the impact o f cognitive complexity (O'Keefe & Delia, 1979), 
communication apprehension (Koper & Boster, 1988; Lustig & King, 1980), dogmatism 
(Boster & Stiff, 1984; Neuliep, 1986; Roloff & Bamicott, 1979), and Machiavellianism 
(Boster & Stiff 1984; Pandy & Rastogi, 1979; Roloff & Bamicott, 1978) on compliance- 
gaining strategies.
Two individual difference variables, Machiavellianism and dogmatism, have 
received a plethora o f research attention. Roloff and Bamicott ( 1978) reported 
significant but moderate relationships between Machiavellianism and message selection. 
This personality trait was positively correlated with the use of pro-social and antisocial 
techniques. Using Roloff s (1976) conceptualization, pro-social strategies are defined by 
Roloff and Bamicott as strategies seeking relational and instrumental rewards by revealing 
information about the source's position and attitudes. Antisocial strategies, on the other 
hand, refer to strategies pursuing such rewards through force or deception. In another 
study, Roloff and Bamicott (1979) demonstrated significant but moderate correlations 
between dogmatism and selection of message tactics. As with Machiavellianism, 
dogmatism was positively related with the average use o f pro-social and two antisocial 
techniques—psychological force and punishing activity techniques.
Williams and Boster (1981) verified several of these findings. First, in their 
reanalysis of Roloff and Bamicott's (1979) data, they demonstrated a significant but 
moderate positive mean correlation between dogmatism and compliance-gaining message
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selection. Then, in their analysis o f Williams and Bostefs data, they found a significant 
but moderate positive mean correlation between dogmatism and message choices. Finally, 
incorporating many variables already explored in compliance-gaining research, Williams 
and Boster determined that negativism, perceived benefit to listener, and dogmatism had 
substantial effects on message choices, but Machiavellianism was an "experimental dead­
end."
The third possible rationale behind the choice of compliance-gaining strategies is 
demographic characteristics, such as gender (Andrews, 1987; Bisanz & EUile, 1989; 
Burgoon, Dillard, Koper, & Doran, 1984; DeTurck, 1985; DeTurck & Miller, 1982;
Falbo. 1977; Falbo & Peplau, 1980; Fitzpatrick & Winke, 1979; Instone, Major & Bunker, 
1983; LulofFs, 1982; Offerman & Schrier, 1985), age (Clark & Delia, 1976; Clark, O’Dell, 
& Willihnganz. 1986; Delia, Kline & Burleson, 1979; Finley & Humphereys, 1974), and 
culture (Hirokawa & Miyahara, 1986; Neuliep & Hazelton, 1985).
There is accumulating evidence concerning gender difierences in the choice of 
message strategies. Luloffs ( 1982), for example, reported that males tend to rely more on 
threats in seeking compliance firom male fiiends, while females tend to rely more on 
negative self-feeling and altercasting in seeking compliance from male and female fiiends, 
respectively. DeTurck and Miller ( 1982) found that males and females differ in their 
likelihood o f use o f four o f Marwell and Schmitt's (1967b) techniques in a hypothetical 
class project situation. Females were more likely than males to choose positive and 
negative expertise appeals, whereas males were more likely than females to rely on 
promises and threats in seeking compliance from their classmates. Fitzpatrick and Winke 
(1979) also observed a number o f significant gender differences in the use of compliance- 
gaining strategies in same sex fiiendship situations. Males were more apt than females to 
exercise non-negotiation strategies with their best fiiend. Females, on the other hand, 
were more inclined than males to seek compliance fi’om thmr fiiends by the strategies o f 
personal rejection, empathie understanding, or emotional appeals.
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Prior to further review of the literature, it should be noted that there are three 
major procedures communication researchers follow to study compliance-gaining 
strategies: (a) message selection, (b) message generation, and (c) message behavior (see 
Boster, 1990). In the message selection procedure, researchers provide respondents with 
a compliance-gaining scenario and a list o f messages. The respondents are then asked 
how likely they would be to use each message in a particular situation. These message 
lists are usually generated by the researchers (e.g., see Marwell & Schmitt, 1967b; Miller 
et ai., 1977; Miller & Steinberg, 1975). In the message generation procedure, researchers 
present respondents with a description o f a compliance-gaining situation. They then ask 
the respondents to report orally or in writing what they would say in order to gain 
compliance from the target person. These responses are then coded by the researchers 
into categories, rating scales, or both. Delia Kline, and Burleson (1979), for example, 
coded the generated messages in terms o f the extent to which each message was adapted 
to the listener (see also Clark, 1979). Finally, in the message behavior procedure, 
researchers examine compliance-gaining messages uttered in situations where the speaker 
and the target are engaged in message exchange. For example, Boster and Stiff (1984) 
analyzed the messages transmitted by experimental participants in negotiating the 
allocation of rewards following an anagram task. Lofthouse (1985) also investigated the 
message behavior o f students arguing about a grade with their professors.
Managerial Compliance-Gaining Strategies
The exercise o f influence or control is basic to organizational management 
because, at least to some extent, it serves both managers' and organizations' goals. As 
Kipnis, Schmidt, SwafBn-Smhh, and Wilkinson (1984) state:
Sometimes influence is used for such personal reasons as securing personal 
benefits. . . .  Most often, however, it is used in the course o f performing 
organizational roles that require influencing others—for example, to encourage 
others to perform effectively, to promote new ideas, or to introduce new work 
procedures. Frequently, a combination of personal and organizational reasons
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underlie the exercise o f influence (pp. 58-59).
Unfortunately, there exists little research that directly addresses questions about 
communication and interpersonal influence in organizational contexts. Kipnis et aL (1984, 
p. 59) assert that "despite the fact that the essence o f managerial work is the exercise of 
influence, there is a paucity o f systematic research on the ways in which managers attendit 
to change the behavior o f others." To date, few researchers have given any systematic 
attention to the choice o f specific managerial compliance-gaining stra t^es. That 
specificity is crucial if determination o f types and efifbctiveness o f compliance-gaining 
strategies is a goal. Riccillo and Trenholm ( 1983) concur with this analysis as they 
suggest that:
One o f the most important decisions a manager must make in organizations to d ^  
is that of determining effective communication strategies to influence subordmates. 
Notwithstanding Etzioni's findings that organizations like to specialize in certain 
modes of influence, managers differ in preferred style o f leadership and power 
preference. Subordinates respond differently to different types of man^eriai 
influence and have definite preferences for certain forms o f influence over others 
(p. 323).
Some communication research exists on interpersonal influence in the 
organizational context. Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson ( 1980), for example, examined 
tactics used by managers to influence their superiors, co-workers, and subordinates. Their 
study was conducted in two steps. In the first step, relying on a mess%e generation 
procedure, these researchers provided managers with written descriptions o f an incident in 
which they were attempting to influence either their superiors, co-workers, or 
subordinates. The managers were then asked to report in writing what th ^  would sqr m 
order to influence each o f these three types o f target employees. Through content 
analysis, a total o f370 tactics grouped into 14 categories were identified. In the second 
step, using a message selection procedure, Kipnis et al. rewrote the 370 influence tactics 
into a 58-item questionnaire. Respondents were then asked to indicate the extent to which
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they would use each tactic to influence their superiors, co-workers, or subordinates.
Factor analysis identified an eight-factor solution labeled as assertiveness (demanding, 
ordering), integration (making others feel important, humbling oneself), rationality 
(explaining reasons), sanctions (administrative punishment such as prevention of salary 
increases), exchange o f benefits (oflfering an exchange o f favors), upward appeal (invoking 
the influence o f higher levels), blocking (threaten to stop working), and coalitions (obtain 
support o f co workers).
Kipnis et al. (1980) determined that the selection o f these influence strategies was 
based on the following five factors: (a) relative power of the manners and their targets of 
influence (the higher the status of the target person, the more reliance on rationality 
tactics; the lower the status, the more reliance on assertive tactics and sanctions); (b) 
reasons for exercising influence (assertiveness for improving performance and assigning 
work, and ingratiation for seeking personal assistance); (c) organizational status of the 
managers (the higher the status, the more use of rationality, assertiveness, and sanctions); 
(d) organizational size (the larger, the more reliance on assertiveness, sanctions, and 
upward appeal); and (e) union of the organization (if unionized, more reliance on 
ingratiation with subordinates, less reliance on assertiveness with co-workers, and less 
reliance on rationality and more blocking with bosses).
Several of these findings are echoed by other researchers. Rim and Erez (1980) 
and Erez and Rim ( 1982), for example, reported a greater usage of rational strategies 
when influencing one's superior, and a greater us%e o f clandestine, exchange, or 
administrative sanction strategies when influencing one's subordinates (see also Erez, Rim, 
& Keider, 1986). Kipnis and Cohen (1980) also found that strategy selection was, at least 
to some extent, related to (a) dominance (the more dominant, the greater use of 
assertiveness and negative administrative sanctions); (b) right to persuade (the higher 
rights in assigning work, the greater use o f assertiveness); (c) personal benefits (the higher 
desire o f benefit fi'om a superior, the greater use of exchange and ingratiation; the higher
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desire of benefit from a co worker, the greater use o f exchange, ingratiation, and blocking; 
the higher desire o f benefit from a subordinate, the greater use of assertiveness and 
coalition); and (d) perceived resistance (the more resistance, the greater use of negative 
sanctions).
fn another research study, Kipnis. Schmidt, SwafBn-Smhh, and Wilkinson ( 1984) 
used similar techniques o f written descriptions to examine man%erial influence strategies 
in three different countries; the Unhed States, England, and Australia. Factor analysis 
suggested seven factors labeled as assertiveness, fiiendliness, reason, sanctioning, 
bargaining, higher authority, and coalition. There was no significant variation reported in 
the use of strategies across managers. However, these researchers discovered that the 
selection of influence strategies was based, at least to some extent, on the following three 
factors: (a) the manager's power (the more powerful, the stronger strategies are used such 
as assertiveness); (b) the manager's objectives (in seeking benefits, friendliness is most 
ofren used; in persuading another to accept a new idea, reason is used); and (c) the 
manager's expectation o f success (if success o f influence seems unlikely, more 
assertiveness and sanctions are utilized).
Using a message selection procedure, Riccillo and Trenholm ( 1983) provided 
evidence of individual differences in the use of managerial influence strategies. These 
researchers predicted that "trust" of subordinates would influence managerial choice of 
three types o f strategies: coercion, reward, and persuasion (rational reason). To test this 
prediction, a sample o f managers was presented with two scenarios: one involving trusted 
(internally motivated) subordinates and a second involving distrusted (externally 
motivated) subordinates. Respondents were then asked to choose the type o f strategy 
they would use in each scenario. As predicted, managers reported using persuasion 
strategy more often in the "trusted" workers' scenario and coercion strategy more often in 
the "distrusted" workers' scenario.
In their cross-cultural research, Hirokawa and Miyahara (1986) relied on a
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message generation procedure to examine cultural differences in the use o f man^erial 
influence strategies in U.S. and Japanese companies. Positing no specific hypothesis, these 
researchers presented American and Japanese male managers with two hypothetical 
compliance-gaining situations. They then asked the managers to describe what they would 
say to their subordinate in order to alter his/her behavior in each situation. The first 
situation required the managers to persuade their subordinate to perform an obligatory 
work-related action (e.g., report to work on time). The second situation required the 
managers to persuade their subordinate to perform a non-obligatory work-related action 
(e.g., communicate ideas and suggestions to management).
Through content analysis, a total o f 139 influence strategies were grouped into a 
"19-category mutually-exclusive coding system" (Hirokawa & Miyahara, 1986, p. 254). 
Different strategy usage was observed depending on whether the managers were American 
or Japanese and whether their goal was to influence subordinates' "obligatory work related 
actions" or "non-obligatory work-related actions." Under the obligatory condition, 
American managers relied more often on punishment-based strategies (e.g., threat, 
warning, or ultimatum), while Japanese managers relied more often on altruism or 
rationale-based strategies (e.g., duty or counsel). Under the non-obligatory condition, 
American managers were found to more often use rationale- or reward-based strategies 
(e.g., direct request, promise, ingratiation), while Japanese managers used more altruism- 
based strategies (duty or altruism).
Criticism
While many insights can be derived from research on compliance-gaining in the 
workplace, there is a significant criticism o f compliance theory in the field of 
communication. This criticism involves the omission o f the compliance-providers' or, 
more specifically, subordinates' perspectives presumably relevant to the explanation of 
compliance-gaining interactions.
Research interest in occupationally related compliance-gaining activity has been
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one-sided, focusing exclusively on the potential persuader (m anner) as an active element 
in the interpersonal persuasive attempt. Typically, most communication scholars and 
researchers use the term "compliance " in the workplace to mean a response o f 
subordinates that would not have otherwise occurred without managers' strategy usage. A 
manager determines what he or she wants the subordinate to do, considers various 
influence strategies, selects the strategy with the fewest repercussions, and uses it to seek 
conformity from the subordinate. Thus, the focus is on the purposeful sought-after 
behaviors in various forms o f compliance-gaining strategies. Compliance-gaining 
situations are calibrated exclusively from the point of view o f the managers.
Consequently, the emphasis has been on superiors with hardly any theory and 
research regarding why and how subordinates reach a decision to comply. My search 
uncovered not a single study focusing on compliance-providers, that is, subordinates' 
decision-making process to comply or not to comply. Communication scholars and 
researchers have failed to seriously address the situation in which the recipient o f a 
particular compliance-gaining message (the subordinate) may decide to resist compliance 
for some reasons (for exceptions, see instructional communication literature such as 
Burroughs, Kearney, & Plax, 1989; Kearney, Plax, & Burroughs, 1991; Lee, Levine, & 
Cambra, 1997; McQuillen, Higginbotham, & Cummings, 1984). This failure is ironic in 
light of the interactional view that both the compliance-seekers and compliance-providers 
(superiors and subordinates, respectively, as used in the present study), as active 
information processors, form compliance-gaining interactions. Both pursue competing 
agendas. Yet, a recent extensive review o f research on compliance-gaining (Kelierman & 
Cole, 1994) does not even touch on the compliance-providers' perspectives.
The currem research draws from this criticism to propose that compliance- 
providefs perspectives can be integrated into compliance theory by focusing on the 
concept of deterrence utilized in the rational choice decision-making theory o f crime. This 
rational-choice perspective emphasizes ofifonders' (compliance-providers) strategic
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thinking, the ways that they process information and evaluate opportunities and 
alternatives. It stresses calculated decision-making, arguing that offenders (compliance- 
providers) choose how to act after estimating the likely costs or sanctions from an illegal 
behavior (Conklin, 1995). Applying this perspective to a different theoretical context, the 
present research posits that conscience and significant other employees fimction as agents 
of social control in a manner similar to m aniem ent. All three pose threats of costs that 
are more or less certain and severe which individuals take into account in deciding 
whether or not to violate organizational norms: (a) se lf imposed shame, (b) socially 
imposed embarrassment, and (c) management imposed physical and material deprivation. 
Thus, the present research begins with the basic compliance model as follows:
SHAME
EMBARRASSMENT ------------------------ ► COMPLIANCE
MANAGEMENT SANCTIONS-----
In addition, this study extends rational choice decision-making theory by utilizing a 
data set o f employees in Japanese and U.S. university hospitals. Extent literature suggests 
that there may be cultural differences in the extent to which each o f the three sanction 
threats is perceived as significant by Japanese and American employees (e.g., Braithwaite, 
1989). To delineate such differences, the present research integrates the theoretical 
variables o f individualism-collectivism from Hofstede's (1980) cultural variability into the 
rational choice decision-making theory. The culturally differentiated compliance model is 
then structured as follows:
SHAME
CULTURE ------- ► EMBARRASSMENT  ► COMPLIANCE
MANAGEMENT SANCTIONS
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Finally, this research proposes cultural differences in the extent to which 
employees are deterred by each o f the three sanction threats. Culture may affect not only 
the perceived level of, but also the magnitude of the deterrent effect o f each o f the three 
threats on subsequent organizational noncompliant behaviors. To rationalize this 
prediction, Hofstede's ( 1980) cultural variability o f individualism-collectivity is intertwined 
with the rational choice decision-making theory.
CULTURE
I
i
SHAME
EMBARRASSMENT COMPLIANCE
MANAGEMENT SANCTIONS
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Chapters:
Rational Choice Decision-Making Theory o f Crime
The rational choice decision-making perspective, a branch o f deterrence theory, is 
developed to advance our knowledge concerning "why some people do not violate the law 
while others do." Traditionally, deterrence research has focused on one type o f potential 
cost, the threat of state-imposed formal legal sanctions in the form o f physical and/or 
material deprivation. It views crime as a function o f rational decision-making about 
penalties imposed by state legislation. People regulate their behavior by calculating the 
threat of various legal sanctions such as capital punishment, jail sentence, and fines. 
Consequently, "the moral crusades, while usually instrumental in the passage o f legislation, 
directly appealed to a sense o f conscience, or what Etzioni ( 1988) calls the moral 
dimension,'" tends to be neglected (Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993, p. 41).
Grasmick and his colleagues (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; 
Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993) assert that there is a need 
to incorporate the moral dimension, along with legal sanctions, into a rational decision­
making model of crime. In doing so, they propose that the moral dimensions may be 
conceptualized as informal sanction threats o f shame and embarrassment that operate 
similarly to the threat o f legal sanctions.
The present research examines this proposition. Given this attempt to extend the 
concept o f deterrence to a different theoretical context, this chapter reviews Grasmick and 
his colleagues' rational choice decision-making theory which suggests that the perceived 
threats o f shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions that originate fi'om three different 
sources—conscience, significant others, and state legitimacy—affect criminality by 
decreasing the expected utility o f crime.
This chapter begins by briefly describing the notion o f deterrence, introducing 
historical views of deterrence by two classical theorists, Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy
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Bentham. Second, the notion o f perceptual deterrence is examined, discussing the issue o f 
type of data to test deterrence theory. Next the two relevant dimensions o f perceived 
sanctions, certainty and severity, are described. Then, the potential deterrent efifects of 
informal sanction threats are delineated. Finally, Grasmick and Bursik's integrated theory 
of rational choice decision-making is reviewed, with an emphasis on the three types o f 
perceived sanction threats. Findings associated with their propositions are also 
summarized.
Deterrence Theorv
The rational choice decision-making theory o f crime, a sociological model o f 
deterrence, is utilitarian, rationalist, and individualist. It assumes that an individual is a 
"profit maximizer, that is, a calculator o f profit firom estimates of gain and cost resulting 
from the projected act" (Geerken & Gove, 1975, p. 497). The individual is the decision­
making unit; he or she renders his or her own decisions. The individual makes a rational 
decision, within the confines of his or her estimates o f rewards and costs, about the 
projected act and, in consequence, behaves rationally. Thus, crime is a fimction of 
individual rational decision-making about pleasures and pains.
Deterrence theory focuses on punishment as a cost fitctor. Specifically, there 
appears to be a conclusion among criminologists that the threat o f legal sanctions serves as 
the only punishment. Scholars offer the view that rational actors take into account the 
state-imposed sanction threat in their "rational" decision concerning whether or not to 
commit a crime. In this view, individual perceptions o f the threat o f legal sanctions 
operate as a sole deterrent or negative inducement to the utility of crime.
Historical View of Deterrence
Many of the theoretical developments within the sociological model of deterrence 
originate fi'om works by Cesare Beccaria and Jerenqr SenthanL Their century-old 
assumptions established a solid basis for current deterrence theory and, as the theoretical 
stimulus, have spadted much o f the empirical research. Their works reflect, to a great
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degree, the philosophical arguments o f the social contract thinkers o f their day, including 
"Locke. Hobbes. Voltaire, and Rousseau, who emphasized hedonism, rationality, and free 
will as the underlying bases of human action" (Curran & RenzettL 1994. p. 7).
Beccaria and Bentham's claim that the function o f punishment is deterrence rather 
than revenge or retribution has wielded a profound influence on later theorizing about 
deterrence (Conklin, 1995). Beccaria ( 1764, 1963) rationalizes this claim as he argues 
that punishment is necessary because human beings are naturally self-serving. If left 
unrestrained, they would always attempt to maximize their personal pleasure even though 
this resulted in offending the rights and freedom of others. Punishment is needed, 
therefore, insomuch as it makes the negative consequences o f crime greater than its 
rewards.
Bentham shares much in common with Beccaria (Geis, 1955). He reasons that all 
human action is a result o f a single motivation—that is. the pursuit of pleasure and the 
simultaneous avoidance o f paim Naturally, humans would engage in rampant criminal acts 
to maximize their personal pleasure unless they were controlled by punishments. 
Punishments and sanctions should be established by law, therefore, so that they operate to 
make the choice to commit a crime more costly than not doing so. Thus, Bentham 
supports Beccaria's view that the purpose o f punishment is deterrence rather than 
vengeance.
Beccaria (1764, 1963) further points out that if punishment is to successMy deter 
crime, it must have, at least, three characteristics: certainty, swiftness, and 
proportionateness. He argues that for a punishment to function as an effective deterrent, 
it should not inflict tremendous pain, but instead, be inescapable. To Beccaria, "the 
certainty of a punishment, even if it be moderate, will always make a stronger impression 
than the fear of another that is more terrible but combined with the hope o f impunity” 
(1764, 1963, p. 58). Equally important, an offender should be tried as quickly as possible 
and, if judged guilty, receive the penalty promptly. Beccaria elaborates this prospect as he
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asserts that "the promptness of punishment is more usefiil because when the length o f time 
that passes between the punishment and the misdeed is less, so much the stronger and 
more lasting in the human mind is the association o f these two ideas, crime and 
punishment" (1764, 1963. p. 56). Finally, proportionate punishment serves as an effective 
deterrent. With his concern over the extreme harshness and cruelty o f the penalties 
imposed in his era, Beccaria states that any punishment should always be appropriate to 
the seriousness of the crime committed. Even the most serious and cruel crimes should be 
punished with a penalty that inflicts suffering "only to exceed the advantage derivable from 
the crime" (Beccaria, 1764, 1963, p. 44).
This proposition is supported by Bentham as he emphasizes the limits of severe 
punishment as an effective deterrent (Geis, 1955). He argues that to successfully inhibit 
crime, a punishment should only be so harsh as to produce enough pain to outweigh the 
pleasure derived from committing the forbidden act. To both Beccaria and Bentham, 
therefore, anything more severe is tyrannical.
Perceived Sanction Threats 
A deterrence doctrine is basically a perceptual theory. As a perceptual theory, 
deterrence theorists assume that perceived risks o f punishment and sanctions, rather than 
the actual risk, are the primary determinant o f criminal behavior (Geerken & Gove, 1975; 
Waldo & Chiricos, 1972). By now, empirical tests o f the perception of sanctions have 
become common, and evidence has been accumulating to support the assumption 
(Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & NfitcheU, 1993; Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980; Grasmick & 
Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993; Grasmick & Green, 1981; Greeken& 
Gove, 1975; Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, & Chiricos, 1983; Tittle, 1977).
However, in the past, deterrence theory was tested by analyzing correlations at the 
aggregate level. Typically, researchers obtained the total rate for a crime classification 
within a specific aggregate, such as states or cities, and examined how it was correlated 
with measures o f punishment for that same unit (e.g., Gibbs, 1968; Tittle, 1969). In a
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study of the relationship between certainty and severity o f punishment and criminal 
activity. Tittle ( 1969), for example, relied on published statistics about each state's prison 
sentencing and crimes reported by the police. To measure the certainty o f punishment, he 
used the "number o f admissions to state prisons for the years 1959-1963 divided by the 
number of crimes reported for the years 1958-1962" (1969, p. 412). To assess the 
severity of punishments, he utilized the mean duration o f prison term for felony prisoners 
released from state prison in 1960. To scale the amount o f deviance, he employed the 
rates for seven difrèrent types o f offenses computed as, "the ration of the mean annual 
number of crimes in that category for the years 1959 and 1962 divided by the population 
in 1960" (1969, p. 413).
Tittle ( 1969) reported as evidence of a deterrent effect significant and consistent 
inverse relationships between certainty of punishment and crime rates for all seven illegal 
behaviors (sex offenses, assaults, larceny, robbery, burglary, homicide, and auto theft). 
However, a significant inverse relationship existed between severity of punishment and 
crime rate only for homicide. Based on these findings, he raised the possibility that 
severity of punishment might act "as a deterrent only when there is high certainty of 
punishment" ( 1969, p. 417). In his view, severe punishment has marginal deterrent effects 
on the commission of crime.
Despite these significant findings. Tittle's (1969) study has been criticized because 
o f his use of available, aggregate rates of crime (see Waldo & Chiricos, 1972 for a 
summary of critique o f aggregate data analysis). First, the use o f published statistics 
causes Tittle to have such problems as unreliability o f the statistics. The crime statistics 
include only those offenses that are reported by the police and, in consequence, he foiled 
to consider criminal activity that went undetected. Second, the use of official statistics 
limits Tittle to seven "crime index" offenses. If a research fixais of attention is on 
deterrence for other types o f criminality (such as victimless crime or white collar crime), 
official statistics are o f little use. Finally, and more critically, the use of aggregate data
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inhibits Tittle from dealing with the issue o f perceptions. He was unable to discern social- 
psychological processes by which the presumed effects o f punishment were realized. His 
reported inverse relationship between severity and crime rates, in fact, reveals no 
information about how the penalties were perceived by potential offenders—or whether 
they were perceived at all.
Indeed, the issue o f type o f data is crucial when testing deterrence theory. While 
official aggregate data have been available for the study o f deterrence, alternative modes 
of analysis must be tried if some o f the remaining deterrence questions are to be answered. 
Specifically, to justify firm conclusions about the role o f informal sanctions as potential 
sources of deterrence, individual level data are necessary. The notion o f "cost" must be 
extended and captured in terms o f individual perceptions o f both formal and informal 
sanction threats.
To date, research on deterrence has shifted from a concern with relationships 
among aggregate properties (e.g., arrest rate and crime rate) to a concern with 
relationships between individuals' perceptions of sanctions and their involvement in illegal 
behavior (Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980). Jensen (1969), for example, offers evidence of a 
relationship between perceived risk of legal sanctions and self-reported delinquency in a 
sample of juveniles in grades seven through twelve. He paid special attention to beliefr 
regarding apprehension and punishment, which had been largely ignored in delinquency 
research, and predicted that such beliefs would be negatively related to both self reported 
and official delinquency. To measure self reported delinquency, Jensen asked respondents 
to indicate the number o f delinquent acts committed within a year prior to his analysis. 
Beliefr were operationalized as 'one's overall, general perception or belief regarding 
apprehension and punishment" (Jensen, 1969, p. 192). As such, belief was measured by 
responses to the following statement: "People who break the law are almost always caught 
and punished" (Jensen, 1969, p. 192). Findings supported his prediction that there is an 
inverse relationship between such belief and delinquency. The more strongly juveniles
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believe in apprehension and punishment, the less likely they report to participate in 
delinquent acts.
A concentration on the relationship between individuals' perceptions of sanctions 
and their behavior is believed to provide a more direct test o f deterrence theory. Even 
Gibbs ( 1968) and Tittle (1969), whose early research was on the relationship between 
properties of legal punishment and crime rates in aggregates, have advocated the necessity 
o f research at the level of an individual's perception and behavior. Gibbs ( 1975, p. 208), 
for example, notes that; "If individuals commit crimes because they have not been deterred 
and if individuals refrain from crimes because they have been deterred, then those who 
commit crimes tend to perceive punishment as less certain and/or less severe than do those 
who conform to laws." Tittle (1980, p. 10) also argues that today it is "generally 
conceded that individual perceptions o f sanction characteristics are probably more 
important than the actual characteristics o f sanctions."
Perceived Certaintv and Severity o f Sanctions 
Deterrence theory proposes that there are, at least, two relevant dimensions o f an 
individual's perceptions: perceived certainty and severity o f punishments (Grasmick, 
Blackwell, Bursik, & MitcheU, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & 
Ameklev, 1993; Grasmick & Green, 1980). These reflect the subjective probability 
(certainty) of incurring a particular cost and the magnitude (severity) o f that cost should it 
be incurred. The assumption is that rational actors, when deciding whether to commit an 
illegal act, estimate the probability o f receiving a legally imposed penalty and the 
magnitude of that penalty.
Measures of Perceived Certainty and Severity
Researchers consistently measure perceived certainty with questions about 
probability of apprehension. Typically, they ask respondents to estimate their own 
chances of being arrested and nearly all o f them report evidence o f significant inverse 
relationships between measures o f perceived certainty o f legal sanctions and involvement
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in illegal behavior (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Jacobs, & McCoUom, 1983: 
Tittle, 1969; Tittle, 1977; Waldo & Chiricos, 1972).
By contrast, as Grasmick and Bryjak ( 1980) observe, little effort has been devoted 
to developing a theoretically and empirically sound measure o f perceived severity of 
punishment. Many extant measures are available, but they are all apt to ignore the 
premises o f utilitarianism that "people's values differ—what is felt as extremely costly (or 
rewarding) by one individual may be considered insignificant by another" (Grasmick & 
Bryjak, 1980, p. 475). They presume that a particular penalty has the same meaning for 
all people (Grasmick & Appleton, 1977; Grasmick & Milligan, 1976; Tittle, 1969). This is 
not likely in reality, however. To illustrate, a fine of $100 for an illegal act would not be 
perceived as equally costly by all individuals. One individual might predict that a fine o f 
$ 100 would be a probable penalty if  apprehended, while another might predict a 30-day 
jail sentence. Due to differences in their personal values, however, the former might 
regard his or her expected penalty o f the fine more costly or severe than the latter (see 
Grasmick, Jacobs, & McCoUom, 1980, for this discussion). The seriousness o f a 
particular penalty is relevant to that individual's values.
Congruent with traditional utility theory, Grasmick and Bryjak ( 1980) have 
developed one o f the few valid indicators o f perceived severity. They asked respondents 
to "imagine you had been arrested and found guilty and the court had decided what your 
punishment would be" (Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980, p. 480). They then asked the 
respondents to "think about what that punishment probably would be for you," and 
indicate "how big a problem that punishment would create for your life" (Grasmick & 
Bryjak, 1980, p. 480). This operationalization avoids the presumption that a particular 
punishment is experienced as equally severe by all individuals. Unlike others, this measure 
taps an individual's subjective judgment o f how costly to him or her the penalty he or she 
expects would be, regardless o f what penalty he or she expects.
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Interaction Effects o f Perceived Certaintv and Severity
There is controversy regarding treatment o f the two relevant dimensions.
Grasmick and Bursik ( 1990) acknowledge that in social psychological literature on 
rational decision-making, scholars and researchers dispute whether the effects o f certainty 
and severity o f sanctions should be treated as additive or as multiplicative. In accord with 
traditional utility theory, however, the interaction hypothesis has been claimed as 
theoretically more important than the additive hypothesis to reduce the expected utility of 
crime (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980; 
Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993). If actors are rational, 
harsh punishments will have no deterrent effect when actors perceive no probability of 
being apprehended, but will have a greater deterrent effect when they are quite certain to 
be apprehended. Thus, in a rational choice perspective, individuals are assumed to 
"multiply the probability (certainty) o f punishment times the expected magnitude (severity) 
of punishment to arrive at a projected cost" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 846).
Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) have reported evidence of a potential interaction 
effect o f perceived certainty and severity on illegal behavior (see also Grasmick & Bursik, 
1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993). They found that perceived severity, at 
relatively high levels of perceived certainty, had a significant deterrent effect on self- 
reports o f involvement in illegal activities. Only among people who believed the certainty 
was relatively high, an inverse and significant relationship existed between perceived 
severity and involvement in illegal behavior. These findings support the interaction 
hypothesis that the magnitude of the perceived severity on involvement in illegal behavior 
is a fimction o f the level o f perceived certainty.
Informal Sanction Threats 
By deterrence, Beccaria and Bentham meant, at least on the surfiice, the inhibition 
of criminal activity by state-imposed legal penalties or sanctions. In their view, when 
those penalties are perceived to be weakened, crime rates are expected to rise.
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Consistent with this view, deterrence theory and research has drawn special attention to 
one type of potential cost, the threat o f state-imposed legal sanctions in the form o f 
physical and/or material deprivation. A majority o f research efforts has focused on the 
relationship between individuals' perceptions o f the state-imposed official penalties and 
their involvement in illegal behavior.
However, legal sanctions are not the only source of compliance with the law. A 
sole focus on formal legal sanctions is inadequate for examinations o f deterrence theory. 
Grasmick and Bursik (1990) note that while some prefer to restrict the term "deterrence" 
to legal sanctions, there is no reason to do so. They point to Meier, Burkett, and 
Hickman's ( 1984) argument that in everyday usage, to be deterred is to refirain from 
wrongdoing out o f fear o f a variety of consequences. These adverse consequences need 
not be limited, therefore, to punishments emanating from state legislations.
This prospect is echoed by a number o f sociologists. They advocate that 
deterrence theory should benefit from an extension to include informal and formal sanction 
threats (Andenaes, 1952, 1966; Gibbs, 1975; Grasmick, Blackwell Bursik, & MitcheU, 
1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993; Tittle, 1980; 
WiUiams & Hawkins, 1986, 1989). In addition to the frirmal state legislation system, there 
should be a complex and highly efficient system o f informal sanctions that deter 
noncompliant behaviors.
Specifically, some o f these scholars speculate that criminals can experience social 
and personal losses from the publicity o f the arrest which are equivalent to any potential 
punishment though court actioiL Andenaes (1952, 1966), for example, argues that legal 
sanctions might deter through the immediate threat o f fines and incarceration, but in 
addition, law, "as a concrete expression of society's disapproval o f an act helps to form 
and to strengthen the public's moral codes and thereby creates conscious and unconscious 
inhibitions against committing crime" (1952, p. 179). The state-imposed legal sanctions 
are entwined with attempts to emphasize the definition o f what is moraUy right and what
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the community should consider to be acceptable behavior. Thus, Andenaes is able to 
assert that law has an "eye-opener e0&ct" in that it directs attention to a punished conduct 
to guarantee moral condemnation o f the conduct and a correspondmg social support for 
certain values.
Other researchers have offored perspectives that are compatible with Andenaes" 
extension of deterrence theory. In an attempt to link the formal sanctions with the 
awakened interest in informal sanctions, Williams and Hawkins (1986, 1989) raise the 
possibility that legal sanctions might trigger other mechanisms of social control. To 
illustrate, an arrest may be followed by a loss o f self-esteem and adverse reactions from 
other people in a society. These researchers propose then that legal sanctions may have 
direct deterrent effects plus indirect deterrent effects through these informal control 
mechanisms. In congruence. Tittle (1980, p. 10) argues that . negative reactions from 
significant others have greater relevance for one's self-esteem, total life circumstances, and 
interaction patterns; and . . .  greater surveillance and probability of being discovered are 
involved in informal sanctions.'" Gibbs ( 1975, p. 209) also states that ""individuals who 
appear to subscribe the most to the social condemnation o f crime are the ones who tend to 
view punishment as the most certain, and they may commit fewer criminal acts because of 
social condemnation rather than fear o f legal punishment "
Currently, many sociologists attempt to compare and potentially to integrate 
deterrence theory with those theories which focus on sources o f compliance with the law 
other than the threat o f legal sanctions. Broadly, these theories emphasize (a) moral 
beliefs about right and wrong and/or (b) attachment to peers, femily, and various 
significant others (e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, & 
Chiricos, 1983; Tittle, 1977). Tittle (1977), for example, operationalizes moral beliefs and 
significant others as follows: moral commitment (moral wrongness of offenses), social 
integration (sense o f belonging in residential area, personal pride in the U.S., etc.), and 
interpersonal/community fear (probability of discovery and perceived loss of respect).
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Similarly, Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, and Chiricos ( 1983) draw on Krschi's (1969) 
control theory to measure these variables as follows: moral belief (moral wrongness of 
offenses) and attachment to parents and peers (importance o f approval and influence of 
disapproval by these people o f respondents' acts, and aflectionate identification with these 
people).
However, the most common approach to incorporating these variables into the 
study o f deterrence has been to compare the direct effect on illegal conduct o f perceived 
legal sanction threat to the direct effects o f moral beliefs and attachment to significant 
others (e.g., Grasmick & Green, 1980; Paternoster et al., 1983; Tittle, 1977). "In nearly 
all survey research," Grasmick and Bursik ( 1990, p. 839) maintain, "the focus has been on 
differences between deterrence theory and other theories, rather than on commonalties and 
linkages" (for exceptions, Williams & Hawkins, 1986, 1989). Few attempts have been 
conducted to conceptualize moral beliefs and attachment as sources of compliance 
analogous to state sanctions and incorporate them in one study. Little effort has been 
devoted to developing parallel measures o f the three types o f perceived sanction threats 
emanating from the state, conscience, and attachment to others.
Rational Choice Decision-Making Theorv o f Crime
Grasmick and Bursik (1990) assert that the explicit emphasis in deterrence theory 
on rational decision-making, with actors considering the threat o f punishment, offers a 
perspective for integrating theories which restrict the notion o f deterrence to the 
consideration of legal sanctions. They propose that both conscience (internalized norms) 
and attachments to significant others, derived from other theories as potential sources of 
compliance, can be conceptualized in a manner similar to the state. These three sources 
pose three different types o f possible threats or costs that are more or less certain and 
severe which actors take into account in deciding whether or not to violate the law: self- 
imposed threat of shame, socially imposed threat of embarrassment, and state-imposed 
threat o f legal sanctions.
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Integration o f perceived threats o f shame and embarrassment, along with the threat 
o f legal sanctions, into a rational choice perspective, adds significantly to Grasmick and 
Bursik's ( 1990) model's ability to explain and predict subsequent illegal behaviors. These 
informal and formal sanction threats correspond to the mechanisms o f social control 
outlined by Wrong (1961) and by Blake and Davis ( 1964). Subsequently and supposedly, 
Grasmick and Bursik are able to constitute an inclusive list of factors which deter criminal 
acts (Grasmick & Green, 1980; Grasmick, Jacobs, & McCollom, 1983).
Shame
The internalization of a norm poses a kind o f potential cost or punishment for 
violating the law—the threat o f guilt feelings or shame for doing something which the 
actor considers morally wrong. According to Grasmick and Bursik (1990), it is a self- 
imposed informal sanction that occurs when individuals violate norms they have 
internalized. It is experienced most immediately as the pain of feeling guilt or remorse, 
and can occur even if no one but the individual is aware of the transgression. The most 
immediate pain o f such guilt-feelings, Grasmick and Bursik predict, probably is a 
physiological discomfort such as self-remorse. However, more long-term consequences 
might be apparent in the form of "damaged self-concept depression, anxiety, etc. which 
could impede normal functioning in one's social environment" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, 
p. 840).
In accord with the traditional expected utility model (Becker, 1968), Grasmick and 
Bursik maintain that individuals are assumed to calculate the likelihood (certainty) o f such 
sanctions and the magnitude (severity) o f such sanctions should th ^  be imposed. In 
deciding whether or not to engage in an illegal act, "individuals take into account whether 
they would feel ashamed and the efi&ct that shame might have on their self-image or self- 
esteem" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 840). The resulting perceived threat o f self- 
imposed sanctions, conceptualized as the product o f certainty and severity, is a cost fiictor 
in the expected utility o f crime. The prediction, then, is that the greater the perceived
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threat of shame, the lower the expected utility o f crime, and the less likelihood that crime 
will occur.
Embarrassment
The attachment to significant others (broadly defined to include fiiends, family, 
employer, etc.) poses another kind o f potential cost or punishment for violating the law— 
the threat o f embarrassment. It is defined by Grasmick and Bursik ( 1990) as a socially 
imposed informal sanction that occurs when individuals violate social norms endorsed by 
significant others whose opinions are o f value to them (e.g., parents, teachers, fiiends, and 
employers). This kind o f punishment occurs primarily in the form of embarrassment when 
such people might lose respect for an actor if he/she commits a crime.
Before further review of the literature, a distinction needs to be made between the 
two types o f informal sanctions. Grasmick and Bursik ( 1990; see also Grasmick, Bursik, 
& Ameklev, 1993) suggest that their distinction between shame and embarrassment 
corresponds to the one made by Williams and Hawkins (1989) between "self-stigma" and 
"social stigma" (stigma emanating from the reactions of others). It also parallels the 
distinction by Braithwaite (1989, p. 75) between "consciences which internally deter 
criminal behavior" and the loss o f "social approval o f significant others," arguing that the 
former develops over time as a result o f repeated incidents o f the latter.
For the loss o f respect, like guilt-feelings, the most immediate pain probably is a 
physiological discomfoa. More long-term consequences, however, might be realized in 
"a loss o f valued relationships and perhaps a restriction in opportunities to achieve other 
valued goals over which significant others have some control" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, 
p. 841). Like the threat o f self-imposed shame, the threat o f socially imposed 
embarrassment can be viewed as more or less certain and more or less severe. When 
estimating the projected costs o f an illegal act, individuals take into account whether th ^  
would lose respect fi’om such significant others (certainty) and the effect that the loss o f 
respect might have on their valued relationships with such significant others (severity).
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The resulting perceived threat o f socially imposed sanctions, conceptualized as the 
product o f certainty and severity, is a cost factor in the expected utility of crime. The 
greater the perceived threat o f embarrassment, the lower expected utility o f crime, and the 
less the likelihood that crime will occur.
Legal Sanctions
Grasmick and Bursik (1990) argue that perceived threats o f shame and 
embarrassment might be combined with the perceived threat o f legal sanctions to generate 
a more inclusive list o f cost factors for a rational-choice perspective on crimes. Legal 
sanctions are state-imposed formal punishments in the form o f material and/or physical 
deprivation. Like shame and embarrassment, legal sanctions have the dimensions of 
certainty and severity. When calculating the projected costs o f illegal behavior, individuals 
take into account the probability (certainty) that they will be caught and the severity of this 
sanction should it occur. The resulting perceived threat of legal sanctions, conceptualized 
as the product o f certainty and severity, is a cost factor in the expected utility o f crime.
The greater the perceived threat o f legal sanctions, the lower the expected utility o f crime 
and the less the likelihood that crime will occur.
It should be noted that unlike other researchers (Andenaes, 1952, 1966; Gibbs, 
1975; Tittle, 1977; Williams & Hawkins, 1986, 1989), Grasmick and Bursik (1990) take a 
stance that the threats of shame and embarrassment are not conditional upon legal 
sanctions. They suggest that it is not the reactions to arrest, but the reactions to the crime 
that potential offenders consider in their rational calculation. An individual can feel 
ashamed or embarrassed even if  the police does not detect the illegal behavior. Thus, 
perceived threats o f shame and embarrassment are conceived as separate entities.
Research
Integrating both formal and informal perceived sanction threats, Grasmick and his 
colleagues have begun to examine the concept o f deterrence and its relationship with other 
analogous behaviors. Grasmick and Bursik (1990), for example, present evidence that all
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three threats (shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions) operate as deterrents to the 
utility o f crime. They report that perceived threat o f shame, emanating from internalized 
normative constraints or internalized norms, is the best predictor of later commission of 
crime by adults ( 18 and older).
In Grasmick and Bursik's analysis, the dependent variable was respondents' present 
inclinations to commit three offenses: tax cheating, petty theft (less then $20), and 
drunken driving. To measure the variable, respondents were asked to simply indicate 
whether they thought they would commit each of the three offenses in the friture. The 
response options were "yes" and "no."
Grasmick and Bursik achieved their objective to develop parallel measures of 
perceived threats o f shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions that tapped both certainty 
and severity for each threat. To scale perceived certainty of shame, embarrassment, and 
legal sanctions, respondents were asked for each o f the three offenses to estimate the 
chances they would feel guilty, lose respect from significant others, and get caught by the 
police if they did the offense. The response options were "definitely would not,"
"probably would not," "probably would," and "definitely would." The measures o f 
perceived severity was an application of the measures developed by Grasmick and Bryjak 
( 1980) "which captures the subjective severity o f the punishment—the meaning the actor 
attaches to the punishment" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 846). For each o f the three 
offenses, respondents were asked to calculate how big a problem guilt-feelings, loss of 
respect and arrest and subsequent legal punishments would create for their lives. The 
response options were "no problem at all," "hardly any problem," "a little problem," "a big 
problem," and "a very big problem." In accord with the principles of the traditional 
expected utility theory, Grasmick and Bursik then multiplied the certainty item times the 
severity item for each of the three punishment threats. These products were treated as the 
independent variables in their subsequent analysis.
As predicted, Grasmick and Bursik (1990) foimd that perceived threats o f shame,
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embarrassment, and legal sanctions inhibited the inclination to commit each of the three 
offenses. These three perceived sanction threats operated as deterrents to tax cheating, 
theft, and drunk driving. For all three offenses, perceived threats o f shame, 
embarrassment, and legal sanctions had significant inverse bivariate relationships. Further, 
the standardized coefGcients for all three threats were inverse in sign, as predicted, except 
tor the coefBcient for embarrassment on theft; in feet, this direct effect was positive in 
sign. Specifically, strong evidence of a deterrent effect of shame was reported for all three 
offenses. For two of the three offenses (tax cheating and drunk driving), shame had the 
greatest direct effect. Based on these findings, Orasmick and Bursik stress the importance 
of internal control in generating compliance with the law. They speculate that "internal 
control might be conceptualized, at least to some extent, as a self-imposed punishment 
threat which can lower the expected utility o f all illegal act" (1990, p. 854).
More recently, Grasmick, Bursik, and Ameklev ( 1993) report similar findings to 
support the theory's key propositions in a data set that merged cross-sectional survey of 
adults in Oklahoma City in 1982 and 1990. Using the same conceptualizations and 
operationalizations of perceived sanction threats developed in their previous research, 
Grasmick et al. predicted that an apparent reduction in drunk driving would be linked to 
increased perceived threats o f legal sanctions, shame, and embarrassment over eight years.
Grasmick et al. (1993) offered evidence that a reduction in self-report drunk 
driving could be attributable to an increase in each o f the three sanction threats. As 
predicted, respondents in their 1990 survey were less likely than those in 1982 survey to 
intend to drink and drive in the future. Further, the perceived certainty and severity o f all 
the three threats for drunk driving were reported to have increased over the eight years. 
Specifically, the perceived certainty and severity o f shame (and the product of certainty 
and severity) for the offense increased significantly. The perceived certainty of 
embarrassment (and the product o f certainty and severity) also increased significantly, but 
the perceived severity did not. While the perceived severity o f legal sanctions increased
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significantly, the perceived certainty and the product o f certainty and severity did not.
In isolating the independent contributions o f the three threats to the reduction in 
drunk driving, Grasmick et al. discovered that the products o f perceived certainty and 
severity o f all the three threats had inverse direct effects. Particularly, shame and legal 
sanctions had significant deterrent effects on intention to drink and drive. Further, the 
bivariate Beta for year became clearly insignificant with inclusion o f perceived threat o f 
shame. Given these findings, the researchers concluded that the increased threat o f shame 
would seem to be the primary source o f reduction in drunk driving in their two surveys.
Criticism
Rational choice decision-making theory is a new perspective on criminology and 
tests o f the model have led to several suggestions for refinement. Grasmick and Bursik 
(1990) point out continuous refinement o f the notion o f deterrence and more complete 
ascertainment o f the full implications o f informal and formal sanction threats as two such 
areas. The concept of deterrence should not be restricted to criminal control and illegal 
conduct in U.S. society. Unfortunately, however, the informal and formal sanction threats 
conceived by Grasmick and Bursik (1990; see also Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & 
Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993) are restricted to projected criminal 
acts or "noncompliance with legal norms" among adults in the United States. Examination 
of their deterrent effects has been confined to a theoretical domain o f criminality in a 
highly individualistic U.S. society. In the face o f ubiquitous norms to be conformed with, 
however, there is no theoretical reason why these perceived sanction threats cannot be 
extended to noncompliant behaviors other than criminality and in societies other than the 
United States. The current research draws fi’om this criticism to apply the concept o f 
deterrence to a unique social setting, the workplace. In doing so, it compares the 
prevalence o f noncompliance with organizational norms among employees in Japanese and 
U.S. organizations through three types o f perceived sanction threats equivalent to those 
conceived by Grasmick and Bursik (1990).
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Chapter 4;
Deterrence in the Workplace;
Extending Rational Choice Decision-Making Theory of Crime
The current research accepts the assumptions o f Grasmick and Bursik's ( 1990) 
rational choice decision-making model and its causal structure as the foundation of 
theorizing about deterrence in the workplace. Their model is logically extended in order 
to build a comprehensive model o f rational choice decision-making of noncompliance with 
organizational norms.
This chapter begins by conceptualizing three types o f perceived punishment threats 
prevailing in the workplace, with an emphasis on conscience, significant other employees, 
and management as potential sources of compliance with organizational rules. Next, 
findings associated with the three sanctions are reviewed. Problems inherent in the 
findings are also summarized. This chapter concludes with a brief description o f the 
propositions of the current research that link the role o f perceived sanction threats to 
noncompliant workplace behaviors.
Perceived Threats of Sanctions
The present research draws on the conceptualization o f Grasmick and Bursik 
(1990) to theorize deterrence in the workplace. It argues that both conscience and 
significant other employees can function as agents of social control in a manner similar to 
that o f management. All three pose threats or costs that are more or less certain and 
severe which employees take into account in deciding whether or not to violate 
organizational rules: self-imposed threat o f shame, socially imposed threat of 
embarrassment, and management-imposed threat of formal sanctions. Thus, conscience, 
significant other employees, and management potentially affect workplace deviance by 
decreasing behavioral intentions to engage in rule violation conduct.
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Shame
The internalization o f a norm poses a kind o f potential cost or punishment for 
violating the organizational rule—the threat of guilt feeling or shame for doing something 
employees consider morally wrong. It is a self-imposed, reflective, informal cost that 
employees might experience immediately as "self-stigma" (Williams & Hawkins. 1989) 
when they violate their moral commitments or offend their own conscience by engaging in 
a particular act.
Current research recognizes that shame and guilt-feelings are not synonymous. 
"Whereas guilt is generated whenever a boundary (set by the Super-Ego) is touched or 
transgressed, shame occurs when a goal (presented by the Ego-Ideal) is not being 
reached" (Pier & Singer, 1953, p. II). While guilt accompanies transgression, shame 
results in failure and one's lowered standing. But according to Grasmick and Bursik's 
( 1990) rational decision-making model, these painfel feelings are caused only through self­
directed judgment. Shame and guilt-feelings occur even if no one else but the employee is 
aware of the transgression. To feel ashamed and guilty, one need not imagine other 
employees and/or people in authority inspecting and condemning the employees' 
transgression. Imagined presence and detection by other employees and managerial 
authorities are not required. The current study then treats the terms "shame" and "guilt 
feelings" in an interchangeable manner.
The current research predicts, drawing on Grasmick and Bursik's ( 1990, p. 840) 
conceptualization, that "the most immediate adverse consequence o f such guilt feelings 
probably is a physiological discomfort,” such as self-remorse. More long-term 
consequences might include "a damaged self-concept, depression, anxiety, etc.," which 
could destroy normal functioning in an employee's social environment (Grasmick &
Bursik, 1990, p. 840). In accord with the traditional expected utility model (Becker,
1968), employees are assumed to formulate perceptions o f the likelihood (certainty) o f 
sanctions and the magnitude (severity) o f sanctions should they be imposed. In calculating
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the projected costs o f deviant behavior, employees take into account whether they would 
feel ashamed and the effect that shame might have on their seif-im^e or self-esteem. The 
resulting perceived threat o f shame, conceptualized as the product o f certainty and 
severity, is a self-imposed cost factor for the expected norm violation conduct. The 
product is conceived important here because, as Grasmick and Bursik ( 1990) emphasize, if 
an employee is rational, severe guilt-feelings will have a greater deterrent effect when he 
or she perceives probability o f guilt-feelings to be high and will have no deterrent effect if 
the employee perceives probability of such painful emotions to be minimum or nonexist. 
Similarly, the certainty of guilt-feelings will have a greater deterrent effect when the 
painful emotions are perceived to be quite severe. The prediction, then, is that the greater 
the perceived th^t^ofs^jgrne, the lower the behavioral intentions to engage in 
noncompliant conduct, and the less the likelihood that rule violation will occur In the 
workplace.
Embarrassment
The attachment to other employees poses another kind of potential cost or 
punishment for violating the organizational rule—the threat of embarrassment for breaking 
rules endorsed by those employees. While an employee's own conscience or internalized 
norms is a potential source o f punishment, so are significant other employees—colleagues, 
supervisors, employers, etc. whose opinions about an employee are o f great value to him 
or her. This kind o f punishmeiit is experienced immediately as "social-stigma" in the form 
o f embarrassment when an employee might lose respect fi-om such significant other 
employees. It is negative reactions from these significant employees to the deviant act that 
impose a punishment on the employee (HoUinger & Clark, 1982, 1983). In 
embarrassment, therefore, concern is always with an employee's own position vis-a-vis 
other employees.
While shame is a self-imposed punishment, embarrassment is a socially imposed 
punishment, though for both, the most immediate adverse consequence is a physiological
43
discomfort, such as self-remorse (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; 
Grasmick & Bursik. 1990; Grasmick. Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993). More long-term 
consequences of embarrassment might be apparent in a loss o f valued relationships and, 
perhaps, a restriction of opportunities to attain occupationally valued goals over which 
significant other employees have some control (e.g., salary increase, promotion, 
collaboration, etc.).
Embarrassment, like shame, possesses the dimensions o f certainty and severity. In 
deciding whether or not to participate in a deviant act, employees take into account the 
probability (certainty) that they will feel embarrassed and the severity o f this sanction 
should it occur. The resulting perceived threat of embarrassment, conceptualized as the 
product o f certainty and severity, is a socially imposed cost factor for expected norm 
violation behavior. The greater the perceived threat o f embarrassment, the lower the 
behavioral inclination to be involved in noncompliant conduct, and the less the likelihood 
that occupational rule violation will occur.
Management Sanctions
The third possible punishment which decreases expected workplace noncompliant 
behavior is management sanctions, and this is an extension o f the formal legal sanctions 
which are central to conventional deterrence theory. While the state is the source of the 
formal punishment threat for noncompliance with legal norms, the administration (or 
management) is the source o f formal punishment threat for noncompliance with 
organizational norms. This kind of punishment occurs primarily in the form o f material 
and/or physical deprivation when managerial authorities detect an employee's 
transgression.
The most immediate adverse consequence of such instituted penalties probably 
involve warning, fines, delay of promotion, salary decrease, discharge, and report to the 
police (HoUinger & Clark, 1982, 1983). More long-term consequences might be a loss of 
trust firom supervisors, coUeagues, and employers and, perhaps, like the threat o f
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embarrassment, a restriction in opportunities to achieve occupationally valued goals (e g., 
prevention of salary increases, promotion, and collaboration). Like shame and 
embarrassment, management sanctions possess the dimensions of certainty and severity.
In deciding whether or not to engage in a deviant act, employees take into account 
whether they might be caught and penalized by people in authority and the severity o f this 
penalty should it be imposed. The resulting perceived threat of management sanctions, 
conceptualized as the product o f certainty and severity, is an administratively imposed cost 
factor for the expected engagement in workplace noncompliant behavior. The greater the 
perceived threat o f management sanctions, the lower the behavioral intention to engage in 
noncompliant conduct, and the less the likelihood that rule violation will occur in the 
workplace.
The present study suggests, therefore, that at least three kinds o f potential costs 
which originate from three different sources—conscience, significant other employees, and 
the management—and possess the two dimensions o f certainty and severity of the 
punishment, operate independently as deterrents to workplace noncompliant conduct. All 
o f the three threats are taken into account separately by employees as cost factors in their 
"rational" decision about whether to comply with organizational norms: (a) self-imposed 
shame, (b) socially imposed embarrassment, and (c) administratively imposed physical and 
material deprivation.
For comparative purposes, the present study follows as closely as possible the 
analysis of Grasmick and Bursik (1990). Nevertheless, the current approach differs from, 
but is not incompatible with, their rational choice decision-making theory o f crime in the 
following four ways: (a) sources o f embarrassment; (b) sources o f formal sanctions, (c) 
samples, and (d) types o f deviant conduct. First, there exists a dififerem degree of 
specification between the two in terms o f sources o f socially imposed punishment threat: 
for the present study, they are significant others in the workplace (e.g., employers, 
superiors, colleagues); for Grasmick and Bursik, they are significant others in society
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generally (e.g., family, friends, employers, etc.). The deterrence doctrine nowhere 
declares, however, that the definition o f significant others should not be specified. Thus, 
the current study expects to find significant other employees operating as an agent of 
social control at an interpersonal level.
Second, there are different sources of fiarmal punishment threats between the two: 
for the present study, they are from the management; for Grasmick and Bursik ( 1990), 
they are from the state. However, as long as this study faithfully extends Grasmick and 
Bursik's research, this difference should not be problematic. The present research, 
therefore, proposes that management will serve as an agent o f social control at an 
impersonal level in a manner similar to state legislation.
Third, there are sample differences between the two: for the present study, it is a 
group of business employees; for Grasmick and Bursik's ( 1990) research, it is a group of 
adults. The deterrence literature nowhere claims, however, that deterrence is a 
sociodemography-specific process. There is no reason, thus, why the current study cannot 
expect the deterrence process to operate across a sample of employees.
Finally, the types o f deviant (or, noncompliant) conduct focused on in the present 
study are different from those in Grasmick and Bursik's research ( 1990): for the present 
study, it is productive deviance (e.g., tardiness); for Grasmick and Bursik's study, it is 
legal deviance (e.g., drunk driving). However, as Meier et al. (1984) and Grasmick and 
Bursik (1990) suggest, there is no theoretical reason why the notion of deterrence cannot 
be applied to other types o f conduct than illegal ones. It is proposed, therefore, that the 
offenses in the present research should be as salient to the deterrence process as those in 
Grasmick and Bursik’s research.
Research and Criticism 
There is not a single study that has conceptualized conscience, significant other 
employees, and the management as sources o f punishments, and incorporated all three into 
a rational choice perspective in the workplace. No research has focused attention on the
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possibility that shame, embarrassment, and managerial sanctions, originating from these 
three different sources and possessing the two dimensions of certainty and severity of the 
sanctions, might be taken into account by employees in their "rationai" decision as to 
whether or not to comply with organizational rules. No efrbrt has been devoted to 
developing comparable measures of perceived threats o f shame, embarrassment, and 
management sanctions for work-related deviant conduct.
While this is true, there exist a handful of studies in the field o f sociolo^ that are 
relevant to assessing the deterrent effects o f these three sanction threats prevailing in the 
workplace. Three empirical studies (HoUinger & Clark, 1982, 1983; Tittle, 1977) to be 
reviewed here clearly indicate that the theoretical boundaries of deterrence can be 
extended to these three sanctions and occupational deviant conduct.
Tittle ( 1977) asserts that there is a blossoming interest in the possible deterrent 
effects of sanctions or sanction threats on nonconformity. However, "evidence is too 
weak to justify firm conclusions or to permit more than rudimentary understanding of the 
place of sanctions in human affairs (Tittle, 1977, p. 580). Little has been revealed 
regarding how much sanction fear contributes to conformity in relation to other factors 
that are operative. Tittle's research is an initial attempt toward understanding this process.
Data were coUected in 1972 in a sample survey o f the population aged 15 and over 
in New Jersey, Iowa, and Oregon. A sample of 1,993 was selected by area probability 
techniques combined with random selection of respondents within each sampled 
household. In Tittle's (1977) analysis, the dependent variable was respondents' present 
inclinations to violate the foUowing rules; (a) smaU theft (about $5), (b) large theft (about 
$20), (c) smoking marijuana, (d) iUegal gambling, (e) assault, (f) lie to spouse or 
sweetheart, (g) tax cheating, (h) fiiilure to stand for national anthem, and (i) role specific 
deviance. Although he surveyed households, not work organizations, one of the role 
deviance items focused on rule violation behavior in the wodtplace. Respondents 
employed in a work organization were asked whether they would actually make personal
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use of their employer's equipment if tomorrow they were in a situation where they had an 
extremely strong desire or need to do so. Five response options ranged from "excellent 
chance" to "almost no chance "
Independent variables included were as follows; (a) moral commitment, (b) social 
integration, (c) relative deprivation, (d) alienation, (e) differential association, (f) 
legitimacy, (g) utility, and (h) sanction fear. Of these eight independent variables, moral 
commitment and sanction fear were analogous to internalization o f a norm, attachment to 
significant others, and the state—conceived by Grasmick and Bursik (1990) as potential 
sources of punishment. To assess moral commitment. Tittle asked respondents to indicate 
how morally wrong they considered each o f the rule violations to be. Five response 
options were allowed, ranging from "not wrong at all" to "very wrong."
To measure sanction fear, the fr)llowing seven indicators were adopted: (a) 
chances of discovery by somebody who does not approve of deviant acts, (b) chances of 
discovery by acquaintances, (c) chances o f discovery by community, (d) amount of loss o f 
respect by acquaintances, (e) amount o f loss of respect in community, (f) chances o f 
arrest, and (g) chances o f jail. To assess chances. Tittle asked respondents to estimate the 
probability of each o f the five (three excluding arrest and jail in the workplace deviance) 
consequences occurring. Response options were given on a five-point scale ranging from 
"almost no chance" to "excellent chance." To scale loss o f respect, he asked respondents 
to estiinate the amount o f respect they would lose. Response options were allowed on a 
five-point scale ranging from "none" to "a great deal.”
For the occupationally related rule violation behavior. Tittle (1977) found strong 
evidence o f deterrent effects of moral commitment and sanction fear in general. Moral 
commitment ranked second only to the utility of the behavior as an independent predictor 
of future workplace deviance. Loss o f respect by acquaintances and in community also 
had significant direct effects on work-related deviance in the expected negative direction. 
These findings emphasise the importance o f internal and external com rokid generating
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compliance with the organizational rules. These controls might be conceptualized, at 
least as self-imposed and socially imposed punishment threats, which can decrease 
expected engagement in occupational deviant conduct.
Despite these significant findings. Tittle's ( 1977) analysis is limited as a test of 
deterrence model o f rational choice decision-making. There are three primary 
deficiencies. F irst Tittle's conceptualization o f moral commitments does not consider a 
component o f rational choice decision-making that such commitments pose possible self- 
imposed threats. He does not use the notion o f "moral wrongness" or "internalization o f a 
norm " as conceived by Grasmick and Bursik. He does not extend the notion to propose 
that morality or internalized norms serve as a potential source o f punishment in a marmer 
similar to significant others and the state. Rather, his approach to incorporating moral 
commitments into the study of deterrence is simply to compare the direct effects on 
deviant behavior o f socially imposed perceived threats of losing respect to the direct efi&ct 
of moral wrongfulness. Consequently, he is unable to isolate and determine the deterrent 
effect of moral beliefs in the form o f internally imposed sanction threat analogous to the 
deterrent effects o f attachment to others in the form o f socially imposed sanction threat.
Second, Tittle ( 1977) makes no predictions concerning a deterrent effect of fiarmal 
sanctions on occupational deviance. Apparently, he leaves formal organizational sanctions 
out of consideration. He makes no efforts to conceptualize the formal organization as a 
potential source o f punishment comparable to the criminal justice system. He includes no 
measures o f such formal sanctions (probability o f arrest and jail). As a result, he is unable 
to provide findings concerning potential deterrent effects o f formal sanction threats.
Finally, Tittle (1977) incorporates no measures of the severity dimension that 
Grasmick and Bursik (1990) claim is crucial in determining the deterrent effects of 
sanction threats. In a rational choice perspective, individuals are assumed to formulate 
perceptions of the probability o f sanctions and the harshness o f such sanctions should th^r 
be imposed. And the resulting sanction threat, conceptualized as the product of certainty
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and seventy, is a cost factor for the expected noncompliant behavior. A lack of severity 
dimension, therefore, renders Tittle's research inadequate as a direct test of deterrence 
model of rational choice decision-making.
HoUinger and Clark ( 1982) acknowledge that there is accumulating evidence that 
informal sanctions by one's peers serve as a stronger deterrent to legal deviance than the 
threat of formal (i.e., criminal/legal) sanctions. However, little research focus has been 
directed to isolating and comparing the deterrent effects on employee deviance o f informai 
sanctions (co-worker) and formalized sanctions promulgated by either the company or the 
criminal justice system. HoUinger and Clark accept this chaUenge.
Data were coUected during 1979 and 1980 in a sample survey of employees 
working at aU hierarchical levels o f 47 formal organizations in Minneapolis-St. Paul 
DaUas-Ft. Worth, and Cleveland. The sample consisted of 16 retail merchandise 
corporations, 10 electronics manuActuring firms, and 21 general hospitals, which 
represented the three largest employment segmems o f the three metropoUtan areas. A 
sample of 9,175 was drawn by random selection o f employees from corporate personnel 
lists and used in the analysis that foUowed.
In HoUinger and Clark's ( 1982) analysis, the dependent variable was respondents' 
tendency to be involved in two categories o f workplace deviant behaviors: property and 
production deviance. Respondents were first presented with specific items describing 
property deviance (e.g., take store merchandise) and production deviance (e.g., come to 
work late and leave early). They were then asked to indicate how often they would 
engage in each deviance. The frequencies o f self-reported involvement in the deviance 
was recorded via a Likert-type index.
Severity o f perceived formal and informal sanctions were the independent variables 
in HoUinger and Clark's research. To measure perceived severity o f formal management 
sanctions, respondents were asked the foUowing question for each deviant item: "what 
would the most common reaction o f persons in authority be" (HoUinger & Claric, 1982,
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p. 339). The response options were "reward or promote." "do nothing," "reprimand or 
punish." "fire or dismiss." and "inform the police." To assess the severity o f informal co­
worker sanctions, respondents were asked to answer the foUowing question for each 
deviance item, "What would the most common reaction o f your feUow workers be?" 
(HoUinger & Clark. 1982, p. 339). Response options were provided on a five-point scale, 
ranging firom "encourage," "do nothing," "discourage," "avoid the person," to "inform 
persons in authority."
HoUinger and Clark ( 1982) reported that perceived severity o f formal and informal 
sanction threats had significant effects on employee deviance in the predicted negative 
direction. These findings highUght the crucial role o f external control in constraining 
employee deviance. External control might be conceptualized, at least to some extent, as 
sociaUy imposed and administratively imposed sanction threats which can decrease the 
behavioral intentions to become involved in a deviant act.
While HoUinger and Clark's (1982) findings lend support for the hypotheses 
derived from rational choice decision-making theory of crime, it is important to note that 
they do not constitute a direct test o f the theory itself. There are three main weaknesses 
inherent in their research. First, the distinctive definitions of perceived severity of sanction 
threats are not included in their analysis. Their operationaUzation of sanction severity 
does not capture the "subjective severity of the punishment" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, 
p. 846). HolUnger and Clark create five categories o f possible reactions of feUow workers 
and management and rank order them along with the "presumed" harshness (severity) o f 
the sanctions. However, in the rational choice decision-making model, what serves as 
severe punishment for some may not be considered as equaUy severe by others (see 
Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980). The meaning attached to the punishment varies firom one 
person to another. For instance, a coUeague reaction o f avoidance may not be perceived 
as equaUy costly by aU employees. Due to differences in their personal values, some 
employees may regard the reaction o f avoidance more costly or severe than that of
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informing people in authority.
Second, HoUinger and Clark (1982) fail to include measures o f the certainty of 
socially and formaUy imposed sanction threats. This failure is crucial in determining the 
deterrent effects of sanction threats. In the rational choice perspective, sanction threats 
are viewed as more or less certain and more or less severe (Grasmick. Blackwdl, Bursik, 
& Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993).
When estimating the projected costs of deviant behavior, individuals are assumed to 
formulate perceptions of both the likelihood o f sanctions and the severity of the sanctions 
should they occur.
FinaUy, and more critically. HoUinger and Clark ( 1982) do not precisely determine 
the deterrent effects o f perceived sanction threats on occupational deviance. They use 
reports of currently occurring deviance rather than estimates of future deviance as their 
dependent variables. Thqr rely on present perceptions o f sanctions to predict acts of 
deviance which have already occurred, thereby raising the possibility that it is the deviance 
that generates sanction threats, rather than the other way around.
In another research study, HoUinger and Clark (1983) point out that regardless of 
a renewed interest in studying white-coUar crime, there has been Uttle attention directed to 
occupationaUy related crimes against the business organization compared to corporate 
crimes committed by the organization itself. Their study is an attempt to correct this 
imbalance by examining the phenomenon o f employee theft. To achieve this goal, these 
researchers propose that "employees who perceive the dual sanctions threats o f 
apprehension and punishment to be minimal or nonexist wUl be more involved in various 
types of property offenses against the work organization" (HoUinger & Clark, 1983, 
p. 400).
The sample for HoUinger and Clark's (1983) research is (presumably) identical 
with that for their 1982 research. Data were coUected during 1979 and 1980 via self­
administered, maUed questionnaires with a random sample o f employees. A total o f 9,175
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employees randomly selected from corporate personnel lists responded to the 
questionnaire and served as respondents for the research.
In HoUinger and Clark's ( 1983) analysis, the dependent variable was respondents' 
past involvement in various theft activities within the employment setting. To measure the 
variable, respondents were asked to indicate how often they stole merchandise, supplies, 
tools, equipment and other material assets belonging to their employers in the past year. 
Response options were given on a five-point scale ranging from "daily, " "about once a 
week," "4 to 12 times per year," "I to 3 times per year," to "never."
As independent variables, HoUinger and Clark ( 1983) included perceived 
organizational sanction threats simUar to Grasmick and Bursik ( 1990), tapping both 
certainty and severity of punishments. To assess perceived certainty of punishment, 
respondents were first presented with the foUowing item; "I beUeve I would be caught if I 
took something belonging to my employer" (HolUnger & Clark, 1983, p. 403). 
Respondents were then asked to report general perceptions o f detection risk for thefts of 
company property—whether by management, co-workers, or any other resource. Four 
response options were given, ranging from "very true" to "not at aU true." Subsequently, 
HoUinger and Clark divided their samples o f respondents into those who reported "very 
true" or "somewhat true" (high perceived risk o f apprehension) and those who indicated 
"not very true" or "not at aU true" (low perceived risk) and treated them as a dichotomous 
independent variable in the analysis which foUowed.
To measure perceived severity, HoUinger and Clark instructed respondents to 
estimate possible informal and formal organizational sanctions that culminated in reporting 
to the poUce. Respondents were asked to indicate the most common reaction o f persons 
in authority to their involvement in each theft activity. The response options were rank 
ordered, rangii% from "positive sanctions (e.g., reward or promotion)," "do nothing," 
"reprimand or punish," "fire or dismiss," and to "inform the poUce." As with the certainQr 
items, HoUinger and Clark created two groups o f respondents: those who perceived
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average or below average sanction severity and those who estimated above average 
sanction severity, and used them as a dichotomous independent variable in their 
subsequent analysis.
Controlling age and sex. HoUinger and Clark ( 1983) reported that both perceived 
certainty and perceived severity had deterrent effects on employee theft activities. 
Specifically, the employee perception of the certainty o f being discovered for theft activity 
was, by far, the strongest independent variable o f the four variables examined (age, sex, 
and perceived severity of sanctions). The respondents who perceived a low certainty of 
detection for acts o f employee theft were over three and one-half times more inclined to 
steal from their employer than those who perceived a high certainty o f apprehension. 
Similarly, the respondents' perception that theft would result in serious negative 
consequences operated as a significant deterrent. Respondents who perceived little 
severity in the management reactions to theft activities were almost twice as likely to 
report involvement in above average levels o f theft activities. These findings demonstrate 
the importance o f external control in generating obedience to the organizational rules. 
External control might be conceptualized, at least to some degree, as a management- 
imposed formalized punishment threat which can decrease the expected involvement in a 
workplace deviant act.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that HoUinger and Clark's (1983) research is 
limited as a direct test o f deterrence model o f rational choice decision-making itself.
There exist four major flaws. First, HoUinger and Clark's deterrence model is limited 
because it is restricted to a consideration of formal sanctions. It does not take into 
account the degree to which employees are rational and calculatix% in their assessment o f 
the personal costs (e.g., shame and embarrassment) of Ulegal behavior as weU as the 
formal costs.
Second, like their previous study, the distinctive definitions o f perceived severity  ^o f 
sanction threats are not incorporated. Operationalization of sanction severity does not
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reflect the "subjective severity of the punishment—the meaning the actor attaches to the 
punishment" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 846).
Third, HoUinger and Clark make no attempt to assess the interaction effects o f 
certainty and severity o f punishment. They uncovered the additive ef&ct of perceived 
certainty and severity on the theft activity—as the perceived certainty o f detection and the 
perceived severity o f the sanction increased, the level o f theft involvement decreased. The 
highest degree of deterrent effect was observed when both certainty and severity were 
perceived to be high. In the sociological model of rational choice decision-making, 
however, the interaction hypothesis is claimed as theoredcaUy more important than the 
additive hypothesis in influencing individual decision-making (Grasmick, BlackweU,
Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev,
1993). If rational, actors, in their decisionmaking, multiply the likelihood (certainty) of 
punishment times the magnitude (severity) o f punishment to reach a projected cost—this 
requires interactive, rather than additive, treatment o f the two dimensions.
FinaUy, consistent with their previous study, HoUinger and Clark's study (1983) 
fails to permit a clear conceptualization o f causal ordering. These researchers rely on self- 
reports of past deviance rather than estimates o f future deviance as their dependent 
variable. They use present perceptions o f sanctions to predict acts o f past deviance. This, 
in turn, raises the possibility that it is the deviance that induces employees to formulate 
perceptions o f sanction threats, rather than the other way around.
The current research, grounded on the rational choice decision-making perspective 
(Grasmick, BlackweU, Bursik, & NGtcheU, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, 
Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993) and drawing from these three relevant studies and criticisms 
(HoUinger & Clark, 1982, 1983; Tittle, 1977), proposes that the concept of deterrence can 
be appUed to informal and formal sanctions and deviant conduct in the workplace. It 
argues that conscience and significant other employees (e.g., employer, coUeagues) serve 
as agents o f social control in a manner similar to the management. AU three pose possible
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threats or costs that are more or less certain and severe which employees take into 
account in deciding whether or not to violate organizational rules. The greater the 
perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and managerial sanctions, the less behavioral 
intentions to noncomply and the less the likelihood that rule violation will occur in the 
workplace.
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Chapters:
Cultural Dtfiferences in 
Perceived Levels of Sanction Threats and Noncompliance Tendencies
Today, deterrence theorists acknowledge the need to examine the causes of 
variability of perceived sanction threats. Grasmick and Bursik ( 1990) indicate that 
researchers should consider why individuals vary in their perceived degrees o f threats o f 
shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions. They encourage others to incorporate this 
issue into research on deterrent effects o f perceived sanction threats.
The current research accepts this challenge. It addresses the issue o f individual 
variability in perceived levels of the three kinds o f sanction threats: some categories of 
employees might perceive greater threats o f shame and/or embarrassment, while others 
might perceive a greater threat o f management sanctions.
Social learning or socialization plays an important role in the development o f social 
behavior and has increasingly become the focus o f study o f deterrence for the criminal act. 
Social learning is a process of social interaction through which people acquire personality 
and learn values, norms, beliefs, skills, and thought and behavioral patterns (Robertson, 
1987). Although some might prefer to restrict socialization to early childhood, it is 
actually "an ongoing process that continues throughout an individual's life" (Curran & 
Renzetti, 1994, p. 183). It continues to occur and influence individual employees over the 
course of their careers.
Sociologists assert that what is taught—that is, the content o f socialization—varies 
across cultures, societies, communities, and social groups. This position is supported by 
Gudykunst and Kim's (1991) claim that culture is a "system o f knowledge." Citing 
Keesing's (1974, p. 89) work, they argue that culture shapes and constrains, as part o f our 
socialization, the way our "human brain acquires, organizes, and processes information 
and creates 'internal models of reality.'" Culture determines the content o f socialization by
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which individual employees' perceptions o f sanction threats are culturally programmed. 
Culturally dififerentiated socialization experiences can make differences in perceived levels 
o f sanction threats.
Focusing on employees in Japanese and U.S. organizations, the present research 
investigates how cultural differences in socialization practices affect the perceived levels o f 
punishment threats o f shame, embarrassment, and m aniem ent sanctions and, in 
consequence, the prevalence of noncompliance behaviors. In doii^ so, this study 
articulates a causal link from culture to perceived degrees of sanction threats and to 
noncompliance tendencies. It speculates that cultural values influence socialization 
experiences o f employees in Japanese and U.S. organizations, thereby producing 
differences in perceived levels o f punishmem threats and prevalence o f noncompliant acts.
The focus on the two dominant forces in the world market, Japan and the United 
States, is significant. Dertouzos, Lester, Solow, and the MIT Commission on Industrial 
Productivity ( 1987) suggest that events happening inside individual organizations 
represent the ground truth of the national economy. While it is important to study such 
events at close range, views from a greater height are also revealing. The current cross- 
cultural study, therefore, presents a broad perspective on two successful economies.
The present research argues that when compared to employees in U.S. 
organizations, employees in Japanese organizations perceive greater levels o f shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions in their rational decision-making concerning 
whether or not to comply with organizational norms. Offering a rationale for this 
argument, this study begins by briefly describing Hofrtede's (1980, 1983,1984; Ho6tede 
& Bond, 1984) cultural variability o f individualism-collectivism, highlighting greater social 
controls and surveillance practiced in coUectivistic societies. Then, the role of social 
controls are examined in determining the perceived levels of threats o f shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions. Finally, a causal chain is outlined from 
culture to these three punishment threats and to noncompliant behaviors.
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Cultural Differences in Perceived Levels o f Sanction Threats 
There are numerous dimensions on which cultures in Japan and the United States 
differ. What they share, at least to some degree, is a basic assumption that Japanese are 
more controlled than Americans by collectivity. It is their strong ties, links, attachments, 
binds, or bonds to such conventional institutions as family and school that keep Japanese 
under control and, thus, reAains them from acting on deviant motivations. Especially 
notable is the theory by Geert Hofstede which has enjoyed great popularity and has had a 
powerful and widespread influence since its inception in 1980. Consequently, it is to this 
brand of cultural variability, individualism-collectivism. that the present study devotes its 
attention.
Individualism-Collectivism
In his book. Culture's Consequences. Hofstede ( 1980) presents four dimensions o f 
cultural variability, along with an analysis o f the empirical data he gathered from 
employees to test it. According to Hofstede, individualism refers to the relationship 
between the individual and the collectivity prevailing in a given society. Uncertainty 
avoidance represents the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable 
with uncertainty and ambiguity. Power distance is described as the extent to which the 
members of a society accept power in institutions and organizations distributed unequally. 
Finally, masculinity is defined as a preference in society for achievement, heroism, 
assertiveness, and material success.
Hofstede (1980) proposes that these four dimensions represent elements of 
common structure in the cultural systems o f countries. He does not assert that any one 
dimension is more predictive of a culture, viewing each of the dimensions as essentially 
fundamental issues in human societies to which every society must find its specific 
answers. He does not examine specific causal ordering o f the different dimensions in his 
test o f cultural variability.
However, the majority o f research on cultural differences in Japan and the United
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States has been directed at the dimension of individualism-coiiectivism. Traditionally, this 
dimension has been claimed as the most useful in understanding cultural differences, as 
well as similarities, o f individual behaviors between the United States and Japan. It 
established a solid basis for intercultural and cross-cultural communication theory and, as 
the theoretical stimulus, sparked much of the empirical research on communication 
conduct between the two nations (e.g., Gudykunst & Nishida, 1984; Gudykunst, Nishida, 
& Chua, 1986, 1987; Nomura & Bamlund, 1983; Triandis, Brislin, & Hui, 1988). Thus, 
the present study focuses on the cultural dimension o f individualism-coiiectivism 
(Hofstede. 1980, 1983, 1984; Ho6tede & Bond, 1984) as a primary dimension that 
contributes to culturally differentiated perceived levels of punishment threats o f shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions for Japanese and American employees.
According to Hofstede (1980, 1983, 1984; Ho&tede & Bond, 1984), individualism 
stands for a loose knit social framework in which "people are supposed to look after 
themselves and their immediate 6mily only" (Hofstede & Bond, 1984, p. 419).
Conversely, collectivism is described as a tightly knit social framework wherein "people 
belong to ingroups or collectivities which are supposed to look after them in exchange for 
loyalty" (Hofstede & Bond, 1984, p. 419).
Hofstede ( 1984) asserts tliat the fundamental issue addressed by tliis dimension is 
the degree o f interdependence, and this is closely related to people's self-concept. The "I" 
identity has precedence in individualistic cultures over the "we" identity, which takes 
precedence in collectivistic cultures. The emphasis in individualistic societies is on 
individuals' initiative and achievement, while the emphasis in collectivistic cultures is on 
belonging to groups. Hsu (1971) concurs with this distinction as he points out that a 
different self-concept is apparent in comparing individualistic western with collectivistic 
Asian thinking. He argues that the western concept o f "personality" does not exist in 
Asian societies. In western societies, "personality" is considered a separate entity distinct 
from society and culture. Hsu views this as a reflection of western individualist thought,
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or what Hofstede calls the "I" identity. By contrast, Japanese use the word jin  {Jen in 
Chinese) for "man" to describe a "human constant" which bonds the person him or herself 
to his or her intimate societal and cultural environment. If separated, an individual loses 
significance o f his or her existence. Japanese people are. thus, more willing to mod% 
their jin  in accord with their environment. Hsu considers this a product o f Asian 
collectivist thinking, or what Ho&tede refers to as the "we" identity.
A more individualistic or more collectivistic self-concept carries different 
orientations toward social controls imposed by primary and secondary groups (e.g., 
Braithwaite, 1989; Hofstede, 1980, 1984). In collectivistic Asian societies, with their 
tightly knit and predetermined social fiamework, there is generally an extensive set of 
expectations about how people should behave toward each other. Behavior tends to be 
rigidly prescribed either by written rules or by unwritten social codes in ways to maximize 
coordination o f the individual with his or her societal and cultural environments. Social 
controls in the form o f informal sanctions applied by primary and secondary groups are, 
therefore, imposed more consistently and for more minor deviations fi'om accepted 
standards. Violating these rules and standards threatens the so-important social 
framework. What or who is different is considered dangerous. Conforming to value 
systems shared by the majority (societal norms) is thus the best guarantee for the 
individual's "we" identity. Consequently, people are presumed to accept the controls and 
acquire very conventional orientations toward rules, norms, and law at an early age.
In individualistic western societies, there are also written and unwritten rules and 
standards, but they are considered more a matter o f convenience and less sacrosanct (e.g., 
Braithwaite, 1989; Hofetede, 1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984). People are told 
to conform to existing rules and standards, yet are rewarded for flouting many 
conventional standards. They are not held to stringent standards. This is because such 
standards may destroy people's autonomous judgments. Rational calculation convinces 
individuals that their freedom and "I" identity are better assured through maintenance o f
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countervailing centers o f group sanctioning. Therefore, the individual stands alone gainst 
all sanctions and controls by primary and secondary groups.
Prior to further discussion o f individualism-coiiectivism, it should be noted that 
while cultures tend to be predominantly either individualistic or collectivistic, both exist in 
all cultures (e.g., Gudykunst & Kim, 1991; Parsons, 1951; Schwartz, 1990). Not all 
western societies are individualistic, o f course, and not all Asian societies are collectivistic. 
Parsons ( 1951, p. 60), for example, indicates that a self-orientation and a collectivity 
orientation involve the "pursuit o f private interests" and the "pursuit of the common 
interests of the collectivity," respectively. However, the same behavior can be 
simultaneously self- and collectivity-oriented. He elaborates this as he illustrates that a 
department head in an organization can act to pursue his or her own welfare, the 
department's welfare, the organization's welfare, and even society's welfare at the same 
time. In congruence, Schwartz ( 1990) states that individualistic and collectivistic values 
do not necessarily conflict. With respect to individualistic values, he argues that:
hedonism (enjoyment), achievement, self-direction, social power, and stimulation 
values all serve self interests o f the individual, but not necessarily at the expense of 
any collectivity. . . .  These same values might be promoted by leaders or members 
of collectivities as goals for their ingroup (Schwartz, 1990, p. 143).
Likewise, with respect to collectivistic tendencies, Schwartz suggests that:
prosocial, restrictive conformity, security, and tradition values all focus on 
promoting the interests of others. It is other people, constituting a collective, who 
benefit from the actor's [or actress'] concern for them, self-restraint, care for their 
security, and respect for shared traditions. But this does not necessarily occur at 
the expense o f the actor [or actress] (Schwartz, 1990, p. 143).
Other researchers concur with this view as they argue that individuals and cultures 
can have both individualistic and collectivistic tendencies (Brittan, 1977; Gudykunst &
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Kim, 1991; Hofstede, 1980; Kawasaki, 1969). While this may be true, they also assert 
that either individualism or collectivism tends to predominate in one culture while both do 
exist. In the United States, for example, there are collective tendencies and some 
subcultures (e.g., religion) tend to be collectivistic, but individualism predominates. In 
Japan, there are individualistic tendencies and some subcultures (e.g., universities) tend to 
be individualistic, but collectivism predominates.
In his study of large multinational business enterprises, Ho6tede (1980) verifies 
this position; culture in the United Sates is labeled as more individualistic rather than 
collectivistic, whereas the opposite is true for culture in JapaiL Using a questionnaire 
survey, Hofstede gathered data from employees working for large multinational business 
subsidiaries in over SO countries, including Japan and the United States. He utilized 32 
value statements regarding organizational practices and compared the distribution of the 
answers from one country to another along four dimensions: individualism-coiiectivism 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity-femininity. On the individualism 
scale, the United States was reported as extremely individualistic (ranked I). Conversely, 
Japan was observed to be nearer to the collectivism end of the individualism-coiiectivism 
scale (ranked 22). Consistent with much previous research, including Hofstede ( 1980), 
then, the present study argues that Japanese employees are more collectivistic rather than 
individualistic, whereas the opposite is true o f American employees.
Culture and Perceived Sanction Threats
Unfortunately, no systematic attempts have been conducted to utilize HoAtede's 
(1980, 1983, 1984; HoAtede & Bond, 1984) cultural variability o f individualism- 
coiiectivism to account for why individuals vary in their perceived levels of sanction 
threats prevailing in the workplace. Little is understood regarding the link between the 
two. Given the preceding discussion, however, this research speculates that the dimension 
contributes to differential perceived levels o f punishment threats o f shame, embarrassment, 
and management sanctions. It argues that greater social control, refiected in a cultural
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value orientation toward collectivity emphasized while Japanese are growing up, plays a 
crucial role in increasing the perceived levels o f punishment threats o f shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions.
Culture and Shame. There appears to be a more or less straightforward 
connection between the individualism-coiiectivism dimension and the perceived threat o f 
shame. As discussed earlier, early socialization and controls lead Japanese to be more 
accepting o f given rules than Americans. Social control in the form o f informal sanctions 
applied by primary and secondary groups is imposed more consistently and for more minor 
deviations from accepted standards. Japanese are taught to conform to more rigid 
standards and are rewarded for such behaviors whereas Americans are told to conform, 
but are rewarded for acting deviant. In other words, Japanese are held to more rigid 
standards o f behavior at an early age and are admonished when th ^  fail to adhere to such 
standards, while Americans are not held to such stringent standards and are often even 
praised when they deviate. Consequently, Japanese are presumed to have more 
conventional orientations toward the rules.
Braithwaite ( 1989) argues that this socialization process is important in developing 
children's moral standards, standards that are expected to endure into adulthood. He 
notes that "as children's morality develops, as socialization moves from building 
responsiveness to external controls to responsiveness to internal controls, direct forms o f 
shaming become less important than induction " (Braithwaite, 1989, p. 72). Stated 
difierently, direct forms o f shaming become less effective as the external use o f shaming 
becomes internalized and the child is internally controlled by shame. As children develop, 
they learn or have feelings for moral standards and develop a conscience. Even in the 
absence o f external controls, children learn to draw on their internalized norms and refrain 
themselves from acting deviant. Japanese employees, who are more likely to be controlled 
at an early age in this maimer, are thus more likely than American employees to internalize 
guilt and to feel ashamed when considering a norm violation act. Japanese employees are
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expected to formulate estimates o f greater probability (certainty) o f guilt-feeiings and 
magnitude (severity) o f such painful emotions should they be experienced.
Culture and Embarrassment. While such internal controls as moral inhibition are 
linked to a threat o f shame in the present research, such external controls as fear of social 
condemnation are linked to a threat o f embarrassment, although both are the product of 
greater social controls in collectivistic cultures. According to Hofetede (1981), while 
Americans in a highly individualistic society are encouraged to be independent, Japanese in 
a collectivistic rather than individualistic society are socialized into a responsibility for the 
maintenance of social relationships. While socialization in the LT.S. is built more on an 
"ethic of independence," socialization in Japan is predicated more on an "ethic of 
interconnectedness," an intercoimectedness which can generate the repulsion o f social 
stigmatization. The emphasis in Japanese socialization is to live up to wishes and 
expectations of other societal members. Thus, Japanese are trained to be more concerned 
with social approval and positive face o f association with others. "Face"—a literal 
translation of the Japanese kao and mentsu—is something that the individual, through his 
or her conduct or that o f people closely related to him or her, must maintain by meeting 
essential expectations or standards placed upon him or her by virtue o f the social position 
he or she holds (Ho, 1976). Due to the controls and socialization experienced as children, 
therefore, Japanese employees are more likely than American employees to have affection 
or respect for others and to feel embarrassed in consideration of status and face 
threatening behavior. Japanese employees who noncomply with the value systems shared 
by other employees (occupational norms) not only do something wrong, but also 
participate in fece and status threatening behavior.
Culture and Management Sanctions. Given the preceding review o f literature, the 
present research proposes that collectivism and perceived threat o f management sanctions 
vary jointly—that is, the more collectivistic the tendency, the greater the perceived levels 
o f formal sanction threat. The general foundation for this claim is found in the assertion
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that Japanese are more controlled than Americans in early childhood. Japanese are trained 
to believe that they are subject to greater control and surveillance than are American 
employees. Recall Hofstede's ( 1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) argument that 
in collectivist cultures with a tightly knit and predetermined social fiamework, behavior 
tends to be more rigidly prescribed either by written rules or by unwritten social codes. 
Social control applied by primary and secondary groups is imposed more consistently and 
for more minor deviations from accepted standards Children in collectivistic cultures are 
more closely supervised throughout their lives and, thus, targets of more intense social 
control than those in individualistic cultures. They are so closely observed in terms of 
violation of rules, standards, and expectations, that they conclude they cannot avoid 
detection and ignore the threat o f punishment should it be imposed by such institutions as 
family and school. Thus, due to these controls and socialization practices at an early age, 
it is predicted that Japanese employees encounter more agents o f social control, or at least 
think they do, and are more likely to believe they are closely scrutinized for minor 
deviations fi'om accepted standards o f performance. Japanese employees are expected 
more likely than American employees to think they will be caught if they commit an 
offense and, thus, according to the rational choice decision-making theory (Grasmick, 
BlackweU, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & 
Ameklev, 1993), perceive greater levels o f managerial sanction threat.
In summary, the current research postulates that collectivism has positive effects 
on the perceived levels o f shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions. That is, the 
more collectivistic the tendency, the greater the social control or surveillance, and the 
greater the perceived levels o f punishment threats.
Cultural Differences in Noncompliance Tendencies
The foregoing discussion provides a  rationale for the hypothesis that there is a 
cultural difference in the overall likelihood o f noncompliance in a specific direction 
suggesting that Japanese employees are less noncompliant than American employees. The
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theoretical reason to expect less noncompliance tendencies among Japanese employees are 
summarized as follows: (a) noncompliance is a function o f three perceived threats of 
shame, embarrassment, and m aniem ent sanctions; (b) greater levels o f punishment 
threats o f shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions are perceived among 
employees who are in more collectivistic nature o f societies; and (c) Japanese society is 
characterized as more collectivistic than is U.S. society.
To elaborate this contention, three patterns o f relationships between 
noncompliance and being Japanese (or American) including three perceived threats are 
briefly delineated. First, the expected sign (+ or -)  o f the relationship between being 
Japanese and noncompliance tendency is inverse because Japanese employees tend to 
perceive a greater threat o f shame, or guilt-feelings, than American employees. It is 
argued that Japanese employees, who would be held to more rigid standards of behavior at 
an early age, are more likely to internalize moral standards and, therefore, according to the 
rational choice perspective (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & MitcheU, 1993; Grasmick & 
Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993), perceive a greater threat o f shame, 
making them less noncompliant. In other words, the perceived sanction threat of shame is 
expected to serve as an intervening variable between culture and deviant behavior. Shame 
should account for the cultural difiference in workplace noncompliant behaviors.
Second, the expected sign o f the relationship between being Japanese and 
noncompliance tendency is inverse because Japanese employees are likely to perceive a 
greater threat of loss o f respect than American employees. Japanese employees, who 
would be more concerned about social approval and positive foce o f association with 
others, are expected to perceive a greater threat o f embarrassment or a loss o f respect and, 
thus, be less noncompliant with status and face threatening character of organizatioiud 
rules. That is, the perceived sanction threat o f embarrassment should operate as an 
intervening variable between culture and noncompliant tendencies.
Third, the expected of the relationship between being Japanese aad
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noncompiiance tendency is inverse because Japanese employees are apt to perceive a 
greater threat o f management sanctions. Japanese employees, who would be more closely 
supervised throughout their lives and, thus, targets o f more intense social control at an 
early age, are expected more likely than American employees to believe that they cannot 
avoid detection and ignore the threat o f punishment should it be imposed by people in 
authority. Stated differently, Japanese employees are predicted to encounter more agents 
of social control, or at least they think they do, and perceive a greater threat o f 
management sanctions, making them less noncompliant. The more frequent monitoring 
attaches a greater threat o f management sanctions to deviant behaviors, dissuading 
Japanese employees from acting on their deviant motivations. Thus, the perceived 
management sanction threat serves as an intervening variable between culture and 
noncompliant tendencies.
In conclusion, these three patterns o f relationships involving three types of 
sanction threats are the source o f the specified inverse sign o f the relationship between 
being Japanese and employee involvement in rule violation behaviors. The more 
collectivistic the tendency, the greater the social control and the perceived levels of 
punishment threats. This, in turn, leads to the lower behavioral inclination to noncomply 
with organizational rules and, in consequence, less likelihood that rule violation behavior 
will occur. That is, the three perceived punishment threats are considered in the 
conceptualization here as three independent mediators that link culture with noncompliant 
tendencies.
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Chapter 6:
Cultural Différences in Deterrent Effects o f Sanction Threats
Culture and Deterrent Effects o f Sanction Threats 
Literature on criminality regularly draws attention to gender differences in the 
deterrent effects on deviance (Hagen, Gillis, & Simpson, 1979, 1985; Hagan Simpson & 
Giilis, 1987), but the role o f culture has been neglected. To date, there have been no 
empirical tests to determine if deterrent effects of shame, embarrassment, and legal 
sanction threats differ across cultures.
Hofstede's ( 1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) cultural variability of 
individualism-coiiectivism enables the present research to address this prospect. It is 
argued that collectivity and individuality—cultural values emphasized, developed, and 
maintained throughout adulthood—contribute to culturally differentiated deterrent effects 
o f the formal and informal sanction threats. Values on responsibility for maintenance of 
social relationships in collectivistic cultures and a sense o f individuality in individualistic 
cultures are presumably major factors accounting for the cultural gap. Secondarily, thus, 
the present research posits, drawing from Hofstede's cultural variability o f individualism- 
coiiectivism, that the deterrent effects o f shame, embarrassment, and management 
sanctions are different for employees in Japanese and U.S. organizations.
Culture and Deterrent Effects of Shame
In Grasmick and Bursik's (1990) formulation, shame functions as a powerfiil 
deterrent. It is defined as a self-imposed informal cost when individuals "offend their own 
conscience by engaging in behavior they consider morally wrong” (1990, p. 837). It is 
experienced immediately as an injury to self-respect or a blow to self-esteem, and it can 
occur even if no one else is aware o f the transgression.
The prediction derived from this conceptualization is that the threat o f shame is a 
greater deterrent for Japanese than for American employees. Japanese employees are
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expected to be more influenced than American employees by guilt &elii%s or self-stigma. 
Howard Kaplan's ( 1975) argument o f self-esteem provides a beginning of the rationale for 
this prediction. According to Kaplan, we develop our sense o f self through social 
interaction with others in the groups to which we belong (e.g., families, peers). We learn 
to place a particular value on ourselves as a person and on our behavior through others' 
reactions to us. Being a member o f the group entails being held in esteem by the group.
A loss of self worth or status as an individual thus leads to a loss o f status as a member. A 
loss of self worth is total extinction o f the individual that has existed as a member o f the 
group. In short, it is a total loss o f identity.
The principles of individualism-coiiectivism (Hofstede, 1980, 1983, 1984,
Hofstede & Bond, 1984) complete the rationale for the prediction—that the threat o f 
shame is a stronger deterrent for Japanese employees than for American employees. A 
loss of self worth or self-esteem is expected to be more influential in collectivistic Japanese 
than in individualistic U.S. work environments. According to Hofstede, while the 
emphasis in individualistic cultures is on being independent, the emphasis in collectivistic 
cultures is on the maintenance of social relationships. Insofar as the collectivistic nature of 
Japanese employees are more likely than the highly individualistic nature of American 
employees to function in a tightly knit social firamework, they are more likely to have a 
sense of self anchored in valuable relationships with other employees. This, in turn, leads 
Japanese employees to be more concerned with self-esteem or concepts in which they are 
held by in such relationships (see also Braithwaite, 1989). Once damaged, it is more 
difiScult for Japanese employees to re-establish self-esteem or concepts in their heavily 
enmeshed âbric o f social relationships with others. Conversely, since it is generally easier 
for American employees operating in a loosely knit social framework to obtain comparable 
replacemern self-concepts or esteem, they are expected to have much less to lose than do 
Japanese employees if they have a guih-feeling or self-stigma. Thus, the current study 
postulates that compared to American employees, Japanese employees are more deterred
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from expressing deviant impulses by their calculation o f a self-imposed punishment threat 
o f shame.
Culture and Deterrent Effeas of Embarrassment
Another informal cost which operates as a strong deterrent is embarrassment. 
According to Grasmick and Bursik (1990, p. 839), it is defined as a socially imposed cost 
that individuals experience when they "violate norms which significant others support." It 
is experienced immediately as the pain o f stigma or a loss of respect fi’om such people, and 
occurs when such people become aware o f the actors' transgression. While the self 
potentially is a source o f punishment threat, so are significant other employees (broadly 
defined to include colleagues and supervisors) whose opinion about an employee are 
considered important and valuable by that employee.
The prediction derived fiom this conceptualization is that the threat of 
embarrassment is a stronger deterrent for employees in Japanese than in U.S. work 
environments. Japanese employees are expected to be more influenced than American 
employees by a loss o f respect or social stigma from reactions of significant other 
employees. The principles of labeling theory offer the beginning of a rationale for this 
prediction. According to Curran and Renzetti (1994), what is crucial is that others 
respond to an individual's rule violation behavior, labeling him or her a deviant. "This may 
be done informally," Curran and Renzetti maintain, "but o f greater significance to labeling 
theorists is when this process takes place in what they refer to as public status degradation 
ceremonies'" (1994, p. 230). The label "deviant" makes up a "master status"—a status 
that has the precedence over all other statuses or characteristics of the employee. Other 
employees, who have deeply ingrained and preconceived ideas o f what a deviant is 
like—untrustworthy and unpredictable—starts organizing their interactions with the 
labeled employee in accord with these stereotypes. They may not only lose respect for the 
labeled employee, but also stop socializing and exclude him or her from social 
environments.
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This contention is extended to propose that a loss of respect from significant 
others or social stigma is experienced as more costly by Japanese employees than by 
American employees—implying that the former would be more deterred by the threat o f 
embarrassment. It is predicted that Japanese employees are more dissuaded from acting 
on deviant motivations by the fear o f repulsion o f social stigmatization by those 
employees. Recall Hofstede's (1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) argument that 
while social development in individualistic cultures is predicated on a sense of 
individuality, socialization in collectivistic cultures stresses the responsibility for 
maintaining social relationships. Insofar as Japanese employees are more likely to operate 
in a dense network of social relationships with other employees, they are more likely to 
have accumulated valuable relationships with those employees. The loss of respect or 
negative self-image in collectivistic Japanese work environments is the worst thing that 
can happen to any employee (e.g., Hirokawa & Miyahara, 1986; Ting-Toomey, 1989). It 
is generally more difficult to obtain comparable replacement relationships with other 
employees and regain social respectability once they are derogated. Losses for Japanese 
employees are greater than for American employees in the arena of social relationships and 
reputation. The current study predicts, therefore, that compared to American employees, 
Japanese employees are more deterred from carrying out deviant impulses by the socially 
imposed punishment threat o f embarrassment.
Culture and Deterrent Effects o f Management Sanctions
According to Grasmick and Bursik (1990), the third possible punishmem which 
decreases expected noncompliant behavior is state-imposed formal sanctions that 
individuals experience in the form of plysical and/or material deprivation (e.g., fines and 
incarceration). Applying this conceptualization to work environments, administratively 
imposed management sanctions are a comparable replacement. These formal sanctions 
operate as deterrents via the regularized bureaucratic rules and corresponding sanctions 
established by people in authority within the work organization. They are experienced in
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the form o f instituted material and/or physical deprivation (such as fines, suspensions, and 
discharges), and occur immediately upon the presence o f detection by managerial 
authorities.
The prediction derived fi'om this conceptualization is that the threat of 
m aniem ent sanctions is a stronger deterrent for Japanese employees than for American 
employees. Japanese employees are expected to be more influenced than American 
employees by instituted material and/or physical deprivation. The principles of cultural 
variability o f individualism-coiiectivism provide a rationale for this prediction. Recall 
Hofstede's ( 1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) argument that while people in 
individualistic cultures such as the United States are socialized to break away from 
dependency and assert dominance, people in collectivistic cultures such as Japan are 
trained to accept an ongoing status o f dependency on their primary and secondary groups 
(e.g., parents, school, employers). For Americans, the relationship between employees 
and people in authority is based on the premise o f mutual advantage; for Japanese, it 
carries a moral component based on mutual obligations. In U.S. work environments, 
"either party can terminate it if it can exchange it for a more advantageous deal elsewhere" 
(Hofstede, 1984, p. 87). In Japanese employmem practices, however, receiving instituted 
penalties such as fines and suspensions, not to mention discharges, is a socially 
disapproved event. It is a reflection o f disloyalty o f the employee toward the employer 
and invites social stigmatization for the employee. It is more difficult for Japanese 
employees, who operate in a tightly knit social fi'amework, to reestablish comparable 
social respectability and regain trust once they are penalized. Losses would be 
experienced as more costly by Japanese employees than American employees, particularly 
in the arena o f social respectability. To sum up, Japanese employees are predicted to be 
more deterred than American employees not only by their rational calculation of informal 
punishment threats o f shame and embarrassment, but also by formal management sanction 
threats.
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Chapter 7:
Models and Hypotheses
The present research examines cultural differences in noncompliant tendencies 
between Japanese and American employees. Specifically, two patterns of multivariate 
relationships involving three types o f sanction threat variables fi’om rational choice 
perspective are proposed as potential sources o f an inverse relationship between being 
Japanese and involvement in noncompliant behavior. First, Japanese employees are less 
likely to engage in deviant acts because they perceive higher risks o f punishment threats of 
shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions than American employees. The 
foundation tor this claim is located in the premises of cultural variability of individualism- 
coiiectivism (Hofetede, 1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) and rational choice 
decision-making theory (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993): 
collectivistic Japanese employees are more controlled than highly individualistic American 
employees in early childhood, leading them to perceive greater sanctions and, thus, be less 
noncompliant. Thus, the current research postulates the following five hypotheses.
H1 : Japanese employees will perceive a greater threat o f shame than will American
employees.
H2: Japanese employees will perceive a greater threat o f embarrassment than will
American employees.
H3 : Japanese employees will perceive a greater threat o f management sanctions than
will American employees.
H4: The perceived threats o f shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions will
lower the likelihood o f noncompliance with organizational norms.
H5: Japanese employees will be less likely than American employees to noncomply
with organizational norms as a result o f their greater threats o f shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions.
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Alternatively, the present research proposes that Japanese employees are less 
inclined to participate in deviant acts because, compared to American employees, they are 
more deterred by the threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions they 
perceive. In other words, for workplace noncompliant behaviors, Japanese employees are 
more strongly influenced by sanction threats than American employees, proposing a 
possibility o f interaction e& cts between cultural difference (Japanese and American) and 
each of the three punishment threats on noncompliant tendencies. Thus, this research 
posits the following three hypotheses.
H6: The perceived threat of shame will have more o f a deterrent effect tor Japanese
employees than for American employees.
H7 : The perceived threat of embarrassment will have more o f a deterrent effect for
Japanese employees than for American employees.
H8; The perceived threat of management sanctions will have more o f a deterrent effect 
for Japanese than for American employees.
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Chapters:
Methods
Data
To test the hypotheses, data were collected in summer 1997 in two surveys of 
employees working at all hierarchical levels (excluding doctors) of university hospitals in 
Japan and in the United States. For each survey, a target size o f200 employees was set 
and self-administered questionnaires were distributed. The self-administered 
questionnaires were adopted because they afforded subjects greater privacy while 
answering the questions. Since most of the questions concerned rule violations, this 
procedure helped to minimize socially desirable responses.
The survey o f Japanese university hospital employees contained questions written 
in Japanese measuring current behavioral intentions to noncomply with three categories o f 
organizational rules and three types of perceived punishment threats (shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions) for the noncompliant behaviors (see Appendix 
A). The same questiotmaire items written in English were used in the survey o f U.S. 
university hospital employees (see Appendix B).
The steps involved in the data collection were as follows. For the survey of 
Japanese employees, an administrative officer in a university hospital with a total number 
of about 850 employees (excluding doctors), located in a northeastern part o f Japan, gave 
permission for her employees to serve as voluntary participants. Initial contact was in a 
letter briefly describing the nature o f the survey and indicating that the researcher would 
soon try to schedule an appointment with the officer. Attempts to schedule the 
appointment were made in person by the researcher and her two native Japanese 
assistants. Given the target sample size o f200 employees, this negotiation was arranged 
in a way that a supervisor in each o f five medical divisions would be responsible for 
randomly selecting a total o f275 employees and distributing questionnaires to them. Each
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employee filled out the questionnaire at his or her convenience and returned it to his or her 
supervisor. The returned questionnaires were then collected by the administrative officer 
and given to one of the two assistants in person. The proportion o f employees who 
responded to the survey was 93.1 percent. A total o f256 Japanese employees responded 
to the anonymous, self-administered questionnaires.
For the survey o f American employees, an administrative officer in a university 
hospital with a total number o f about 1,000 employees (excluding doctors), located in a 
southwestern part of the United States, gave permission for her employees to be 
participants. Like the survey o f Japanese employees, initial contact was in the form of a 
letter briefly describing the nature of the survey and suggesting that the researcher would 
soon try to schedule an appointment with the officer. Attempts to schedule the 
appointment were made in person by the researcher and her instructor. This negotiation 
was arranged in a manner that the officer's assistant would be in charge o f distributing 
questionnaires to all employees (excluding doctors). Each employee answered the 
questionnaire at his or her convenience and mailed it to the researcher. The return rate 
was 29.2 percent. A total o f  340 employees responded to the anonymous, self- 
administered, mailed survey questionnaires.
To control for the possible effect o f different cultural backgrounds among 
respondents in the U.S. university hospital 68 respondents were eliminated as they 
reported being non-white. This restriction, plus missing cases on any of the variables 
described below, resulted in an N o f238 for American sample and 231 for Japanese 
sample.
Comparisons o f the two samples indicate that the Japanese sample differed 
significantly fi’om the U.S. sample in percentage male (16.0 percent in the Japanese 
sample, 27.3 percent in the American sample), mean age (36.0 years old in the Japanese 
sample, 41.0 years old in the American sample), and mean education of employees (14.6 
years o f education in the Japanese sample, 15.5 years of education in the American
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sample). To avoid confounding findings, these three demographic variables were included 
as controls in the analyses.
Measures
This section describes the instruments used to measure the dependent and 
independent variables of the study. Given financial and time constraints, the structure of 
questions was close-ended in order to make data analysis manageable. All question items 
were designed to maximize clarity and brevity, along with mutually exclusive response 
categories. Prior to the actual distribution o f the questionnaire, these items were pre­
tested on five native English speakers. Feedback from the pre-test was used to improve 
instructions and clarity of items in the questionnaire.
To develop the Japanese version o f the questionnaire, every eSbrt was made to 
insure literal compatibility with the English one. Initially, the questionnaires were 
translated into Japanese by two bilingual Japanese graduate students. Their translations 
were subsequently verified by two other Japanese natives.
Noncompliance with Organizational Norms
The dependent variable proposed in Hypotheses 4-8 is respondents' noncompliance 
with organizational norms, operationalized as the behavioral inclination to commit each of 
three offenses in the future (see Appendix A, questions 45-47; and Appendix B, questions 
46-48). As Grasmick and Bursik (1990) point out, behavioral intentions and subsequent 
behaviors are not synonymous. An employee's current intention to commit an offense may 
not be apparent in actual behavior in the foture. However, the present research takes the 
stance, consistent with the rational choice decision-making model, that "any discrepancy 
between present intention and future behavior is expected to result fi’om changes over time 
in the expected utility of crime, including changes in perceived costs" (Grasmick & Bursik, 
1990, pp. 844-845). This stance enables the researcher to assess the effects o f present 
perceptions o f each punishment threat on present estimates o f whether or not to commit 
an offense in the future.
78
The two surveys included three product deviance questions used in HoUinger and 
Clark's ( 1982) research on deterrence in the workplace: (a) take a long lunch or break 
without approval, (b) come to work late or leave early without approval and (c) use sick 
leave when not really sick. The decision to focus on these three forms of 
counterproductive deviance was pragmatic because these three are inherently believable 
organizational rule violation behaviors (Harper & Efirokawa, 1988; Hirokawa & Miyahara. 
1986; HoUinger & Clark, 1982). These are behaviors that both Japanese and American 
employees can see themselves engaging in, or have previously engaged in, within their 
respective work environments. In support of this decision, HoUinger and Clark ( 1988) 
report that these three are the most frequently occurring forms o f productive deviance—at 
least in the U.S. work environments.
To measure involvement in the deviant behaviors, respondents were simply asked 
whether they thought they would commit each o f the three offenses in the future. For 
each offense, a code of 0 was assigned if the respondents thought they would not commit 
it and a code o f I was assigned if the respondents thought they would commit it. In the 
combined samples (N=469), 34.1 percent reported that they would "take a long lunch or 
break without approval"; 27.1 percent reported they would "come to work late or leave 
early without approval"; 25.4 percent reported they would "use sick leave when they are 
not reaUy sick."
Shame. Embarrassment, and Management Sanctions
The dependent variables in Hypotheses 1-3 are perceived threats of shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions, operationalized as the product of current 
estimates of certainty and severity o f punishments for the organizational offenses. The 
questions included paraUel the original perceived threat measures used in Grasmick and 
Bursik's (1990) research on noncompliance with laws. Unlike Grasmick and Bursik, 
however, the current research focuses on deterrence to noncompiiance with organizational 
rules for business employees, and the perceived threat measures are thus modified in form.
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Consistent with the rational choice perspective (Grasmick. Blackwell. Bursik. & 
Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik. 1990; Grasmick. Bursik. & Ameklev, 1993), three 
steps were taken to create reliable and valid measures o f punishment threats. As a first 
step, the perceived certainty o f each o f the three punishment threats was assessed. For 
perceived certainty o f shame, respondents were asked if they "would feel guilty" if they 
committed each o f the three offenses (see Appendix A, questions 09, 11, and 13; and 
Appendix B, questions 10, 12, and 14). For perceived certainty o f embarrassment, 
respondents were asked if most o f the employees whose opinions they value would lose 
respect for them if they committed each of the three offenses (see Appendix A. questions 
21. 23, and 25; and Appendix B. questions 22, 24. and 26). For perceived certainty of 
management sanctions, respondents were asked if they thought they "would get caught" 
by people in authority if they committed each of the three offenses (see Appendix A, 
questions 33, 35. and 37; and Appendix B, questions 34, 36, and 38). Response options 
for each certainty scale were "definitely would not" (coded I), "probably would not" 
(coded 2), "probably would" (coded 3), and "definitely would" (coded 4).
The means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are presented in Table 1 in the 
columns labeled The means for the certainty of shame tend to be higher than for the 
other two types of punishment threats. The largest certainty mean in the table is 3.63 for 
certainty o f shame for coming to work late or leaving early without approval. The lowest 
is 2.68 for the certainty o f management sanctions fi r^ using sick leave when not really sick.
Insert Table 1 about here
As a second step, perceived severity for each of the three punishment threats was 
scaled. For perceived severity o f shame, respondents were asked if th ^  did feel guilty for 
committing each of the three offenses, how big a problem this would create for them (see 
Appendix A, questions 10, 12, and 14; and Appendix B, questions 11,13, and 15).
80
Table I
Means (anH Standard Deviations  ^of Certainty Severity and the Product of C and S fCA' 51 of
Shame, Embanassment and Management Sanctions (N=M691
C S CA'5
Shame
Taking a long lunch or break 3.354 3.104 10.945
(.808) (1.066) (5.231)
Coming to work late or leaving early 3.627 3.452 12.977
(.673) (1.086) (5.184)
Using sick leave 3.522 3.429 12.450
(.655) (1.005) (4.890)
Embarrassment
Taking a long lunch or break 2.731 3.503 9.908
(-845) (.991) (4.791)
Coming to work late or leaving early 2.945 3.631 11.036
(.807) (.969) (4.946)
Using sick leave 2.979 3.586 11.090
(.814) (1.010) (5.009)
Management Sanctions
Long break or lunch 2.868 3.463 10.224
(.847) (.990) (4.732)
Come to work late or leave early 3.307 3.625 12.247
(.768) (.976) (4.861)
Use sick leave 2.682 3.614 9.985
(.947) (.995) (5.022)
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For perceived severity o f embarrassment, respondents were asked if most of the 
employees whose opinions they value within their hospital did lose respect for them, how 
big a problem this would create for them (see Appendix A, questions 22, 24, and 26; and 
Appendix B, questions 23. 25. and 27). For perceived severity o f management sanctions, 
respondents were asked if persons in authority caught and decided what their punishment 
would be, how big a problem it would create for them (see Appendix A, questions 34, 36, 
and 38; and Appendix B, questions 35, 37, and 39). Response options for each severity 
item were "no problem at all" (coded I), "hardly any problem" (coded 2), "a little 
problem" (coded 3), "a big problem" (coded 4), and "a very big problem" (coded 5).
The means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported in Table 1 in the 
columns labeled "S." By contrast to the certainty means which tend to be highest for 
shame, the severity means tend to be lower for shame than for the other two punishment 
threats. The highest severity mean is 3.63 for embarrassment for coming to work late or 
leaving early without approval. The lowest is 3.10 for shame for taking a long lunch or 
break without approval.
A final step in the development o f the punishment threat measures was to multiply 
certainty items by severity items. For each of the three types of punishment threats 
(shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions) for each of the three offenses, the 
certainty item was multiplied by the severity item. These products are then treated as 
variables in the subsequent analyses.
Each threat scale potentially ranges from 1 to 20, and the means and standard 
deviations (in parentheses) are reported in the columns labeled "C X 5" in Table 1. For all 
three categories o f deviant behavior, the mean product is the greatest for shame; 10.95 for 
taking a long lunch or break without approval; 12.98 for coming to work late or leaving 
early without approval; and 12.45 for using sick leave when not really sick.
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Culture
In the current research, culture is a key independent variable. It is classified into 
two categories in the analyses; Japanese and Americans. Employees who responded to 
the Japanese version o f the questionnaire are categorized as Japanese: in fact, the Japanese 
university hospital practices a rule that all employees must be Japanese. The second 
category is derived fi’om employees who answered the English version o f the 
questionnaire and reported their race to be Caucasian (see Appendix B, question 02). In 
the analyses that follow, these two categories are treated as a dummy variable (coded 1 for 
Japanese and 0 for Americans), with Japanese comprising 49.3 percent o f the merged 
samples. The regressions to be reported are thus comparisons of Japanese with American 
respondents.
Control Variables
Assuming that differences among respondents in the relationship o f each of the 
three sanction threats and engagement in deviant behaviors are, in part, a fimction o f 
possible sources o f spuriousness outside o f the present research, three sociodemographic 
variables were included as controls: gender, age, and years o f formal education.
In the analyses, gender is a dummy variable coded 1 A r males and 0 for females 
and having a mean (i.e., proportion male) o f .22 (see Appendix A and B, question 01).
Age and years o f formal education are interval level variables with means o f 38.5 and 15.0 
and standard deviations o f 9.9 and 1.9, respectively (see Appendix A, questions 02 and 04; 
and Appendix B, questions 03 and 05). Post high school education but no college is 
treated equivalent to one year o f college, while 3-year nursing school education is treated 
equivalent to three years o f college.
Finally, the analyses control past involvement in counterproductive behaviors. 
Grasmick and Bursik (1990) suggests that past offending influences current perceived 
threats o f informal and formal sanctions and, in consequence, intetition to engage in the 
deviant behaviors. They argue that current perceived threats and behavioral inclinations to
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commit an ofifense are dependent, at least to some extent, on past involvement in the 
offense. There is a possibility that previous norm violation experiences may function as a 
potential source o f spuriousness. For each o f the three offenses, respondents were asked 
whether they had committed each offense at least once in their entire lives (see Appendix 
A, questions 48-50; and Appendix B, questions 49-51). In the combined samples 
(N=469), 30.9 percent said they had taken a long lunch or break without approval; 30.7 
percent said they had come to work late or left early without approval; and 15.6 percent 
said they had used sick leave when they were not really sick. These hems, coded 1 for 
respondents who reported they had committed the offense and 0 for those who reported 
they had not, allow this study to assess the effects o f current perceived sanction threats on 
current behavioral intentions to commit the offense while controlling for prior offending.
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Chapter 9;
Analysis
Plan of Analysis
The current research proposes that cultural differences in the variable o f fiiture 
involvement in deviant behavior may stem from cultural dififerences in perceived threats o f 
shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions. To test the proposal, the analysis is 
performed in three steps. First, t-tests comparing the Japanese sample to the American 
sample for offense measures and measures of perceived threats are conducted. Then, 
bivariate correlations among all variables are computed. Finally, a series o f Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regressions are applied as direct tests of the specific eight 
hypotheses. Since direction is predicted, one-tailed tests are appropriate, and the 
conventional .05 level is used for judgments concerning significance.
Cultural Differences in Perceived Levels of Sanction Threats
As direct tests o f the first three hypotheses, the theoretical variables o f perceived 
threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions are regressed on culture and 
control variables o f gender, age, education, and prior offending. Two equations are 
presented for each of the three perceived punishment threats for each o f the three 
categories of deviant acts. The first equation reports the regression o f each of the three 
punishment variables on culture. The standardized coefficient, or Beta, for Japanese 
represents a simple bivariate effea o f being Japanese (coded 1 for Japanese and 0 for 
whites), compared to Americans, on the punishment variable. This coefficient suggests 
whether there is a significant diffisrence in the perceived degree of each threat. The 
present research predicts that for the theoretical variables of perceived threats o f shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions, the coefficient for Japanese should be positive 
and significam. In other words, Japanese are expected to perceive a significantly higher 
threat o f each o f the three sanction threats.
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Equation 2 adds the control variables o f gender (coded I for male), %e, education, 
and prior ofiending (coded I for respondents who reported th ^  had committed the 
offense) to determine whether the efifect o f Japanese on perceived punishment threat is 
spurious due to some combination o f the effects o f these control variables. The current 
research proposes that the standardized coefficient for Japanese may decrease, but should 
continue to be significant with the addition o f these control variables.
Cultural Differences in Future Intention to Participate in Noncompliant Behavior
A series of OLS regressions are performed to examine Hypothesis 4 which 
proposes inverse direct effects o f perceived threats o f shame, embarrassment, and 
management sanctions on intended future offenses, and Hypothesis 5 concerning the 
inverse direct effect of culture on the future offending mediated by these three threats. To 
test these hypotheses, intended future offense is regressed on culture, three perceived 
threats, and control variables.
A total of nine equations are presented for each o f the three future offenses. The 
first equation reports the regression o f a theoretical variable o f future offense on culture. 
The standardized coefficient, or Beta, for Japanese represents a simple bivariate effect of 
being Japanese (coded I for Japanese) on the theoretical variable. This coefficient 
suggests whether Japanese employees are less inclined than American employees to 
participate in future offenses. The present research predicts that for the theoretical 
variable of future offenses, the coefficient for Japanese should be inverse and significant 
without controlling for the three types o f punishment threats.
Equation 2 adds the control variables o f gender (coded I for male), age, education, 
prior offending (coded 1 for yes) to determine whether the anticipated inverse effect of 
Japanese is the result of spuriousness due to these four variables. The current research 
proposes that with the inclusion of these sociodemographic variables to the analysis, the 
coefficient for Japanese may decrease, but remain significant.
8 6
Equation 3>S add, one at a time, the threats o f shame, embarrassment, and 
management sanctions to the previous equation containii^ Japanese and the control 
variables. These equations enable the research to assess the extent to which each threat, 
by itself and without controls for the others, accounts for the inverse effect of Japanese on 
future offending. The current research postulates that the significant inverse effect o f 
being Japanese on future offenses is mediated by greater levels o f sanction threats 
perceived by Japanese employees compared to American employees. Specifically, 
Japanese employees are expected to perceive greater threats of shame, embarrassment, 
and management sanctions than do American employees, leading to significantly less 
likelihood of future offenses. Thus, the intervening effects o f sanction threats should be 
inverse in sign and statistically significant. Also, the effects o f sanction threats should 
render the effect o f being Japanese on future offenses insignificant.
Equation 6-8 contain the various combinations o f two threats, along with culture 
and control variables. These equations permit examination of which combinations o f the 
two threats are effective in accounting for the cultural differences in the likelihood of 
noncompliant behavior. With the addition o f two types o f punishment threats, the 
standardized coefBcient, or Beta for each threat should be inverse, making the 
standardized coefiScient for Japanese insignificant.
Equation 9 includes all three threats, along with culture and control variables. 
Threats o f shame, embarrassment, and managemern sanctions in the equation enable the 
research to compare the direct effects o f intervening variables of these threats. The 
current research predicts that the standardized coefBcient, or Beta, for each threat is 
inverse in sign and statistically significant. Further, with the inclusion o f all three sanction 
threats, the standardized coefficient for Japanese is expected to become insignificant. 
Cultural Differences in Deterrent Effects o f Sanction Threats
To test the last three hypotheses, OLS regressions are performed. It is 
hypothesized that the expected deterrent effect o f each o f the three sanction threats is
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dififerent for Japanese and for American employees. Thus, these f^potheses propose a 
model of statistical interaction which can be tested by creating product terms of culture 
(coded I for Japanese) and each o f the three sanction threats.
One equation is presented for each o f the three future ofifending types. In the 
equation, intended future offense is regressed on perceived sanction threat, Japanese, and 
Japanese X Threat. This regression is formulated in the following equation:
Offense = a + b%Threat + b2Japanese + bgfJapanese X Threat) + e
For American respondents who are coded 0 on the dummy variable, the interaction 
term involving Japanese is zero, and the equation is reduced to Oflfense = a + b|Threat + 
e. Thus, b { is the effect of perceived threat on intended future involvement in the offense 
for Americans. For Japanese, the equation becomes Offense = (a + b?) + (b | + bgJThreat 
+ e. Therefore, the effect o f perceived threat on future offense is (b% +b])  for Japanese, 
and a significance test for bg is a test of the difference in the effect o f threat on future 
offending between the two samples.
For three categories o f future offense and threat of shame, the b's associated with 
the three product terms are expected to be inverse and significant, indicating that the 
deterrent effect o f shame on future offending should be significantly higher for Japanese 
than for American respondents. In other words, the threat of shame is not as strong a 
deterrent for American respondents as for Japanese respondents. Likewise, for future 
offending and threat of embarrassment, the b's associated with the three product terms are 
predicted to be inverse and significant, suggesting greater deterrent eCkct of 
embarrassment for Japanese respondents than for American respondents. Finally, with 
three categories o f future offending, the b's for three product terms for management 
sanctions are expected to be inverse and significant. This indicates that management 
sanctions in the form of material and/or p in e a l deprivation are more o f a stronger 
deterrent for Japanese respondents than for American respondents.
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Analysis
Comparisons o f Japanese and American Samples
As a first step toward hypothesis testing, a series of t-tests are reported. Tables 2- 
4 report simple comparisons o f the Japanese and American samples for three rule violation 
measures, and measures of perceived certainty and severity, as well as the product of 
certainty and severity, for each o f the three threats.
Taking a Lone Lunch or Break without Approval. The comparison of the two 
samples concerning a future offense o f taking a long lunch or break without approval and 
perceived threats o f shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions for the offense is 
presented in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
Comparing the Japanese sample to the American sample, the percentage who 
report they had taken a long lunch or break without approval during their whole lives is 
significantly lower for the Japanese sample. Likewise, the percentage of Japanese 
respondents who report they will do so in the future is significantly lower than that of 
American respondents. These findings are consistent with the expectation o f the current 
research that Japanese employees are more inclined than American employees to avoid 
noncompliant acts.
Table 2 also reveals significant differences in perceived levels of all three sanction 
threats in the predicted direction For each of the three threats, the difference between the 
two samples is significant for certainty, severity, and the product o f the two. Clearly, 
Japanese respondents, compared with American respondents, perceive greater probability 
that they will feel ashamed, lose respect firom significant other employees, and be caught 
by management authorities when considering whether or not to take a long lunch or break
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Table 2
Aporovai
Variable
Japanese 
(N = 23l)
American 
(N = 238) t p
Percent Who Have Taken a Long a Lunch or 
Break without Approval in Whole Life
9.09 52.10 -11.36 <001
Percent Who Intend to Take Long Lunch or 
Break without Approval in the Future
13.42 54.20 -10.29 <001
Mean Certainty of Shame 3.76 2.96 12.24 <001
Mean Severity of Shame 3.62 2.60 11.83 <001
Mean Certainty X Severity of Shame 
(Threat of Shame)
13.81 8.16 13.90 <001
Mean Certainty of Embarrassment 3.11 2.37 10.59 <001
Mean Severity of Embarrassment 3.73 3.29 4.95 <001
Mean Certainty X Severity of Embarrassment 
(Threat of Embarrassment)
11.91 7.96 9.79 <001
Mean Certainty of Management Sanctions 3.30 2.45 12.53 <001
Mean Sevens of Management Sanctions 3.69 3.24 4.99 <001
Mean Certainty X Severity of Management 
Sanctions (Threat of Management Sanctions)
12.38 8.13 10.85 <001
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without approval. For seventy, Japanese respondents estimate more severe efifect o f the 
guiit-feeiings, the loss o f respect, and the formal management sanctions. These differences 
in certainty and severity for each o f the three threats are large enough that the product o f 
certainty and severity o f each threat is significantly greater for Japanese than for American 
respondents.
Coming to Work Late or Leaving Earlv without Approval. The comparison of 
Japanese and American respondents for coming to work late or leaving early without 
approval and perceived threats of shame, embarrassment and management sanctions for 
the offense is reported in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 about here
The results are similar to the previous rule violation conduct. As expected, a 
significant difference exists between the two samples in the percentage who indicate they 
had committed the offense during their whole lives. Similarly, for Japanese respondents 
compared with American respondents, the percentage who report they will do so in the 
future is significantly lower.
Table 3 also shows significam differences in perceived levels o f all three 
punishment threats. For each of the three threats, the difference between the two samples 
is significant for certainty, severity, and the product in the expected direction. Japanese 
respondents, compared with American respondents, report a greater likelihood that they 
will feel guilty, lose respect fi*om significant other employees, and be caught by people in 
authority when considering whether or not to come to work late or leave early without 
approval. Similarly, Japanese respondents perceive more severity for guilt-feelings, loss of 
respect, and formal sanctions should they occur. These differences in certainty and 
severity for each o f the three sanction threats are so large that the product o f certainty and 
severity o f each threat is significantly greater for Japanese than for American respondems.
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Table 3
without AoDrovai
Variable
Japanese 
(N = 23l)
American 
(N = 238) t p
Percent Who Ha% e Come to Work Late or 
Leave Early without Approval in Whole Life
19.91 41.18 -5.12 <001
Percent Who Intend to Come to Work Late or 
or Leave Early without Approval in the Future
12-55 41.18 -7.35 <001
Mean Certainty of Shame 3.89 3.37 9.11 <001
Mean Severity of Shame 3.94 2.97 10.78 <001
Mean Certainly X Severi^ of Shame 
(Threat of Shame)
15.48 10.55 11.68 <001
Mean Certaintv of Embarrassment 3.22 2.68 7.75 <001
Mean Severity of Embarrassment 3.86 3.41 5.21 <001
Mean Certainty X Se\'erity of Embarrassment 
(Threat of Embarrassment)
12.77 9.36 7.94 <001
Mean Certainty of Management Sanctions 3.50 3.12 5.46 <001
Mean Severity of Management Sanctions 3.83 3.43 4.51 <001
Mean Certainty X Severity of Management 
Sanctions (Threat of Management Sanctions)
13.56 10.97 5.96 <.001
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Using Sick Leave When Not Reallv Sick. The comparison o f the two samples
for an offense o f using sick leave when not really sick and perceived threats of shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions for the offense is presented in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 about here
The results are somewhat different from those for the previous two of&nses. 
Contrary to the expectation, no significant difference is observed between the two samples 
in the percentage who indicate th ^  had engaged in this rule violation behavior during their 
whole lives. Neither is there a significant difierence in the percentage who report they will 
do so in the future.
However, the table demonstrates significant differences in perceived levels o f all 
three punishment threats in the predicted direction. For each of the three threats, the 
difference between the two samples is significant for certainty, severity, and the product. 
These findings indicate that in considering the projected costs of using sick leave when not 
really sick, Japanese respondents, compared with American respondents, estimate a higher 
probability of feeling guilty, losing respect from significant other employees, and being 
caught by management authority. Japanese respondents also perceive greater severity o f 
the guilt-feelings, the loss of respect, and the management sanctions should they be 
imposed. These differences in certainty and severity frir each sanction threat are large 
enough then that the product o f certain^ and severity o f each threat is significantly greater 
for Japanese than for American respondents.
Bivariate Correlations
Before estimating direct effects on future offending of culture and three perceived 
threats in an OLS regression model, the current study examined, as a second step, all 
bivariate relationships among the variables used as predictors. In these analyses, data for 
Japanese and American respondents were merged with Japanese as a dumny variable for
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Table 4
Variable
Japanese 
(N = 23l)
American 
fN = 238) t p
Percent Who Have Used Sick Lea\'e 
When Not Really Sick in Whole Life
15.58 15.55 0.01 495
Percent Who Intend to Use Sick Leave 
When Not Really Sick in the Future
22.94 22.73 -1.19 117
Mean Certainty of Shame 3.59 3.45 2.31 Oil
Mean Severity of Shame 3.71 3.16 6.10 <001
Mean Certainty X Severity' of Shame 
(Threat of Shame)
13.57 11.37 5.00 <001
Mean Certainty of Embarrassment 3.13 2.82 4.15 <001
Mean Severity of Embarrassment 3.76 3.42 3.66 <001
Mean Certainty X Severity of Embarrassment 
(Threat of Embarrassment)
12.12 10.09 4.46 <001
Mean Certain^ of Management Sanctions 3.25 2.13 15.70 <001
Mean Severity of Management Sanctions 3.75 3.48 2.92 .002
Mean Certainty X Severity o f Management 
Sanctions (Threat of Managemern Sanctions)
12.41 7.63 11.71 <001
94
culture, coded I for Japanese. The threats o f shame, embarrassment, and management 
sanctions were the products o f the certainty and severity measures. Male was a dummy 
variable for gender, coded 1 for males. Age and years o f education were interval variables 
measured in years. Finally, prior offending was a dummy variable for past involvement in 
the offense, coded 1 for respondents who said they had committed the offense during their 
lives.
Insert Table 5, 6, and 7 about here
Tables 5-7 report the bivariate correlations involving the dependent variables (i.e., 
the inclinations to commit each o f the three offenses in the future). It is found that prior 
offending is more strongly correlated with the dependent variables than are culture (coded 
I for Japanese and 0 for Americans), perceived threats, and sociodemographic variables. 
These correlations range from a low o f+.547 to a high o f +.735. However, all three 
bivariate correlations involving Japanese and behavioral intentions are inverse, as 
predicted. This indicates that Japanese respondents are less likely than white respondents 
to commit the offenses in the future. For intended fiiture offense o f taking a long lunch or 
break without approval, the bivariate correlation with Japanese is -.430; for intended 
future involvement in coming to work late or leaving early without approval, -.322; and 
for intended friture involvement in using sick leave when not really sick, -.055. The first 
two correlations achieve significance beyond the .001 level, but the last one fiüls to do so 
(P=.117).
Strong significant correlations in the predicted direction exist between future 
offending and the intervening variables o f perceived threats o f shame, embarrassment, and 
management sanctions. All nine correlations involving future offense and perceived 
threats (i.e., products of certainty and severity) are inverse and statistically significant 
beyond the .001 level. This suggests that the threats o f shame, embarrassment, and
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Table 5
Correlations o f Behavioral Intention to Take a Long Lunch or Break without Aumoval with Perceived
Threats and Control Variables (N=469. one-tailed tests»
Variables (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
( 1) Long lunch or break 1.000
(2) Japanese -.430
« 001)
1.000
(3) Shame -.479
«001)
.541 
(<001)
1.000
(4) Embarrassment -.295
«001)
.413
«001)
.556
« 0 0 1 )
1.000
(5) Management sanctions
«001)
-.345
«001)
.449
« 0 0 1 )
.583 
(<001)
.564 1.000
(6) Male .089
(.026)
-.137
(.001)
-.164
« 0 0 1 )
-.136
(.002)
-.177 
(<001)
1.000
(7) Age .061
(.093)
-.254
«001)
- 110 
(.009)
-.154 
(<001)
-.117
(.006)
185 
(<001)
1.000
(8) Education .164
«001)
-.245
«001)
-.170
« 0 0 1 )
-.068
(.072)
-.227 
(<001)
-161
«001)
.042
(.183)
1.000
(9) Prior offense .735
« 001)
-465
«001)
-.475 
(<001)
-.306 
(<001)
-.331
«001)
.117
(.006)
.098
(.017)
.059
(.101)
l.OOO
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Table 6
Correlaiions of Behavioral Intention to Come to Work Late or Leave Earlv without Approval with
Perceived Threats and Control Variables (N==469. one-tailed tests)
Variables (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
( L ) Come to work late or 
leave early
l.OOO
(2) Japanese -.322 
(<001)
1.000
(3) Shame -.435 
(<001)
.476 
(<001)
l.OOO
(4) Embarrassment -.239 
(<001)
.345 
(<001)
.544 
(<001)
l.OOO
(S) Management sanctions
(<001)
-.285 
(<001)
.266 
(<001)
.572
« 0 0 1 )
.536 1.000
(6) Male .109
(.009)
-.137
(.001)
-.202 
« 0 0 1)
- 101 
(.014)
-.201
«001)
1.000
(7) Age .011
(.402)
-.254 
(<001)
-.170
(.009)
-.178
« 001)
- 139 
(.001)
185 
(<001)
l.OOO
(8) Education .142
(.001)
-.245 
(<001)
-.181 
(<001)
-.066
(.077)
-.200
«001)
161
«001)
.042
(.183)
1.000
(9) Prior oflënsc .728
(<.001)
-.230 
(<001)
-.322 
(<001)
-.184
« 0 0 1 )
-.221 
(<001)
.064
(.084)
-.016
(.365)
.081
(.039)
(9)
1.000
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Table 7
Correlations of Behavioral [ntentiop to Use Sick Leave When Not Reallv Sick with Perceived Threats and
Control Variables (N=469. one-tailed tests)
Variables (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(I) Use sick leave l.OOO
(2) Japanese -.055
(.117)
l.OOO
(3) Shame -.362
(<(K)l)
.225 
(<001)
l.OOO
(4) Embarrassment -.263 
(< 001)
.202 
(<001)
.524
« 0 0 1 )
1.000
(S) Management sanctions
(<001)
-.219 
« 0 0 1)
.476
(<00l)
.466
« 0 0 1 )
499 l.OOO
(6) Male .073
(.058)
-.137
(.001)
-.212
« 0 0 1 )
-.112
(.008)
-.204
«001)
l.OOO
(7) Age -.058
(.103)
-.254 
(<001)
-.014
(.380)
-.128
(.003)
-.188 
(<001)
.185
(<00l)
l.OOO
(8) Education -.016
(.366)
-.245
«001)
.041
(.187)
.014
(.385)
-.172
(<.00l)
.161 
(<001)
.042
(.183)
l.OOO
(9) Prior offense .547 
(<001)
.001
(.495)
-.297
« 0 0 1 )
-.249 
(<001)
-149
(.001)
.116
(.006)
.007
(.439)
-.077
(.049)
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management sanctions operate as deterrents, as expected, to intended future involvement 
in the three offenses. The correlations are in the range o f a low o f -.219 for the 
correlation between management sanctions and using sick leave when not realty sick to a 
high of -.479 between shame and taking a long lunch or break without approval.
Consistent with the expectation, being Japanese is positively correlated with all 
three perceived threats for each three future offending. All nine correlations containing 
perceived threats and Japanese reach the significance beyond the .001 level. This suggests 
that Japanese respondents, compared to American respondents, perceive significantly 
higher threats o f shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions when considering 
each offense. The correlations range from a low o f +.202 for the correlation between 
Japanese and embarrassment for using sick leave when not really sick to a high o f +541 
between Japanese and shame for taking a long lunch or break without approval.
The sociodemographic control variables tend to be related to the perceived threats. 
For all three threats for all three offenses, men score significantly (p< 05) lower on all 
three punishment threats than do women, with correlations in the range of-. 101 to -.212. 
Age also has an inverse correlation with each o f the threat-offense combinations. With the 
exception of the correlation between age and shame for using sick leave when not really 
sick (p=.380), all significance levels achieve significance beyond the .01 level. Education 
is less consistently related to perceived sanction threats. For two types o f future offending 
(taking a long lunch or break without approval and coming to work late or leave early 
without approval), education produces significant (p<.00l) inverse correlations with 
shame (-. 170 and -.181) and management sanctions (-.227 and -.200), but no correlation 
with embarrassment. For the offense o f using sick leave when not really sick, education 
has a significant (p<.001) inverse correlation (-. 172) with management sanctions, but not 
with the other two threats.
Prior offending is significantly correlated with all three perceived threats ranging 
fi’om a low o f -. 149 for the correlation between management sanctions and using sick
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leave when not really sick to a high o f -.475 between shame and taking a long lunch or 
break without approval. All nine correlations involving prior offending and sanction 
threats achieve significance beyond the .001 level.
Regression Analvsis o f Determinants o f Perceived Sanction Threats
As direct tests o f the seven hypotheses, a series o f OLS regressions are performed. 
Although some variables are dichotomous (e.g., intended future involvement in the 
offense), an OLS regression model is consistently adopted because the OLS regression, 
unlike logistic regression, facilitates a comparison o f direct effects o f intervening variables 
for three perceived threats. The current research, however, replicates the analyses using a 
logistic regression model and reaches the same conclusion.
To assess the first three hypotheses, an OLS regression is used to first regress each 
of the three sanction threats for each of the three future offenses. In the second equation, 
the control variables are added to determine whether any effect o f being Japanese in the 
first equation is merely a function o f the sociodemographic composition of the two 
samples.
Culture and Shame. Table 8 reports the direct tests of Hypothesis I regarding 
the cultural differences in perceived levels of punishment threat o f shame for future 
offending.
Insert Table 8 about here
Equation I reveals that three standardized coefficiems, or Beta, for Japanese are 
positive as expected and statistically significant (p<.OOI). This indicates that Japanese 
respondents perceive a greater threat o f shame than do American respondents when 
considering each o f the three future offending types. For taking a long lunch or break 
without approval, the coefBcient is +.541; for coming to work late or leaving early 
without approval +.476, and for using sick leave when not realfy sick, +.225.
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Table 8
OLS RcEression o f Shame on Culture and Control Variables (N=469. nnp-taileri teste)
Lone Lunch or Break
Come to Work Late 
or Leave Earlv Use Sick Leave
Eq. I B g a Eq. I Eg. 2 i g j . 1 ^ 2
Japanese 6.654 4.151 4.926 3.967 2.202 2.416
Beta .541 .397 .476 .383 .225 .247
S — <001 <001 <001 <001 <001 <001
Male _b_ -.954 -1.484 -2.111
Beta — -.075 -.118 — -.178
— .025 .002 — <001
Age _b_ — .019 — -.027 — .039
Bm .035 -.052 — .079
S - ~ .187 ---- .102 — .037
Education _ k _ -.125 -.132 — .277
Beta — -.045 ---- -.048 — .106
_ E _ — .124 ---- .119 — .008
Prior offense b __ -3.190 -2.504 -3.626
Beta — .397 -.223 — -269
_ 0 _ — <001 — <001 — <001
(intercept) 8.160 11.269 10.550 15.160 11.366 6.613
r2 .293 .365 .226 .295 .051 .177
P <001 <001 <.001 <001 <.001 <001
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Equation 2 adds the control variables o f gender, age, education, and prior 
offending. The coefiScients associated with being Japanese are not substantially altered 
with the addition o f these control variables. For taking a long lunch or break without 
approval, the coefficient is +.397; for coming to work late or leaving early, +.383; and for 
using sick leave when not really sick, +.247. All three coefficients are significant beyond 
the .001 level. These findings are consistent with the first hypothesis of the current 
research that Japanese perceive a higher threat o f shame than do Americans when 
considering future deviant acts.
Equation 2 also shows that some o f the control variables have significant direct 
effects on perceived threats o f shame. Males perceive a significantly lower threat of 
shame than females. For taking a long lunch or break, the coefficient is -.075 (p=.025); 
for coming to work late or leaving early, -.118 (p=.002); and for using sick leave when not 
really sick, -. 178 (<001). Age (Beta=.079, p=.037) and education (Beta=. 106, p=.008) 
also have significant direct positive efifocts on threat o f shame for using sick leave when 
not really sick. These findings indicate that the older and the educated perceive a greater 
threat o f shame when considering future offenses. Prior offending has a statistically 
significant inverse effect on shame. For taking a long lunch or break without approval, the 
coefficient is -.397; for coming to work late or leaving early without approval, -223; and 
for using sick leave when not really sick -269. This suggests that people who say they 
had committed the offense tend to formulate perceptions o f a lower threat o f shame.
Culture and Embarrassment. Table 9 reports the multivariate analysis examining 
Hypothesis 2 regarding the cultural differences in perceived degrees of punishment threat 
of embarrassment, using an OLS regression model.
Insert Table 9 about here
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Table 9
OLS Regression o f Embarrassment on Culture and Control Variables (N=469. one-tailed (esis)
Lone Lunch or Break
Come to Work Late 
or Leave Early Use Sick Leave
EgJ. Eg. 2 Eg. 1 E g^ Eg. 1 Eg. 2
Japanese _L_ 3.951 3.216 3.409 2.903 2.024 1.905
Beta .413 .336 .345 .293 .202 .190
<001 <(K)l <(H)1 <001 <001 <001
Male _b_ -826 -.471 -.652
Beta — -071 -.039 — -.054
_a_ — .050 — .188 — .119
Age _b_ «—» -.021 — -.050 --- -.035
Beta — -.043 — -.100 --- -.070
— .163 — .014 — .064
Education _b_ .092 __ .069 .142
Beta — .036 — .026 — .053
_ a _ — .204 — .280 --- .122
Prior offense - b _ mm -1.445 __ -1.254 -3.283
Beta --- - 140 — -.117 — -.238
J 2 _ --- .002 — .004 -- - <001
(intercept) 7.962 8.373 9.357 10.978 10.092 10.028
r 2 .170 .195 .119 .143 .041 .113
P <001 <001 <001 <001 <001 <001
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The results are similar for the perceived threat o f embarrassment. The 
standardized coefficients., or Beta, for Japanese employees in Table 9 are positive as 
predicted and statistically significant beyond the .001 leveL This indicates that Japanese 
respondents perceive a greater threat of embarrassment for the three offenses than do 
American respondents. For taking a long lunch or break without approval the coefficient 
is +.413; for coming to work late or leaving early without approval +.345, and for using 
sick leave when not really sick, +.202.
Addition of the control variables in the second equations does not substantially 
alter these findings. The coefficients for Japanese employees remain positive and 
significant beyond the .001 level with controls o f the sociodemographic variables of 
gender, age, education, and prior offending. For taking a long lunch or break without 
approval the coefficient is +.336, for coming to work late or leaving early without 
approval +.293; for using sick leave when not really sick, +. 190. These findings clearly 
support the second hypothesis o f the current research.
The equation also reveals that being male has a barely significant inverse direct 
effect on embarrassment for taking a long lunch or break without approval (Beta=- 071, 
p=.050). Age has a significant inverse direct effect on embarrassment for coming to work 
late or leaving early without approval (Beta=-. 100, p=.014). Prior offending has 
significant inverse direct effects on embarrassment for all three offenses. For taking a long 
lunch or break without approval the coefficient is -. 140; for coming to work late or 
leaving early, -.117; and for using sick leave when not really sick, -.238. All these three 
coefficients are statistically significant beyond the .01 level
Culture and Management Sanctions. Tests of Hypothesis 3 concerning the cultural 
differences in perceived levels o f punishment threat o f management sanctions are reported 
in Table 10 in the form o f OLS regression equations.
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[nsert Table 10 about here
The results are similar to those for the perceived informal sanction threats. In the 
6rst equation, the standardized coefiBcients, or Beta, for Japanese employees is positive as 
expected and statistically significant b^ond the .001 level. This indicates that compared 
to American respondents, Japanese respondents perceive a significantly greater threat o f 
management sanctions when considering the three future offenses. For taking a long lunch 
or break without approval, the coefBcient is +.449; for coming to work late or leaving 
early without approval +.266; and for using sick leave when not really sick, +.476.
The addition o f the control variables o f gender, age, education, and prior offending 
in Equation 2 does not substantially change these findings. The direct effects o f being 
Japanese on the formal sanction threat continue to be positive and statistically significant 
beyond the .001 level. For taking a long lunch or break without approval the coefBcient 
is +.340; for coming to work late or leaving early without approval +.161; and for using 
sick leave when not really sick, +.434. These findings clearly support the third hypothesis 
o f the current research.
The equation also demonstrates that gender has significant direct effects on the 
formal sanction threat for all three offenses. The significant inverse coefBcients for males 
suggest that compared to women, men perceive a significantly lower threat of 
management sanctions. For taking a long lunch or break without approval the coefBcient 
is -.094 (p=.012); for coming to work late or leaving early without approval -. 136 
(p=.001); and for using sick leave when not really sick, -. 110 (p=.004). Education also 
has significant inverse direct effect on management sanction threat for taking a long lunch 
or break without approval (Beta=^ 121, p=.002) and for coming to work late or leaving 
early without approval (Beta=-122, p=.003). Prior offending has significant inverse 
effects on the formal sanction threat for all three offenses. For taking a long lunch or
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Table 10
OLS Regression of Management Sanctions on Culture and Control Variables (N=469. one-taiied tests)
Lone Lunch or Break
Conte to Work Late 
or Leave Earlv lise Sick Leave
Eq. i i a a Eq. 1 i i l EgJ. Eg. 2
Japanese _b_ 4.242 3.158 2.584 1.564 4.781 4.354
Beta .449 .340 .266 .161 .476 .434
<001 <001 <001 <001 <001 <001
Male _b_ -1.081 -1.601 -1.334
Beta . . . -.094 — » -.136 — -.110
-EL. .012 — .001 — .004
Age _b_ . . . .002 -.035 -.028
Beta — .006 —— -.071 — -.054
— .495 ---- .059 — .097
Education b -.304 -.315 -151
Beta . . -.121 — -.122 — -.057
— .002 —— .003 — .087
Prier oQense _b_ -1.619 -1.757 -1.941
Beta — -.158 —— -.167 — -.140
-EL- — <001 — .004 — <001
(intercept) 8.134 13.871 10.975 18.449 7.630 11.771
r2 .201 .246 .071 .141 .227 .270
P <001 <.001 <001 <001 <001 <001
106
break without approval, the coefficient is 158, tor coming to work late or leaving early 
without approvaL 167, and for using sick leave when not really sick, 140. All these 
coefficients are significant beyond the .001 level.
Regression Analvsis of Determinants o f Noncompliance Tendencies
The analyses examining hypotheses 4 and 5 regarding the cultural difforences in 
likelihood to participate in future ofienses are presented in Tables 11-13. It is important 
to emphasize that the intervening effect o f any one threat on the relationstiip between 
being Japanese and future offenses should be interpreted as a function o f the following 
two magnitudes; (a) the magnitude o f cultural differences in the perceived levels of 
sanction threat and (b) the magnitude o f the effect o f that threat on intention to become 
involved in the three offenses.
Isolation o f the independent contributions o f the three threats to the cultural 
differences in intended future offenses is not a simple task because, as Grasmick, Bursik,
& Ameklev ( 1993) assert, there exist strong correlations among these threats. Tables 5-7 
demonstrate that all o f these correlations are positive and significant beyond the .001 level. 
The correlations range fiom a low o f+.466 for the threats o f shame and management 
sanctions for using sick leave when not really sick to a high of +.583 for the threats of 
shame and management sanctions for taking a long lunch or break without approval. The 
current research examined the multicoUenarity diagnostics fi'om SPSS outputs in the 
various regressions, but they suggested no harmful multicoUenarity problem.
Taking a Long Lunch or Break Without Approval. The effects o f culture, control 
variables, and three perceived threats on the behavioral intention to take a long lunch or 
break without approval in the future are presented in Table 11.
Insert Table 11 about here
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Table 11
(N=469: one-lailed tests in oarcnthesesi
Eg. 1 Eg. 2 Eg . 3 Eg. 4 Eq. 5 E g^ E&_7 Eg . 8 Eg. 9
Japanese b -408 -.089 -.036 -.071 -.065 -.035 -032 -.060 -.032
Beta -.430 -.093 -.038 -.075 -.068 -.037 -.034 -.063 -.034
(<001) (.006) (.170) (.027) (.039) (.177) (.199) (.054) (.198)
Shame b -- -.013 ------ -.013 -.012 __ -.012
Beta -- — -.141 --- —• -.138 -.129 — -.130
_E_ ------ ------- (<(K)l) — ------ (.001) (.001) — (.002)
Embarrassment _b_ -.006 .000 __ -.003 .000
Beta ------- --- -.056 -.005 — -.028 .004
— -- (.051) — • (.445) — (.230) (.460)
Management b mmm mmm — ■ ■■ 1 — -.008 -.003 -.006
sanctions Beta ------ —- -----* •— -.076 — -.026 -.063 -.028
------ --- ------ (.016) — (.249) (.058) (.251)
Male b -.017 -.029 -.022 -.025 -.030 -.031 -.026 .031
Beta -.015 -.026 -.019 -.022 -.026 -.027 -.023 -.027
_R_ ------ (.319) (.207) (.276) (.244) (.208) (.196) (.236) (.196)
Age b -.002 -.001 -.002 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.002 -.001
Beta -- -.032 -.027 -.034 -.032 -.027 -.027 -.033 -.027
— (.161) (.198) (.143) (.163) (.196) (.195) (.154) (.198)
Education _b_ .026 .025 .027 .024 .025 .024 .025 .024
Beta — .104 .098 .106 .095 .098 .095 .098 .095
_ E _ -- (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.002)
Prior oOense _ b _ .708 .667 .700 .696 .667 .667 694 .667
Beta .690 .651 .682 .678 .650 .650 .676 .650
-- (<001) (<001) (<001) (<001) (<001) (<001) (<001) «001)
(intercept) .542 -.166 -.022 -.119 -.060 -.020 .002 -.056 .002
.185 .561 .574 .564 .566 .574 .574 .566 .574
P <001 <001 <001 <001 <001 <001 <.001 <001 <001
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Equation I in Table 11 reports the bivariate standardized effect o f culture on the 
intended future offense. The significant inverse effect (Beta=-.430, p<.001) simply 
Indicates that compared to American respondents, Japanese respondents report they are 
significantly less likely to take a long lunch or break without approval in the future.
The control variables are added to the regression in Equation 2. The effect of 
being Japanese remains positive and statistically significant (Beta=-.093, p=.006), with 
controls of the sociodemographic variables of gender, age, education, and prior offenses. 
The equation also reveals that education has a significant positive effect (Beta=+ 104, 
p=.00l), while prior offense has a positive direct effect (Beta=+.690, p<.001) on the 
dependent variable o f future offense.
Equations 3-5 add, one at a time, the threats o f shame, embarrassment, and 
management sanctions to the previous equation to evaluate a fimction of each threat, by 
itself and without controls for the other threats, as an intervening variable in the 
relationship between culture and the intended future offense. Clearly, addition of these 
variables does reduce the magnitude o f the coefBcient for Japanese, supporting 
Hypothesis 5. The variable that by itself is most effective in accounting for the effect of 
being Japanese is threat of shame. The coefBcient o f -.093 for Japanese in equation 2 is 
reduced by 59% to -.038 and becomes no longer significant with the addition of threat of 
shame in equation 3. In equations 4 and 5, when only threat of embarrassment and threat 
of management sanctions are included separately, the reduction in the effect o f Japanese is 
less than in equation 3. In feet, the coefBcient for Japanese remains significant (p<.05).
Equations 6-8 contain the various combinations o f two threats. Equation 8, which 
involves embarrassment and management sanctions, is least effective in accounting for the 
effect of Japanese. In this equation, the coefBcient fisr Japanese is -.063, compared with 
-.037 for the combination of shame and embarrassment and -.034 for the combination of 
shame and management sanctions. The coefBcients for Japanese in equation 6 and 7 are 
not much smaller than the -.038 in equation 3, which includes shame and control variables.
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These comparisons, therefore, suggest that the greater perceived threat o f shame for 
Japanese employees is the primary source o f their lower future intention to take a long 
lunch or break without approval.
Equation 9 offers additional evidence for this conclusion. When all three perceived 
threats are included, the coefficient of >.034 for Japanese is only slightly smaller than the 
coefficient o f -.038 from equation 3, which contains shame and control variables. The 
greater threats o f embarrassment and management sanctions that Japanese perceive 
contribute very little, beyond the greater threat o f shame, to the lower inclination of 
Japanese than American respondents to commit the offense.
While the difference in the perceived levels o f shame between the two samples is 
primarily responsible for the difference in future involvement in taking a long lunch or 
break without approval, shame is the only threat variable that has a significant deterrent 
effect (p=.002) on the offense in the merged data set. The coefficient for shame (Beta= 
130) is more than four and half times as great as that for management sanctions (Beta= 
-.028). Although the direct effect of the formal sanctions is inverse as predicted in 
Hypothesis 4, it fails to achieve significance (p=.25l). The direct effect of embarrassment 
is not significant (p=.460), as well; in feet it is positive (Beta=+.004), contrary to the 
expected "deterrent" effect. These findings suggest that the cultural difference in the 
perceived levels of shame and its strong deterrent effect are the primary source o f less 
inclination o f Japanese respondents to commit the future offense.
The addition of perceived threats o f shame, embarrassment, and management 
sanctions to the equation does not create any changes in the direction nor the statistical 
significance o f all demographic variables. Although the bivariate correlation between male 
and intention to take a long lunch or break without approval (r=+ 089) is significant 
(p=.026), male does not make a direct contribution to intention to take a long lunch or 
break without approval and to the cultural difference in the intended involvement in the 
offense between Japanese and American respondents. The analyses reported in Tables 8-
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i 0 reveal that the direct efifea o f male is insignificant in equation 9 because men perceive 
significantly lower threats o f shame (Beta=-.075, p=.025), embarrassment (Beta=^.071, 
p=.050) and management sanctions (Beta=-.094, p=.012) fiarthe offense.
Education makes a direct contribution to future intention to take a long lunch or 
break without approval. The bivariate correlation between education and the intended 
future offense is positive (r=H-_ 164) and significant beyond the .001 level, and education 
has a significant inverse direct effect on the perceived threat o f management sanctions 
(Beta=- 121, p=.002). Nevertheless, even when the formal sanction threat is controlled in 
equation 9, as well as 5, 7, and 8, education continues to have a significant positive effect 
o f .095 on the future offending (p=.002). Thus, while some of the positive correlation 
between education and the intended future offense occurs because the more educated 
people perceive a higher threat o f management sanctions, education continues to have a 
significant effect independent o f the fiarmal sanction threat variable.
Equation 9 also reveals that prior offense makes a direct contribution to intention 
to take a long lunch or break without approval. The bivariate correlation between prior 
offense and the intended future offense is positive (r=+.735) and significant beyond the 
.001 level, and prior offense has inverse direct effects on the perceived threats o f shame 
(Beta=-397, p<.00l), embarrassment (Beta=-. 140, p=.002), and management sanctions 
(Beta=-. 158, p<.001) for the offense. Nevertheless, even when the three threats are 
controlled in equation 9, prior offense has a significant positive direct effect o f .650 on the 
future offense. Thus, while some o f the positive correlation between prior offense and the 
intended future offense occurs because people who had committed the offense perceived 
lower threats o f shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions, prior offending has a 
direct effect independent o f these punishment variables.
Coming to Work Late or Leaving Eariv \^fithout Approval. The results are 
somewhat different for the intended future offense o f coming to work late or leaving early 
without approval. Equation 1 in the Table 12 reports the bivariate standardized effect o f
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culture on the intended fiiture ofiense. The significant inverse effect (Beta=-.322, p<.OOI) 
simply indicates that Japanese respondents are significantly less likely than American 
respondents to indicate th^r intend to come to work late or leave early without approval 
in the future.
Insert Table 12 about here
The control variables are added to the regression in Equation 2. None o f the four 
sociodemographic variables have significant effects except prior offending. With the 
addition o f these control variables to the analysis, the effect of being Japanese remains 
significant (Beta=-. 154. p< 00l).
Equations 3-5 add the threats of shame, embarrassment, and management 
sanctions separately to the previous equation which contains culture and control variables. 
Addition o f these variables does reduce the magnitude of the coefBcient for Japanese. The 
coefficient is reduced to -.084 when shame is added (Equation 3), to -.135 when 
embarrassment is added (Equation 4), and to -. 140 when management sanctions is added 
(Equation 5). However, unlike the results in Table 11, the coefficients for Japanese 
remain significant beyond the .01 level even with the addition o f any one of the threats. 
These findings are in sharp contrast to Hypothesis 5.
Equations 6-8 contain the various combinations of two threats. Equation 8 which 
includes embarrassment and management sanctions is least effective in accounting for the 
effect o f culture. In this equation, the coefficient for Japanese is -. 134, compared with 
-.085 the two combinations of shame and embarrassment and shame and management 
sanctions. However, all these three coefficients remain significant beyond the .01 level. 
This suggests that any one of the greater punishment threats perceived by Japanese 
respondents is not the source of their lower intention to come to work late or leave early 
without approval.
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Table 12
QLS of Behavioral Intention to Come to Work Late or Leave Eatlv without Anprcn-al on [ndepcndent
Variables (N=469: one-laiied tests in nateotfaeses)
Eg. 1 Eg. 2 Eg. 3 Eg. 4 Eg, 5 Eq..6 EaJ. E&.8 Eg. 9
Japanese _b_ -.286 -.137 -.075 -.120 -.124 -.076 -.075 -.119 -.077
Beta -.322 -.154 -.084 -.135 -.140 -.085 -.085 -.134 -.087
_E_ (<.OOI) (<001) (.009) « 001) « 0 0 1 ) (.008) (.009) (<001) (.008)
Shame -b _ _ -.016 mmm -.016 -.015 -.016
Beta — — -184 —— -- -188 -176 — -.181
_E_ — — (<001) — --- (<001) «001) — « 0 0 1 )
Embarrassmeni _b_ -.006 __ .000 mm -.(K)3 .001
Beta — --- — -.066 --- 010 — -.029 .016
_E_ — —- — (.023) -- (.394) -- (.223) (.338)
Management _ b _ — mmm — — -.(M)8 -.001 -.007 -.002
sanctions Beta — —— — — -.092 — -.014 -.078 -.019
_R_ *— --- — — (.003) — (.358) (.020) (.314)
Male -b _ .046 .022 .043 .032 .022 .021 .033 .020
Beta — .042 .021 .040 .030 .020 .020 .031 .019
J2_ — (.093) (.256) (.106) (.176) (.258) (.267) (.170) (.275)
Age _b_ — -.001 -.002 -.001 -.001 -.002 -.002 -.002 -.002
Beta — -.026 -.036 -.033 -.033 -.035 -.037 -.035 -.036
S — — (-208) (.128) (.155) (.154) (.134) (.125) (.142) (.132)
Education _b_ .010 .008 Oil .007 .008 .008 .008 .007
Beta — .043 .034 .045 .032 .034 .033 .034 .031
— (.092) (.140) (.082) (.163) (.143) (.150) (.146) (.162)
Prior oflense _b_ .661 .620 .653 .646 .622 .621 .645 .621
Beta — .686 .645 678 .671 .645 .644 .670 .644
— « 0 0 1) «001) « 001 ) « 001 ) «001) (< 001) (<.001) « 0 0 1 )
(intercept) .412 .019 .258 .085 .174 .255 .271 .179 .271
r2 .104 .560 .584 .564 .567 .584 .584 .568 .584
P <•001 <.001 <001 <001 <001 <.001 <.001 <001 <.001
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Equation 9 (all three perceived threats) provides additional evidence for this 
conclusion. Addition of these variables does reduce the magnitude of the coefficient for 
Japanese. However, the effect observed for being Japanese on the future oflfending 
remains significant with controls for the three perceived threats (Beta=- 087, p=.008).
The greater threats o f shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions perceived by 
Japanese respondents contribute very little to their lower likelihood to come to work late 
or leave early without approval in the future. In other words, the difference in the future 
intention cannot be attributed to the difference in the perceived threats o f these three 
sanctions between Japanese and American respondents.
While the differences in the perceived levels o f shame, embarrassment, and 
management sanctions are not responsible for the difference between the two samples in 
future involvement in this offense, shame has a significant deterrent effect (p=.002) on the 
offense in the combined data set. The coefficient for shame (Beta=^ 181) is more titan 
eleven times as great as that for management sanctions (Beta=-.0l9). The direct effect of 
the formal sanctions is inverse as predicted in Hypothesis 4, but it fails to achieve 
significance (p=.314). The direct effect of embarrassment is also insignificant (p=.338); 
again, it is positive (Beta=+ 016), in sign, contrary to the expected "deterrent" effect.
Equation 9 also shows that none of the three sociodemographic variables have 
significant effects, while the effect o f prior offending is significant beyond the .001 level. 
Although the bivariate correlation between male and intention to come to work late or 
leave early without approval (r=+. 109) is significant (p=.009), male does not have a 
significant direct effect in the equation (Beta=+.019, p=.0S4). The analyses reported in 
Tables 8 and 10 reveal that the direct effect o f male is insignificant because males are apt 
to perceive significantly lower threats of shame (Beta=-.118, p=.002) and management 
sanctions (B eta= -136, p=.001). The bivariate correlation between education and future 
offending is also significant (r=+. 142, p=.001), but the direct effect is insignificant 
(Beta=+.031, p=. 162). The insignificance of the direct effect appears to result from the
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tendency (as reported in Table 10) that the less educated respondents perceive a higher 
threat o f management sanctions (Beta=- 122, p=.003).
Prior offense also contributes directly to the future offending with a control for 
three punishment threats. The bivariate correlation between prior offonse and the intended 
future offense is positive (r=+.728) and significant beyond the .001 level, and prior offense 
has significant inverse effects on the perceived threats o f shame (Beta=-223, p<.00l), 
embarrassment (Beta—. 117, p=.004), and management sanctions (Beta—.167, p=.004). 
Nevertheless, even when the three threats are controlled, prior offense has a significant 
positive direct effect of .619 on the foture offense. This indicates tfiat while prior 
offending might affect future intentions indirectly through the three perceived threats, 
prior offending also has a direct effect independent o f all three punishment threats.
Using Sick Leave When Not Reallv Sick. The results for the future offense of 
using sick leave when not really sick are somewhat different fi’om those for the previous 
two offenses. The bivariate Beta for Japanese in Equation I in Table 13 is -.055, 
indicating that Japanese respondents are less likely than white respondents to commit the 
offense in the future. However, the coefScient for Japanese is not statistically significant
( P = . 1 I 7 ) .
Insert Table 13 about here
The control variables are added in Equation 2. With the inclusion of 
sociodemographic variables o f gender, age, education, and prior offense, the coefBcient 
for Japanese becomes significant (Beta—.072, p=.040). Specifically, age (Beta—.084, 
p=.020) and prior offending (Beta=+.547, p<001) are significantly associated with the 
future offense, suggesting that these two control variables serve to suppress the inverse 
relationship between being Japanese and the future offending.
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Table 13
onc-lailed tests in narenthescs)
E gj. En . 2 Eq. 3 Eo. 4 Efl^ Eq. 6 Eg^ Eo.9
Japanese b -.048 -.063 -.016 -.040 -.004 -.012 .007 -.006 .006
B g a -.055 -.072 -.018 -.046 -.004 -.014 .009 -.006 .007
_ a _ (.117) (.040) (.334) (.133) (.462) (.366) (.425) (.444) (.437)
Shame _ b _ -.020 mm» _ -.018 -.017 __ -.016
Beta -.221 — — -.197 -.192 — -.182
— — (<001) — — (<001) «001) — «001)
Embarrassment b -.012 ■ mm -.004 mm» -.008 -.003
Beta ---- ■■■ — -.137 -.050 — -.092 -.029
_ E _ —- — — « 0 0 1 ) ---- (.135) — (.021) (.268)
Management b mm* — — — -.014 ■m» -.007 -.010 -.006
sanctions Beta —— — — -.157 ---- -.077 -.112 -.066
- E _ ---- — — — «001) ---- (.055) (.013) (.094)
Male b .014 -.027 -.006 -.004 -.026 -.031 -.004 -.029
Beta .013 -.026 -.006 -.004 -.024 -.029 -.004 -.028
— (.370) (.257) (.441) (.461) (.270) (.230) (.461) (.242)
Age b -.004 -.003 -.004 -.004 -.003 -.003 -.004 -.003
Beta -.084 -.066 -.093 -.092 -.071 -.073 -096 -.075
_EL_ ---- (.020) (.047) (.010) (.011) (.036) (.034) (.008) (.030)
Education - b _ .002 .008 .004 .000 .008 .006 .002 .006
Beta ---- .010 .033 .017 .000 033 .026 .008 .027
_ E _ — (.405) (.201) (.335) (.491) (220) (.258) (.417) (.250)
Prior oflense _ b _ .656 .585 .617 .630 579 .582 .611 .578
Bsa — .547 488 .514 .525 .482 484 .509 .482
- E L . —- « 0 0 1) (<001) «001) (<001) (<001) «001) «001) «001)
(intercept) .277 .288 .418 .408 448 .447 .479 .482 .488
r2 .003 .309 .349 .326 .327 351 .353 .333 .353
P .234 <001 <.001 <001 <001 <.001 <001 <001 <001
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Equations 3-5 add, one at a time, the threats o f shame, embanassment, and 
management sanctions to the previous equation. Clearly, the Beta for Japanese in 
Equation 2 is reduced and becomes insignificant with the addition o f each o f the three 
threat variables. The variable that by itself is most effective in accounting for the ef&ct o f 
Japanese is threat o f management sanctions. Shame also contributes as much to the effect. 
In fact, the Beta o f -.004 for Japanese in Equation 5, which includes management 
sanctions, is not much different fi'om Beta of -.018 in Equation 3, which includes shame. 
These findings provide support for Hypothesis 5 concerning the direct effect o f culture 
being mediated by perceived threat variables.
Equations 6-8 provide support for this conclusion. Equation 7. which contains 
shame and management sanctions, accounts for all inverse effect o f being Japanese on the 
future offense. With the addition o f the two threats, the coefBcient for Japanese becomes 
positive in sign and statistically insignificant (Beta=+ 009, p=.425). In Equation 6, which 
contains shame and embarrassment, the Beta for Japanese is -.014. The corresponding 
Beta in Equation 8 (embarrassment and management sanctions) is -.004. These 
comparisons, therefore, also suggest that Japanese employees score significantly higher on 
future involvement in using sick leave when not really sick primarily because they score 
significantly higher on the perceived threats of shame and management sanctions.
The conclusions are not altered when all three perceived threats are in Equation 9, 
along with culture and control variables. The Beta o f .007 for Japanese is positive in sign 
and not much different fi’om the Beta o f .009 in Equation 7 (shame and management 
sanctions). This indicates that the greater threat o f embarrassment perceived by Japanese 
respondents contributes very little, b^ond the greater threats o f shame and management 
sanctions, to their lower inclination to use sick leave when not really sick.
While the differences in shame and management sanctions appear to account fisr all 
inverse effect o f being Japanese on the fiiture offense, shame is the only punishment 
variable that has a significant inverse effect on intention to use sick leave when not really
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sick in the merged data set in Equation 9. The coefiScient for shame (Beta=^. 184, p<.001) 
is more than two and a half times as large as the coefBcient for management sanctions 
(Beta=-.066, p=.094). These findings indicate that greater threats of both shame and 
management sanctions perceived by Japanese respondents contribute directly to their 
lower intention to be involved in the offense; the greater threat o f shame is a primary 
source of their less intended future offense. The coefBcient for the threat of 
embarrassment is inverse (Beta=-.029), consistent with the expected "deterrent" effect, but 
it is not statistically significant when shame and management sanctions are controlled.
Equation 9 also shows that the addition o f the three perceived threats does not 
create any changes in the direction nor the statistical significance o f all demographic 
variables. Age continues to make a direct contribution to intention to use sick leave when 
not really sick (Beta=-.075, p=.030). The results reported in Table 8 demonstrate that age 
has a significant positive direct effect on the threat of shame for the offense (Beta=+.079, 
p=.037). Nevertheless, even when the threat o f shame is controlled, the direct effect of 
age remains significant. Thus, while some o f the inverse association between age and 
future offending occurs because older people perceive a higher threat of shame, age 
continues to have a significant effect independent of the self-imposed punishment variable.
Prior offense also makes a direct contribution to intention to use sick leave when 
not really sick. The bivariate correlation between prior offense and the intended future 
offense is positive (r=+543) and significant beyond the .001 level; and prior offense has 
inverse direct effects on the perceived threats o f shame (Beta=-269, p<.001), 
embarrassment (Beta=-.238, p<.00l), and management sanctions (Beta=-.140, p<.001). 
Nevertheless, even when the three threats are controlled, prior ofBsnse continues to have a 
significant positive direct effect o f .482 on intention to use sick leave when not really sick. 
This indicates that prior offending might affect the future intentions indirectly through the 
three perceived threats; prior offending also has a direct effect independent o f the three 
punishment variables.
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Interaction Effects
To test the last three hypotheses, OLS regressions are performed. Results in Table 
14 assess the possibility o f interaction effects between culture and perceived threats on 
intended future offenses.
Insert Table 14 about here
Taking a Long Lunch or Break without Approval. For future involvement in 
taking a long lunch or break without approval and threat o f shame, the b associated with 
the product term in Table 14 is positive and statistically significant (b=+.025, p=.002).
This indicates a significant difference between Japanese and American respondents in the 
deterrent effect of perceived threat o f shame on the future offense. The effect (b) is -.043 
for American respondents but only -.018 (i.e., -.043 + .025) for Japanese respondents. 
Additional analysis reveals that the effect of shame among Japanese is significant (p=.002). 
In contrast to Hypothesis 6, the nature of this interaction suggests that despite their lower 
likelihood to commit this fiiture offense, Japanese employees are less influenced than 
American employees by the threat o f shame. With this offense as the dependent variable, 
moral sentiments have more o f a deterrent effect for American employees than for 
Japanese employees.
The significant difference found in the effect of perceived threat of shame on this 
future involvement between Japanese and American respondents warrants that the product 
term be left in another equation where the control variables are added to the regression. 
The analysis, not reported here, indicates that the product term becomes clearly 
insignificant with the addition o f the control variables of gender, age, education, and prior 
offense (p=.355).
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Table 14
OLS Regression of Bchaviorai Intention to Commit the Oflènse on Culture. Perceived Threats and
Interaction Terms (N=469. one-tailed tesis)
Independent
Variable
Lone Break 
or Lunch
Come to Work Late 
or Leave Earlv
Use
Sick Leave
Shame (.S') _b_ -.043 -.041 -.036
Beta -.476 -.478 -.406
-B— <.001 <.001 <001
Japanese _b_ -.505 -.491 -.072
Beta -.532 -.553 -.083
<001 <001 .250
Japanese X S _b_ .025 .026 .008
Beta .393 .487 .132
_E_ .002 .001 .168
Embarrassment (£) b -.022 -.017 -.023
Beta -.218 -.194 -.270
_E _ .001 .002 <001
Japanese _k_ -.479 -.337 -.016
Beta -.505 -.136 -.019
<001 .047 .433
Japanese X E J l . .013 .009 .001
Beta .189 .140 .021
_EL_ .074 .150 .434
Management sanctions (A/) _k_ -.022 -.031 -.018
Beta -221 -.344 -.212
JL _ <001 <001 .004
Japanese _b_ -.387 -.571 .110
Beta -.408 -.642 .126
- B - <001 <001 .131
Japanese XM b .006 .027 -.006
Baa .086 .453 -.091
-EL_ .262 <•001 .267
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For this future offense, the b for the product term in the equation for embarrassment 
(b=+ 013, p=.074) or for management sanctions (b=-f-.086, p=.262) is not significant.
With this measure o f the dependent variable, therefore, the magnitude of the deterrent 
effects o f these two perceived threats does not differ significantly between Japanese and 
American respondents. Specifically, for the threat o f embarrassment, regardless o f which 
indicator o f the dependent variable is used, the b's for the product terms are not 
significant. Inconsistent with Hypothesis 7, these findings suggest that the m%nitude of 
the effect o f embarrassment on involvement is not a fimction o f culture.
Coming to Work Late or Leaving Earlv without Approval. The significant 
interaction term for threat o f shame using the future involvement reported earlier is 
replicated with intended future involvement in coming to work late or leaving early 
without approval as the dependent variable. The signs and magnitudes of the b associated 
with the product term in Table 14 indicates that the inverse effect o f perceived threat of 
shame on this intended future offense is greater for American respondents (b=-.041) than 
for Japanese respondents [(-.04l)+.026], or -.015, and the b for the product term is 
significant at the .001 level. Additional analysis reveals that the effect of shame for 
Japanese is statistically significant (p=.013). Again, these findings are in direct contrast to 
Hypothesis 6. Regardless o f their lower intention to participate in this offense, Japanese 
employees are less deterred than American employees by their moral beiiefe.
Another regression, not reported here, indicates that the interaction effect remains 
significant even with the control variables in the equation. The inverse effect o f the 
perceived threat o f shame is greater for American respondents (-.021) than for Japanese 
respondents [(-.021)+.0l3], or -.008, and the difference is statistically significant at the .01 
level.
With this intended future involvement, the interaction o f culture and threat of 
management sanctions is significant in a direction which suggests that Japanese 
respondents are less deterred than white respondents by the formal sanction threat. The
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efFea is -.031 for American respondents and [(-.031)+.027] or -.004 for Japanese 
respondents; the difference in the effect o f management sanctions for Japanese and 
American respondents is .027. Additional analysis demonstrates that the effect o f 
management sanctions for Japanese is not significant (p=.230). These findings are in 
contrast to Hypothesis 8 that the threat o f management sanctions is more o f a deterrent 
for Japanese than for American employees. In spite o f less likelihood to be involved in 
this future offense, Japanese employees are less influenced than American employees by 
the threat o f instituted penalties.
Additional analysis, not reported here, reveals that the interaction effect remains 
significant even with the controls in the equation. For American respondents, the effect of 
management is -.015 and significant (p<.00l). The effect o f management sanctions for 
Japanese respondents is -.015 plus the coefBcient o f .014 for the product term, or -.001. 
Thus, the effect of management sanctions on the future involvement in coming to work 
late or leaving early is greater for American respondents than for Japanese respondents, 
and the difference (i.e., the b for the product term) achieves significance beyond the .01 
level.
Using Sick Leave When Not Reallv Sick. The significant interaction terms for 
threats of shame and management sanctions using the future involvement reported earlier 
are not observed with intended future involvement in using sick leave when not really sick 
as the dependent variable. While the signs and magnitudes o f the appropriate b's in Table 
14 reveal that the inverse effects o f shame and management sanctions are greater for 
American respondents than for Japanese respondents, neither o f the b's for the product 
terms achieves significance beyond the .05 level.
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Chapter 10:
Summary and Discussion
Cultural Differences in 
Perceived Levels o f Sanction Threats and Noncompliance Tendencies
Summary
The objective of the current research has been to account for cultural differences in 
noncompliance tendencies through cultural differences in perceived levels o f shame, 
embarrassment, and management sanctions between employees in Japanese and U.S. 
organizations. To do so, this study has proposed that Japanese employees perceive a 
greater threat of each punishment threat than do American employees. Subsequently, it is 
argued, Japanese employees are less likely than American employees to commit future 
offenses.
Hypotheses 1-3 are clearly supported as the analyses offer evidence o f significant 
cultural differences between Japanese and American respondents in the perceived levels of 
sanction threats in the predicted direction. However, the findings relevant to Hypotheses 
4 and 5 are less consistent. For two o f the three offenses (i.e., taking a long lunch or 
break without approval and using sick leave when not really sick), the direct inverse effect 
of being Japanese is not rendered insignificant with the inclusion o f the perceived threats 
of embarrassment and management sanctions. For the offense to come to work late or 
leave early without approval, the effect remains significam with the addition o f any one of 
the three threats. Besides, while the differences between the two samples in perceived 
levels o f embarrassment and management sanction threats seem to contribute little beyond 
the effect o f shame to lower noncompliance tendencies o f Japanese respondents, neither of 
these two threats has a significant deterrent effect on any future offense. It is concluded, 
thus, that these data do not yield clear support fi?r the Hypotheses 4 and S.
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Shame
Grasmick and Bursik (1990) point to the importance o f internal control in 
generating conformity to extant rules, suggesting that internal control might be 
conceptualized, at least to some extent, as a self-imposed punishment threat o f shame 
which can lower the expected noncompliant behavior. This argument is upheld in the 
current research. Shame, a variable with a long and recently revitalized tradition in 
sociology, not only appears in the present analyses as the only significant deterrent to 
future offending, it also accounts for the lower likelihood o f Japanese employees to 
commit offenses in the future. The inverse relationships between being Japanese and two 
o f the three future offenses (i.e., taking a long lunch or break without approval and using 
sick leave when not really sick) exist because, compared to American respondents, 
Japanese respondents perceive significantly higher threats o f shame. The significant 
inverse relationships between Japanese and the two offenses became clearly insignificant 
with the inclusion o f the self-imposed punishment threat. In conclusion, the lower 
likelihood o f Japanese respondems to commit these two offenses is attributable to cultural 
differences in the perceived threat levels, with Japanese perceiving a higher threat of 
shame than white respondents.
Embarrassment
The findings for the threat o f socially imposed embarrassment are less compatible 
with the prediction o f the current research. Although the inverse relationships between 
Japanese and future offenses were somewhat attenuated with inclusion of embarrassment, 
the relationship was not rendered insignificant. For none o f the three offenses did the 
difference in the perceived levels o f embarrassment between the two samples make 
significant contribution to the tendency o f Japanese employees to  be less noncompliant. 
Regardless o f the significantly higher threat o f embarrassment perceived by Japanese than 
by American respondents, this difference was not responsible for the inverse relationships 
between being Japanese and future offending. Additional evidence for this conclusion was
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offered as the analyses revealed that for none o f the three ofifenses did the threat of 
embarrassment have a significant deterrent effect, beyond the threat o f shame or 
management sanctions.
These findings are problematic since past research suggests that significant others 
play an important role in producing conformity with norms (e g., Andenaes, 1952, 1966; 
Paternoster et al., 1983; Tittle, 1977; Williams & Hawkins, 1986, 1989). The current 
research examined the patterns o f correlations among the independent variables (i.e., the 
threat variables and the control variables) to determine if the insignificant direct effect of 
embarrassment could be due to especially strong correlations with other variables. The 
correlations between embarrassment and the sociodemographic control variables were not 
as strong in magnitude as the correlations between shame and these variables, as well as 
management sanction and these variables. Besides, for all three offenses, the magnitudes 
of the correlations among the three threat variables were about the same. The coUenearity 
problems surrounding the measure o f embarrassment should be no more severe than those 
surrounding shame and management sanctions.
As Grasmick and Bursik ( 1990) suggest, one possibility concerns the certainty 
dimension o f embarrassment. In the current research, respondents were asked if most of 
the employees whose opinions th ^  value would lose respect for them if they committed 
the offenses. It can be that "among some or all respondents an affirmative response meant 
they think they would suffer a loss o f respect jf significant others knew about the 
transgression" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 855). However, th ^  did not necessarily 
believe that those other employees would discover the transgression. If the perceived 
chance of detection by significant other employees were zero, then even if the perceived 
certainty times the severity o f embarrassment were high, the employee would be 
experiencing no threat of embarrassment. A better scale might be developed by 
multiplying the perceived probability that significant other employees would find out about 
the offense, times the perceived probability that detection would result in a loss of respect,
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times the perceived severity o f such a sanction. A more refined measure o f threat of 
embarrassment such as this might have yielded results more consistent with the prediction 
of the current research, as well as the extant deterrent literature.
Notwithstanding, the effectiveness o f embarrassment as a deterrent has been 
questioned in recent research (e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & 
Ameklev, 1993; Williams & Hawkins, 1989). Grasmick and Bursik (1990), for example, 
suggest the possibility that the threat o f such a sanction has become a less effective 
deterrent over time. Perceptions o f punishment threat o f embarrassment wield less impact 
on decisions to engage in deviant conduct now than in the past. This position is supported 
as Grasmick and Bursik reported that embarrassment operated as the weakest deterrent of 
the three. The direct effect o f embarrassment on each o f three types o f illegal conduct 
(e.g., tax cheating, petty theft, and drunk driving) was not significant. Williams and 
Hawkins (1989) also uncovered no significant direct deterrent effect on wife assault of 
perceived risk of social-stigma resulting fi'om an arrest (see also Grasmick, Bursik, & 
Ameklev, 1993). Consequently, the findings in the present research that the significant 
cultural difference in the perceived threat of embarrassment might be offset by the 
possibility that the effectiveness o f embarrassment as a deterrent declined at the same time. 
Management Sanctions
The analyses indicate that inclusion of the perceived management sanction threat 
did substantially account for the cultural difference in the likelihood o f one of the three 
future offenses (i.e., using sick leave when not really sick). The inverse relationship 
between Japanese and the offense was rendered insignificaiit with the addition of the 
formal sanction threat. Cultural differences in the perceived levels o f management 
sanction threat in the predicted direction, along with the effect o f shame, accounted for the 
entire inverse relationship between being Japanese and the offense; in Act, the effect of 
Japanese became positive in sign when management sanctions and shame were controlled.
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Nevertheless, for none o f the three offenses did the formal sanctions have a 
significant deterrent effect beyond the effect o f shame and embarrassment. One possibility 
is that formal sanctions might have an indirect, not direct, effect on noncompliance (e g., 
Andenaes, 1952, 1966; Williams & Hawkins, 1989). Andenaes asserts that law, "as a 
concrete expression o f society's disapproval o f an act helps to form and to strengthen the 
public's moral codes and thereby conscious and unconscious inhibitions against 
committing crime" (1952, p. 179). Furthermore, Williams and Hawkins aigue that legal 
sanctions may wield indirect deterrent impacts through a loss o f selfiesteem. Apparently, 
these views were supported in the current research. The analyses revealed that once the 
threat o f shame was controlled, the direct effect o f management sanctions became no 
longer significant. This indicates that formal sanctions might be a prerequisite for the 
moralizing impact as a deterrent.
Another possibility concerns the nature o f the dependent variable used in the 
analyses. The present research chose as the dependent variable minor offenses for which 
the management sanctions for employees would be trivial. On the other hand, for many of 
the offenses in the workplace (e.g., theft, drug use), the strictly formalized penalties, 
independent o f any informal punishments contingent upon them (i.e., "stigma" of 
discharges or unemployment) are more severe. In their research on work-related 
deterrence, HoUinger and Clark (1982, 1983) included serious offenses such as employee 
theft with presumably the most serious organizational sanctions that culminated in 
reporting to the police. For all settings, these researchers found that perceived risk of 
formal sanctions had significant deterrent effects. It is possible, therefore, that in the 
current study, with the offenses selected, the perceived threat o f management sanctions 
did not reach the threshold necessary for deterrence, while it did in HoUinger and Clark's 
research.
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Cultural Differences in Deterrent Effects of Sancrion Threats
Summary
The current study has also suggested that the deterrent effects of perceived 
sanction threats are conditioned by culture. It has been proposed that the punishment 
threats o f self-imposed shame and socially imposed embarrassment, as well as formal 
management sanctions, are more of a deterrent for Japanese employees than for American 
employees.
The evidence o f deterrent effects o f these three sanction threats in this study is in 
sharp contrast to Hypotheses 6-8. Threats of shame, embarrassment, and management 
sanctions operated as greater deterrents for American than for Japanese respondents. 
Specifically, the difference in the deterrent effects o f shame and management sanctions 
reached significance, indicating that American employees were more deterred than 
Japanese employees by these sanction threats.
Interaction Effects o f Culture and Shame
The findings for cultural differences in the deterrent efi&ct o f shame were 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 6. For all three offenses, the threat o f shame functioned as a 
greater deterrent for American respondents than for Japanese respondents. Especially for 
two offenses (i.e., taking a long lunch or break without approval and coming to work late 
or leaving early without approval), the difference in the deterrent effect o f shame was 
significant in the direction that Japanese respondents were less deterred than American 
respondents by the threat o f shame. Despite their lower intention to commit these 
offenses, Japanese employees were less influenced than American employees by their 
moral sentiments.
One possibility for these contradictory findings is a greater tendency for Japanese 
respondents to choose the extremes for the certainty o f shame for the two offenses. The 
high skewness, with the majority o f Japanese respondents reporting that they would surely 
feel ashamed, creates a pattern yielding substantially smaller standard errors for the
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Japanese coefiScient for the theoretical variable o f shame. This suggests smaller variance 
around the unstandardized coefiScient for Japanese compared to that for American 
respondents. Consequently, the interaction test for significance may be also influenced, 
generating contradictory results. On the other hand, however, shame was the threat 
treated as a product o f the certainty and severity o f the punishment in the present study 
Thus, while the skewness problems surrounding the measure of certainty of shame cannot 
be underestimated, they cannot fully account for why the deterrent effect o f shame (the 
product of certainty and severity) was greater for American than for Japanese.
Another possibility is that the treatment o f  morality might be producing difl&rent 
results. The conceptualization o f internalized norms is an extension of the 
conceptualization proposed by Grasmick and his colleagues (Grasmick. BlackweU, Bursik 
& Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Ameklev, 1993) which 
captures internalization of norms as a source o f punishment analogous to the state and 
significant others. The internalization o f norms stimulates guilt-feelings in consideration 
of norm violation conduct; and to avoid the painful feelings employees keep themselves 
from being noncompliant. However, it might be that Japanese respondents conform to 
norms simply because they believe in and internalize normative bases. It is possible that 
they do what is right because it is right, not because they are avoiding costs or 
punishments (see Etzioni, 1988 for this discussion). If  this speculation is correct, it is 
concluded then that Japanese respondents are more apt to have a "hardened conscience," 
allowing them to behave contrary to their moral sentiments.
Interaction Efifects o f Culture and Embarrassment
Hypothesis 7 that the deterrent efifect o f embarrassment should be significantly 
stronger for Japanese than for American employees was not supported. The interaction 
analyses revealed that the deterrent efifect o f embarrassment was smaller for Japanese than 
for American respondents, while for none of the three ofifenses did the difiference approach 
significance. A  possibility is that recent movements toward increased "individuation and
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separation" characterize Japanese culture. In a highly individualistic society, the opinions 
of others matter little in shaping one's behavior. In a coUectivistic Japanese society with a 
strong sense of community, the threat o f socially imposed embarrassment should serve as 
a stronger deterrent. Nevertheless, the data indicate that Japanese respondents were less 
deterred than American respondents by a loss o f respect o r social stigma. These findings 
imply, therefore, that the collectivity in a Japanese society has been transfiarming into 
individuality in a manner that would substantially reduce the deterrent effects o f the 
socially imposed sanction threat of embarrassment. Cultural patterning o f deterrent effects 
o f informal sanctions might be changing over time.
Interaction Effects of Culture and Management Sanctions
The findings for cultural dififerences in the deterrent effect o f management 
sanctions were not consistent with Hypothesis 8. The hypothesis and rationale suggest 
that the deterrent effect o f formal sanctions would be relevant to the extent that the 
sanctions (e.g., dismissal, suspension, discharges) associated with the offense impede 
social relationships. The effect would be dependent on the extent to which instituted 
penalties accompany a loss of social respectability and distrust. Once derogated, it would 
be generally more difficult for Japanese employees, who function in a tightly knit social 
framework, to regain social respect. Losses would be experienced as more costly for 
Japanese than for American employees. For all three offenses, however, the threat of 
formal sanctions functioned as a greater deterrent for American respondents than for 
Japanese respondents. For the offense o f coming to work late or leaving early without 
approval, the difference in the deterrent efifect o f management sanctions reached 
significance. These findings, therefore, illustrate that the strategies for linking 
management sanctions to morality can be a usefiil heuristic for management in U.S. 
organizations.
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Conclusion
While the current research does not ofifer clear support for ail hypotheses 
advanced, it does have both pragmatic and theoretical implications. Practically, findings 
associated with the cultural variabilities in the perceived levels o f and in the magnitudes of 
deterrent of three sanction threats should o & r vital information to management 
practitioners. To secure employee compliance and maximize corporate profits, manners 
ought to consider the decision-making process o f their subordinates. The rationales 
behind their decisions to comply or not to comply with organizational rules must be 
integrated into the development o f effective persuasive strategies. Without understanding 
of the culturally differentiated rational calculation o f subordinates, the blossoming interests 
of practitioners in competing with foreign forces and o f specialists in expanding their 
markets on multinational and international levels will be in vain.
Theoretically, the present research should serve as an impetus for future research 
concerning the role of perceived threat variables in the rational choice decision-making 
model. The caveats o f external validity is acknowledged. Due to the use o f university 
hospital employees as a sample, the conclusions from the current research may be limited 
to white-collar employees in non-profit seeking organizations. The results may not be 
generalLzable to blue-collar employees in profit seeking business organizations. The 
impact of this sampling should be realized, therefore, in interpretation of all findings 
reported here.
More importantly, the present research recognizes the need for advances in 
measurement, particularly o f embarrassment. It used a measure o f embarrassment which 
captured the probability o f suffering a  loss o f respect and the severity of the loss, while 
others (e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, 1990) have suggested that the perceived probability of 
detection by significant others might be a prerequisite for the probability o f loss o f respect. 
A more refined measure of embarrassment, taking into the perceived risk of detection by 
other employees, must be tried in the future.
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Furthermore, the researcher is aware o f the necessity o f a greater variety of 
offenses to ascertain the deterrent efifect o f management sanction threat. This research has 
restricted the analyses to only three categories o f minor offenses with presumably minor 
management consequences, and has not considered more serious offenses (such as drug 
use and theft) with more serious m aniem ent consequences that may culminate in 
reporting to the police. A greater variety o f offenses should be included in the future to 
determine the deterrent effect o f formal sanction threat.
In addition, the present research realizes that future research will benefit from an 
extension to include both cost and reward factors. This study has considered only the cost 
factor in employees' calculations of expected rule violation conduct. However, as the 
original concept of utility emphasizes, "All actions are directed toward the gain o f pleasure 
or the avoidance of pain" (Dyke, 1981, p. 3 1). We are purposeful animals and the 
purpose is to maximize benefits and minimize costs. In support o f this view, Scheff (1988, 
p. 396) argues that the "emotion of pride and shame make up a subtle and pervasive 
system o f social sanctions . . . .  We experience the system as so compelling because of 
emotions—the pleasure of pride and fellow feeling on the one hand, and the punishment o f 
embarrassment, shame, or humiliation on the other." This view must be tested in future 
research to determine the moral and normative bases o f compliance with organizational 
rules.
Equally important, the current research acknowledges that the treatment of 
morality as a source of compliance needs to be refined in a manner that can enrich a 
rational choice perspective across cultures. It has assumed that the perceived threat of 
shame, originating from internalized norms (or conscience), serves to deter noncompliant 
behaviors. The theoretical variable has been aimed at respondents' calculation o f the self- 
imposed cost. However, this stance might not be applicable to all nationalities (see 
Etzioni, 1988 for this discussion). Some employees may comply simply because it is right
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to do so, not because they are avoiding costs or punishments. Some employees may not 
seek causality at all.
Finally, the current research realizes the caveats o f simple distinction between 
Japanese and American employees. The individualistic-coUectivistic distinction may be 
too broad. Differentiating Japanese employees ffom American employees on the basis of 
cultural variability on individualism-coUectivism dimension may be too simplistic, and 
ignores the fact that people within cultures vary in their individualistic or coUectivistic 
orientation. In fact, the young generation in Japan increasingly have been changing into 
individuality. This trend would predict a reduction over time in cultural differences in 
deterrent effects of perceived sanctions associated with noncompliant behaviors. Change 
over time in the cultural patterning o f perceived risks should be explored in the future.
In conclusion, I would encourage others to incorporate these kinds o f issues and 
other advances in decision-making theory into cross-cultural research on the deterrent 
effects o f self-imposed, sociaUy imposed, and formal sanction threats. Perhaps it is time to 
move beyond the question of whether the threats o f shame, embarrassment, and formal 
sanctions deter noncompliance with laws to the questions on whether these threats operate 
as social control, in general, across cultures. The current research has provided a step in 
that direction.
133
References
Andenaes, J. (1952). General prevention—Illusion or reality. Journal o f Criminal Law 43. 
176-198.
Andenaes, J. ( 1966). The general preventive effects o f punishment. LTniversitv of 
Pennsvlvania Law Review. 114. 949-983.
Andrews, P. H. ( 1987). Gender differences in persuasive communication and attribution 
of success and failure. Human Communication Research. 13. 372-385.
Baxter, L. A. (1984). An investigation of compliance-gaining as politeness. Human 
Communication Research. 10. 427-456.
Bamlund, D., & Yoshikawa, M. (1990). Apologies: Japanese and American styles. 
International Journal of Intercultural Relations. 14. 193-205.
Beccaria, C. (1764, 1963). On crimes and punishments. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill.
Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political 
Economv. 76. 169-217.
Bisanz, G. L., & Rule, B. G. (1989). Gender and the persuasion scheme: A search for 
cognitive invariants. Personality and Social Psvcholoev BulletiiL 15. 4-18.
Blake, J., & Davis, K. (1964). Norms, values and sanctions (pp. 456-484). In R. Paris 
(Ed ), Handbook of modem sociology. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
Boster, J. J. (1990). An examination o f the state o f compliance-gaining message behavior 
research. In J. P. Dillard (Ed.), Seeking compliance: The production of 
interpersonal influence messages (pp. 7-17). Scottsdale, AZ: Gorsuch Scarisbrick 
Publishers.
Boster, F. J., & Stif^ J. B. (1984). Compliance-gaining message selection behavior. 
Human Communication Research. 10. 539-556.
Braithwaite, J. (1989). Crime, shame and reintegration. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
134
Brittaa, A. ( 1977). The privatised world. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Burgeon. M., Dillard. J. P., Koper, R_, & Doran. N. (1984). The impact o f communication 
context and persuader gender on persuasive message selection. Women's Studies 
in Communication. 7. 1-12.
Burroughs, N. F , Kearney, P., & Plax, T. G. (1989). Compliance-resistance in the college 
classroom. Communication Education. 38. 214-229.
Clark, R. A. (1979). The impact o f selection of persuasive strategies o f self-interest and 
desired liking. Communication Monographs. 46. 257-273.
Clark, R. A., & Delia, J. G. ( 1976). The development o f functional persuasive skills in 
childhood and early adolescence. Child Development 47. 1008-1014.
Clark, R. A., O'Dell, L., & Willihnganz, S. (1986). The development o f compromising as 
an alternative to persuasion. Central States Speech Journal 37. 220-224.
Cody, M. J., Greene, J. O , Marston, P., Baaske, E., CHair, H. D , & Scheneider, M. J, 
(1985). Situation-perception and the selection of message strategies. In M. L. 
McLaughlin (Ed.), Communication vearbook 9. Beverly EBlls, CA: Sage.
Cody, M. J., & McLaughlin, M. L. (1980). Perceptions o f compliance-gaining situations:
A dimensional analysis. Communication Monographs. 47. 132-148.
Cody, M. J., & McLaughlin, M. L. (1985). The situation as a construct in interpersonal 
communication research. In M. L. Knapp & G. R. Miller (Eds ), Handbook of 
interpersonal communication (pp. 263-312). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Conklin, J. E. (1995). Criminology. (5th ed ). Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Curran, D. J., & Renzetti, C. M. (1994). Theories o f crime. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn 
& Bacon.
Delia, J. G., Kline, S. L., & Burleson, B R. (1979). The development o f persuasive 
communication strategies in kindergarteners through twelAh-graders. 
Communication Monographs. 46. 241-256.
Dertouzos, M. L., Lester, R. K., & Solow, R, M (1989). Made in American: Regaining
135
the productive edge. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
DeTurck, M. A. (1985). A transactional analysis o f compliance-gaining behavior ESeas 
of noncompliance, relational contexts, and actor's gender. Human Communication 
Research. 12. 54-78.
DeTurck, M. A , & Miller, G. R. ( 1982). The efifect o f birth order on the persuasive 
impact o f message and the likelihood o f persuasive message selection. 
Communication. II. 78-84.
Dyke, C. (1981). Philosophv o f economics. Englewood Cliflfe, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Erez, M , & Rim, Y. (1982). The relationships between goal, influence, tactics, and 
personal and organizational variables. Human Relations. 35. 871-878.
Etzioni, A  (1961). A Comparative analvsis o f complex organizations- On power, 
involvement, and their correlates. New York: Free Press o f Glencoe.
Etzioni, A  (1975). A comparative analvsis o f complex organizations: On power.
involvement, and their correlates (Revised and enlarged edition). New York:
The Free Press.
Etzioni, A  (1988). The moral dimension: Toward a new economics. New York: The 
Press.
Falbo, T. (1977). Relationship between sex, sex-role, and social influence. Psvchologv of 
Women Ouarterlv. 2, 41-52.
Falbo, T., & Peplau, L. A  (1980). Power strategies in intimate relationships. Journal o f 
Personality and Social Psychology. 38. 618-628.
Fineley, G. £., & Humphreys, C A  (1974). A naive p^choio^ and the development of 
persuasive appeals in girls. Canadian Journal o f Behavioral Sciences. 6, 75-80.
Fitzpatrick, M. A , & Winke, J. (1979). You always hurt the one you love: S tra t^ e s  and 
tactics in interpersonal conflict. Communication Ouarterlv. 27. 3-11.
French, J. R. P., & Raven, B. (1960). The bases o f social power, h i D. Cartwright & A  
Zander (Eds ), Group dynamics (2nd ed.) (pp. 607-623). New York: Harper &
136
Row.
Geerken, M., & Gove, W. ( 1975). Deterrence: Some theoretical considerations. Law and 
Society Review. 9, 497-513.
Geis, G. (1955). Pioneers in crim inolo^ VO: Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Journal of 
Criminal Law. Criminology, and Police Science. 46. 160.
Gibbs, J. (1968). Crime, punishment, and deterrence. Southwestern Social Science 
Quarterly. 48. 515-530.
Gibbs, J. (1975). Crime, punishment and deterrence. New York: Elsevier, 1975.
Goffinan, E. (1969). Strategic interaction. Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press.
Grasmick, H. G , & Appleton, L. (1977). Legal punishment and social stigma: A 
comparison o f two deterrence models. Social Science Quarterly. 58. 14-28.
Grasmick, H. G , BlackweU, B. S., Bursik, R. J Jr., & MitcheU, S. (1993). Changes in 
perceived threats o f shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions for imerpersonal 
violence, 1982-1992. Violence and Victims. 8, 313-325.
Grasmick, H. G., & Bryjak, G. (1980). The deterrent efifect o f perceived severity of 
punishment. Social Forces. 59. 471-91.
Grasmick, H. G , & Bursik, R, J. Jr. (1990). Conscience, significant others, and rational 
choice: Extending the deterrence model. Law and Society Review. 24. 837-860.
Grasmick, H. G , Bursik, R. J. Jr., & Ameklev, B. J. (1993). Reduction in drunk driving as 
a response to increased threats o f shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions. 
Criminology. 31. 41-67.
Grasmick, H. G, & Green. D. (1981). Deterrence and the morally committed. Sociological 
Quarterly. 71. 321-335.
Grasmick, H. G , Jacobs, D., & McCoUom, C. B (1983). Social class and social control: 
An application o f deterrence theory. Social Forces, 62, 359-374.
Grasmick, H. G , & Milligan, H. (1976). Deterrence theory approach to socio­
economic/demographic correlations o f crime. Social Science n^n^itarfy. 57. 608-
137
617.
Gudykunst. W. B., & Kim. Y. Y. (1992). Communicating with strangers: An approach to 
intercuitural communication (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Gudykunst, W. G , & Nishida, T. ( 1984). Individual and cultural influences on uncertainty 
reduction. Communication M ono^phs. 51. 23-36.
Gudykunst, W. B , Nishida, T.. & Chua, E. (1986). Uncertainty reduction in Japanese- 
North American dyads. Communication Research Reports. 3, 39-46.
Hagan, J., Gillis, A. R., & Samson. J. (1985). The class structure o f gender and
delinquency: Toward a power-control theory. American Journal of Sociology, 90. 
1151-1175.
Hagan, J., Samson, J., & Gillis, A. R. ( 1979). The sexual stratification of social control. 
British Journal of Sociology. 30. 25-38.
Hagan. J., Simpson, J., & Gillis, A. R. (1987). Class in the household: A power-control 
theory of gender and delinquency. American Journal o f Sociology. 92. 788-816.
Hirokawa. R. Y , & Miyahara, A. (1986). A comparison of influence strategies utilized by 
managers in American and Japanese organizations. Communication Ouarterlv. 34. 
250-265.
Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes o f delinquency. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Ho, D. Y. F. (1976). On the concept o f flice. American Journal o f Sociology. 81. 867-884.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's consequences. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
HoAtede, G. (1983). Dimensions o f national cultures in fifty countries and three regions.
In J. Deregowski, S. Dzuirawiec, & R. Annis (eds ). Explications in cross-cultural 
psychology. Lisse, Netherlands; Awets and Zeitlinger.
Ho&tede, G. (1984). Cultural dimensions in management and planning. Asia Pacific 
Journal o f Management. 81-98.
Hofstede, G , & Bond, M. (1984). Ho&tede's culture dimensions. Journal of Cross- 
Cultural Psychology. 15. 417-433.
138
Hollinger, R_ C . & Clark, J. P. ( 1982). Formai and informal social controls o f employee 
deviance. Sociological Ouarterlv. 23. 333-343.
Hollinger, R. C , & Clark, J. P. ( 1983). Deterrence in the workplace: Perceived certainty, 
perceived severity, and employee theft. Sociological Forces. 62. 398-418.
Hsu, F. L. K. (1971). Psychosocial homeostasis and jen: Conceptual tools for advancing 
psychological anthropology. American Anthropologists. 73. 23-44.
Instone, D , Major, B., & Bunker, B. B. (1983). Gender, self confidence and social 
influence strategies: An organizational simulation. Journal o f Personalitv and 
Social Psychology. 44. 322-333.
Jensen. G. F. (1969). "Crime doesn't pay": Correlates o f a shared misunderstanding. Social 
Problems. 17, 189-201.
Jones, E. E. (1964). Integration. New York: Harper & Row.
Kaplan, H. B. (1975). Self-attitudes and deviant behavior. Pacific Palisades, CA:
Goodyea.
Kawasaki, I. ( 1969). Japan unmasked. Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle.
Kamey, P., Plax, I .  G , & Burroughs, N. F. (1991). An attributional analysis o f college 
students' resistance decisions. Communication Education. 40. 325-342.
Keesing, R. (1974). Theories o f culture. Annual Review o f Anthropology. 3. 73-97.
Kelman, H. C (1961). Processes o f opinion change. Public Opinion Quarterly. 25. 57-78.
Kipnis, D , & Cohen, E. S. (1980). Power tactics and affection. Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, Philadelphia, PA.
Kipnis, D., Schmidt, S. M., SwafBn-Smhh, C , & Wilkinson, I. (1984). Patterns of
managerial influence: Shotgun managers, tacticians, and bystanders. Organizational 
Dynamics. 12. 58-67.
Kipnis, D , Schmidt, S. M., & Wilkinson, I. (1980). Intraorganizational influence tactics: 
Explorations in getting one's way. Journal o f Applied Psychology. 65. 440-452.
Koper, R. J., & Boster, F. J. (1988). Factors affecting verbal aggressiveness and
139
compliance gaining effectiveness; The relationship between communication 
rewards, communication approach/avoidance, and compliance gaining messages.
In D OTfair&B R_ Patterson (Eds.), Advances in interpersonal communication 
research (pp. 129-146). Las Crunces, MM: CRC.
Lee, C. R., Levine, T. R., & Cambra, R  (1997). Resisting compliance in the multicultural 
classroom Communication Education. 46. 29-43.
Lofthouse, L. J. (1985). An empirical investigation o f individual and situational differences 
in compliance ^aininp Unpublished thesis, Arizona State University, Tempe.
Luloffs, R. (1982). Compliance-gaining and compliance resisting strategies in dvadic 
conversations. Paper presented at the annual meeting o f the Western Speech 
Communication Association, Denver, CO.
Lusting, M. W„ & King, S. W. ( 1980). The effect o f communication apprehension and
situation on communication strategy choices. Human Communication Research. 7, 
74-82.
MarweU, G.. & Schmitt, D. R. ( 1967a). Compliance-gaining behavior: A synthesis and 
model. Sociological Ouarterlv. 8^  317-328.
MarweU, G , & Schmitt, D. R. (1967b). Dimensions of compliance-gaining behavior An 
empirical analysis. Sociometrv. 30. 350-364.
MarweU, G , & Schmitt, D. R. (1990). An introduction. In J. P. Dillard (Ed ), Seeking 
compliance: The production of interpersonal influence messages (pp. 3-5). 
Scottsdale, AZ: Gorsuch Scarisbrick Publishers.
McLaughlin, M. L., Cody, M. J., & Robey, C S. (1980). Shuationai influences on the 
selection of strategies to resist compliance-gaining attempts. Human 
Communication Research. 7, 14-36.
McNfillan, C. J. (1982). From quality control to quality management: Lessons from Japan. 
Business Ouarterlv. 47. 31-40.
Mc(^uiUen, J. S., Ifigginbotham, D. C , & Cummings, M C (1984). Compliance-resisting
140
behaviors: The effects o f age, agent, and types o f request. In R. Bostnim (Ed.), 
Communication Yearbook 8. (pp. 747-762). Beverly KUs, CA: Sage.
Meier, R. F , Burkett, S. R_, & Hickman, C. A. (1984). Sanctions, peers, and deviance: 
Preliminary models o f a social control process. Sociological Quarterly. 25. 67-82.
Miller, G. R., Boster, F., Rolofif M. E., & Seibold, D. R. (1977). Compliance-gaining 
message strategies: A typologr and some findings concerning efifects of 
situational differences. Communication Monographs. 44. 37-51.
Miller, G. R., & Steinberg, M. (1975). Between people: A new analvsis o f interpersonal 
communication. Palo Alto, CA: Science Research Associates
Neuliep, J. W. (1986). Self-report vs. actual use o f persuasive messages by high and low 
dogmatics. Journal o f Social Behavior and Personalitv. 1,213-222.
Neuliep, J. W., & Hazelton, V. (1985). A cross cultural comparison o f Japanese and 
American persuasive stra te^  selection. International Journal o f Intercuitural 
Relations. 9, 389-404.
Nomura, N., & Bamlund, D. (1983). Patterns o f interpersonal criticism in Japan and the 
United States. International Journal of Intercuitural Relations. 7, 1-8.
Offermann, L. R., & Schrier, P. E. (1985). Social influence strategies: The impact o f sex, 
role, and attitudes toward power. Personalitv and Social Psvchologv Bulletin. 11. 
286-300.
O'Keefe, B. J , & Dellia, J. G. ( 1979). Construct comprehensiveness and cognitive
complexity as predictors of the number and strategic adaptation o f arguments and 
appeals in a persuasive message. Communication Monographs. 4 6 .231-240.
Pandy, J., & Rastogj, R. (1979). Machiavellianism and ingratiation. The Journal o f Social 
Psvchologv. 108, 221-225.
Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Parsons, T. (1963). On the concept o f influence. Public Opinion Quarterly. 27. 35-62.
Pascale, R. T , & Athos, A. G. (1981). The art o f Japanese management. New York:
141
Simon and Schuster.
Paternoster. R_, Saltzmam L. E., Waldo, G. P., & Chiricos, T. G. (1983). Perceived risk 
and social control: do sanctions really deter? Law and Society Review. 17.457- 
480.
Piers, G , Singer, M. B. (1953). Shame and guilt. Springfield., IL: Charles C Thomas 
Publisher.
Riccillo, S. C , & Trenholm, S. (1983). Predicting manager's choice of influence mode: 
The effects o f interpersonal trust and worker attributions on managerial tactics in 
a simulated organizational setting. Western Journal o f Speech Communication 47.
323-339.
Rim, Y., & Erez, M. ( 1980). A note about tactics used to influence superiors, co-workers 
and of the foot-in-the-door effect. Personalitv and Social Psychology Bulletin. 7, 
431-457.
Roloflf, M. E. ( 1976). Communication strategies, relationships, and relational change. In 
G. R. Miller (Ed.L Explorations in interpersonal communication (pp. 173-195). 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Roloflf M. E., & Bamicott. E. F. (1978). The situational use o f pro- and anti-social 
compliance-gaining strategies by high and low Machiavellians. In B. D. Ruben 
(Ed ), Communication yearbook 2 (pp. 193-205). New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction.
Roloflf M. E., & Bamicott, E. F. (1979). The influence o f dogmatism on the situational 
use of pro- and anti-social compliance-gaining strategies. Southern Speech 
Communication Journal- 45. 37-54.
Scheflf T. I. (1988). Shame and conformity: The deforence-emotion systeoL American 
Sociological Review. 53. 395-406.
Schwartz, S. (1990). Individualism-coUectivism. Journal o f Cross-Cultural Psvchologv.
2L 139-157.
142
Seiboid, D R., CantriL J. G., & M ^ers. R_ A. (1985). Commumcaboii and imerpersonal 
influence. In M. L. Knapp & G. R. Miller (Eds.), Handbook o f interpersonal 
communication (pp. 551-614). Beverly ffills, CA: Sage Publications.
SUlars, A L. (1980). Attributions and communication in roommate conflicts. 
Communication Monographs. 47. 180-200.
Skinner, B. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan.
Ting-Toomey, S. (1988). Intercuitural conflict styles: A 6ce-negotiation theory. In Y. Y. 
Kim & W. B. Gudykunst (Eds.), Theories in intercuitural communication (pp. 213- 
235). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Tittle. C R. (1969). Crime rates and legal sanctions. Social Problems. , 409-423.
Tittle, C. R. ( 1977). Sanction fear and the maintenance o f social order. Social Forces. 55. 
579-596.
Tittle, C. R. (1980). Sanctions and social deviance: The question o f deterrence. New 
York: Praeger.
Triandis, H. C , Brislin, R. W , & Hui, C. H. (1988). Cross-cultural training across the 
individualism-collectivism divide. International Journal of Intercuitural 
Relations. 12. 269-289.
Waldo, G. P., & Chiricos, T. G. ( 1972). Perceived penal sanction and self-reported
criminality: A neglected approach to deterrent research. Social Problems. 19. 522- 
540.
Weinstein, E. A., & Deutchberger, P. (1963). Some dimensions ofaltercasting. 
Sociometrv. 26. 454-466.
Williams, D. L , & Boster, F. J. (1981). The effects o f beneficial situational characteristics, 
negativism, and dogmatism on compliance-gaining message selection. Paper 
presented at the annual meeting o f the International Communication Association, 
Minneapolis, MN.
Williams, K., & Hawkins, R. (1986). Perceptual research on general deterrence: A critical
143
review. Law and Society Review. 20. 545-572.
Williams. K., & Hawkins. R. ( 1989). The meaning o f arrest for wife assault. Criminoloev. 
27, 163-181.
Wrong, D. ( I96I). The oversociaiized conception o f man in modem sociology. American 
Sociological Review. 26. 183-193.
144
Appendix A; Questionnaire in Japanese
145
-"MSN-
£ j L - y - ÿ 3 LTx V iKDSSm
M (CXk6A4 e * R K % t 6 * m e  L T t ?  0  i f ,
r&M8U4fr#(D&(IOtfkBF%( Cross-Cultural Sludr of Orgaoizatiooal Behavior ) j
Institutional Review Board 
r w '4 c ® » ± » X t t .  e * K 6 i 'T B : $ : 6 T /  V «14
<î<fW cM L < îf<O J:^  K * » .  $ 0 % L T l '5 A 'e « % f 6 # e B B 9 6  LZÜO  i f .
^ <i/c(c<î:oT C <0JH »r^lnL -ai«t5«ftt. 2ooS(Ciî»t^|§iaiÎT»<0lSÆlv 
j ll= M f5 f iia , t O t f ^ U i f .
C < o r > f - h m i5 K * «  6 0O«l!M P®ClHlÇLni< JwKU  
t f z e i  5 j} e m il''a s< # c < [5 6 m i'if ;& < x  B f® A ^ K K fc'it-5 ? rft« 3 C lcH  
f  3 A 0 E K % m # e# 6 A :® . rBWjOgf5r^J:5L< i» B H .'« L ± « fifo  ' î ü ,  
7 > f -  l-mmRAORltx 6 0 % B f i f  6 A gW O # <  
# U i f ,
*) itir/U, ^^CAieA 
t ® i  i  icM f t  (Î ^  X  fis< £«r«è L T i & b a i f  o
COT > T -  H c ( i# ^ * 'O f 7  < /< -  h<C ® W ¥5*< ^ inT t> ‘5 i f ,  L i'L ,  
C 0aS-C îi*^n/i±r07=-:^(±® È«P® <!: L T S ï^ ftd jÿ -tfrT T Ïâ if, 
A o g m < 7 > y -  h m m ic ; s A $ a 6 c 6 ( i— i-ürX/L. w n .  ' r > ' r - h m m  
IE A < ± ± T E S tfi> m 'L r iî‘D i f ,  Xx =3>t‘^ - ^ ( Z - r ~ 9 i r À J j ' l k .  C 0 7 >  
7 -  h m m iiA T K m ^ ft if ,
5 c o m ^ e m u A x  -e L T w m m /z  f j o i ® i: t
® « t i  L / c . 3 , A g 5 ^ l c # : L : i f ,  
b L X C O a 2 « - i l U T # . 3 L / z 6 x  f c ^ T ' f * < i ' 7 
c a % -e L T T $ i' ,  »±ax% at% M x s ^ - c ^ < D ^ m ^ & i t t■ c m à ^ r o  
C 0 7 > 7 -  hamc^t'-c{5rA'®M #A<$*)i  l^^^x m m /z< T i a o t t ^ i - e *  
*& eLTT$L',
t) fC L i'6 c 6 m c 2 # T (iC $ ^ i'ifA < x  RzKcrtgyjogx l:* a iL r J :A L <  fc-gi 
( . ' * L ± ( f i f ,
a m c Æ & s iL T x  A f ( m K e $ L ± i f i f ,  0 c ^ i ' i  c /z .
U niversity  of Oklahoma 
Department of Communication 
610 Elm Avenue. Room 101 
Norman. Oklahoma 73019-0335 
( 405 1325-3111
146
I.
0 I . ttsii A .-cm /,rTaçi.'. )
1. m
2 .
_____________t
0 3 .  ii> u r 7  < -C - h W'- i o * c f a .t*
1. fê ffL x v ^ ^  c e o i)
2 . 5E8ÎLA:
3. W@L/:
4.
5- fêü L T l'n c» .' ü m )
0 4 . e® # Æ i€ -fc 'H * '-ti-T è< .'.
0 5 . è  -, r  i* n ff ig S  $  l-Jü'
0 6. SS^6>ï/t<D l6«ttE^EEt5<i:L /^^é'nx-4-A 'o 
1 -3ig[fAXBBK,XT$ u .  )
1. <6®8ÉSfl6)Eîg^t-5 jlS T 'ttttv io
2 . 3 .
3 .  e < o m   )
0 7 . gg<o#m <od:# c@ !#x(O R eà) 6 u
147
0 8. ÜM SEII-X ttC tt
C 1 % l i 2 e m c F .  A T m X /T T ^ U .  )
l .  ( i l ' 2. l 'i 'x .
II.
9:(c. iS R tt»(cfe(t^  3ag<o«fl«ig(c M t-g r» a ^ i» M )> '^ T ^ i', c n è i i  
^  *> 9 . g o t?«  o $
t*o
C«0*ia#%(0*ic& 6Ir%(ix R R Ë *0]5F#M 'm j(cSf &A'<) LA$ti/,A<x 6(C 
/ ig # .  eA W fceô i ' ô c 6 e f  ^ c6;»<. gk 'C aA T 6ai3<C i'A 'tL fi*ex,o 
^^n(iiî36<ô<r. H j& <aii'ô 'ii'-3*tty t«A ® flra& icJ:oT i5e$nfr, e c r  
() LgCx ^< ifci<cnè® C t«^L fcR . ACCA:@#A<* (0 A « te i:5 A '6 fô  3&'^ fe 
^X .T $l'o  @(ce<OK(De»^@#0±A<. *%A:(C<!: 0
a& A  /i-fT A 6  5 iv  m T t i t f amRM(C*Lx
t)m < m L T i'3 K ^  1 o*c^. A-CBB/LTTaFi'.
0 9. Ù L 6 .  *ncfc;6<Sr^<£L(c:S^HcDSâx X ( i# # e t^ /:6 L A :6
*Æ»m&ee i; -s i s i  ' t  -r^'»
1. &-,6x
2 . 3 B 0 m m e R l: '5 T 6 6 ô .
3. ^ x  3l® Saiî-« t: nel'T '^ 5  -5 o
4. zltLTx 3 lO * a « -« l;^ il'T '* ô ô o
10. LLLx *  fifzf)<!(f-ôiti L (cm#RKD#±. X (i*& e 6 6 # (z # L T  
n< oS3& ^BistztL tzi^
<iB3a«r è-fc-r i S i  '  ^  t-Ji'o
1. ±<rJiSfiL
2 . (16 L
3. 'P U m i È t z f
4 . j A c â / iM a e â / i f
5 . 6 T L ± & /ilH ia e  ê
11. (>L(jx 6C^A<9FôT'iL(Cgmx X (i# ig L /t6 L /:'^x  îl<75ft»€-
# U 5 6 E i'É fA '.
1. à -36.  # < D m m e ! S U 6 T j )4 9 .
2. # o e a e iR L 6 T A 4 ô .
3. ^4x  ^ m # m e # d i 'T A 6 ô o
4. ïftLTx îl< 0 * » « -S U 'ii'r.fc^9 o
2
148
12. LLÙ. *nCfc35<llF^ttL<caJ1.
« C / t i L / z i .  f : < O f m ^ f i ^ / £ / z l Z t r > z : ± ' < / > m â t ^ ê K C I ! ! i a ^ ê
1.
2. ti^^ trJa^/£L
3. d^ LBUBirê/zi-
4 .  ^ênnUBi-ê/zi'
5 .  èTfcA à^ïBIH ^êfc-r
1 3 . t> L t .  *n£fc*<*âttlRaT'<ÏV'®ICfîa^SÈ»c«:e^è r > / Z t L
/ z i .  % < D # m t e e 6 A ' .
1. ê o i x  jio*a^Ki;-5T*i&-59o
2. n<0£Ski:BLi-e^6-jo
3. É ^ .  3 l® *a$lg  L (Cl 'T '«  6  -5 ,
4. * L T x  % 0A m e^ L :(C l'T $ 6 9 »
14. tL fc . ^(CA:A<:$:^(i#a-e(Cl\<D(C)Ra&@A(C*S&6^#(CjN^ 
L rp ® f ia î- « u t6 L /c 6 . - e ^ a u f ç ( c / t c ^ - , r à '® S K
(CHH^-è (:-r i S t  ' t-r;5'o
1. ±<HH(CL
2. (i6A^M a(CL
3 . CÎ^LrJlB^ê/z't
4 . ;^ è ( c H a « r è f c - r
5. è r t ) A è ( £ R g a ^ ê / t - r
t t l 'T x  i> Lm z^fj: /t /)< Ztli< D ZtirLfi:/>^-r,/z/ £ i l i .  *(C^(0@#<.'A<%'4-CA  
6  ô *'&'ô Av lcm ôT& 6 ôA'6"7A'tfg ;L T $ l M(Z t^Dm/><. /ô t j fz iZ t  
-3 T  2: q)lfgfflSia<P A <5 5  A't iS x . < /c 5 1 v
l 5 .  L L Ü .  & (C (:A # 5 r(C L lc m « H H l< D # # . X ( i * » e 2 : 6  6 u ô f T a  
e L(CA'^(:(C6 (1\ 3rit £ g 6 ^ 1 ' $ TA' .
1. à - ^ t .  g^C 'A '^-^TA ^ôo
2. Pirï. g*.ÙA<l@fTA6ô.
3 .  g * . ù ( l % ^ ( C l '- C & 6 ô .
4 . * L T .  H < D g « ^ æ C (£ i 'T '* 6 -3 o
149
e L /Z A '^ / :m c * L .  g ^ - S r îÇ O t^ S o /c à L f c ^ , .  f< O g » C '( lA  
->r<i:<DgfiË«®*^Ê5 t>®-e-ré'o
i .
2 -  li (^D'J>LamJi^^6 
3 .  i ' (
4- 6TümmA<^6 
5 . C<7)i;tL(k<@ @ [A<A6
17. b L t)V * <ïfci<a=ôT<ïLcsiif. X (± #m ef e a u ô f f % e u z ^
^/ïfc(O SflO C »(± iS-r< i:S l,'t-rA 'o
1.
2. i@ -rcA6ô
3 .  ^5 )^ . % $ 'Z L ' T t 6 ô
4 . % $ < L l 'T A 6  7
18. t)Lfcv */i/;d<I^SI/iL»caîiU 6 # e L/ZA'-,/c$(Z)P) 
L .  ^5^^^<0iZS.r,tztLfz<^. e (D g Q L ù ( i^ C :r : lc 6 T ,T 6 '(0 m
i  b<75-c-r/i'o
1. ±(mmA</zL'
2. ^i^(0'PL^SfÊi)<f>i
3 .  l ' (
4 . àr{3ffi® *< *-5
5 .
{ÿ^ ^ Ltif)^r,tzti ^ { f . ibtitz(Dg ^ ù (ilS -4 -< t S i  ' î  r / l 'o
1. it-rX'Sô^n
2 .  9
3 .  l @ $ / Z u - C A 6 i
4 .
150
2 0. fcLfe. 6 6 l ' ?
e<Og%K'li
i> tifzizt o T i'O g a ttttf® * i  b<Otf^é',
1.
2. li^<D'pLm9Li)<^i>
3 .
4 .
5 . z<DôÂ.iifi<mmi)<^i
â:iz^ iSRrtJCM'Tx
■ e L T fc L C ir . ^ t£ /z i< z tii(D Z ti:L fz ii .  -e<D:35r* 
^ T âB ^-5 àB ô * 'é fô * 'tîS ;L < /f$ U o  ® c i i .  c t i^ < o ^ ^ c D j5<Cfc<c»^r5
<A:$L'.
2 1. fcLfc. ^/:î:A:A#ôI<LL(cë#H(Dm&. JL lU m ^t-^rz^L fz 'fi  
•&5^ô'CL * ôA'o
1. &-3 651^0-C$6 3
2 .
3 . 9
4.
2 2. L L k .  '^Z/zA^ÊirôTyzL<cg^R,1«0êêx ^ C 6 lc # L
Ra<D(i2:A6'A<. t> titz-^Vi.^<D ^i:^-^tzt 
L tz ^ .  i'c^ëffAè^ÀBSS-S-ê
fc t 'iS l 't t 'A 'o
1. ±(Ma/ZL
2 . (i6 /,aM K < L  L
3 . 'P U S M ^ ttz t
4. ± ë < [ M a ^ â ^ T
5 . 6 T L ± & % m a e  #  ^c-r
151
2 3 . f iK rtJ c fe
<.'-COT^^fc< h titz^nn9L < f3 t.i^ô"CLzô
A'o
1. èr>t5^ô'C«6-5
2 .
3 .
4 .  % L T ^ 6 % ( , 'T j 5 6 i
2 4 . Ù L 6 .  ^ t i t z t< ï f^ t iU z S S { ^  X ( l# m L A :* K * L . R R A c t f  
u T m m e t f (  / z t  u / t
-e<oir«® éJK ^tt«A cfc»::i^r, è'® eay:âttB i«€^âA :-r 
à S l.'i-4 -é ',
1. ^< P .W iL
2. (i6/L |^HME<CL 
3-
4 .
5 . t T L A â 'z M a t g / f # -
2 5 . L L L .  ^ / Z 6 L
tzCj^ iSKF*î{ctîi'r®®?-tî<ea<o{iè^<i:{ix ihtitz^ <r>m.^ <r> 
È i^ ô X 'L a 0 ii\
I- È r . t ^ Ô X ' t> ^ ^
2 .
3 .  ' T t  6  i
4.  a^ L T 5 ^ 4 3 (i:L 'T $ 6 i
2 6 . L L L .  ^  i 'O) ( C * e e  6  o tzWiz
ML. em (0(i6x,< trA <. firi/z'^<n99c<n
ê i i r ^ ^ f z t  L f z ^ .  i:(Dtf9[(Dê:m^(iHrÀfzlZà ^Zà '< nm & kê  
4'M a-S- à  f z - tà S ^  ' t  tfi-o
1. ±<M@CkL
2. « J iA t'tia ttL
3 . •PLfm ^ÈtzT
4 . :*câ< iPaia^à^c-r
5 . tx L :K ê  /ziH iae è t z r
152
9 1 # * # .  î S K r t C ; É î V v r * ^ g ^ C S l ' f f a i ' - c T T # I V  
(>L(Rk:. 6<Cfcà<cn6<0C<i:eLttà^2^tt'B. e<o;Er*)6<*ttfc2:®j9SSSÊS 
± T & a± & m 7  )5'^ ^Ô < /f  SU, g K . ^(OlMl3S<J5ttfcCé: r , r  jf<PtSflg
m*<OA5 < aïs U,
2 7.  Ù L Ù .  ^(CA:A<Mr?<cLlcgRR K om A. X ( l * » e 6 6 * e L ^  
ojtA Cè. R R m c $ îU T # R e 6 <  Bfea®(ii/,2fll*<ÏA:'v<DfÿR
1.
2 .
3.
4 .  * L T ^ S % l ' ? $ 6 ô
2 8. L L t .  LcmRM<0#6. % ( l* a e è 5 î r Â îr L ^
A i2 ^ m c # L . )SKf*î«Ctî(.vT(i«t€-âî<ea©«i2:Aè'*<. i^t£fz 
"\© #R © & e^LA :6 Lfcè. f © # « « * < [A:C6 T,T6f<ommm 
* © $ a  k© T fA ',
1. ±^<@*A<%U
2.
3 . i '<  6;ü'aeb5<$a
4 . t-chsm<^ î>
5 . c © ô & b (L < e m A < A 6
2 9 . L L b .  X ( i # i â T 6 6 U i LfiA- - , fe
L J: ô  * ',
1. # - ,6 # i T A 6 i
2. ^^7frt-Ci>^n
3 . ^ 6 > ^ S A k l'T A 6 i
4 . ^ L T ^ S A L l'T A ^ ô
153
3 0 . fc L fe. «Ckfc*<llFârttLicSÜfx 6 u i f f A e L Ç Ç ^
îSKrt»cfc-urM€rt.-<BEfl<0«i:/.ér^<. ^tzfz'^ay 
%*(0&en:Ly±6 L/t<^v -,ri '< O g K M O
i- ±<«aw <tti'
2. (iA<Od>LmmA<t5
3. i'<
4.
5 . C <0'5;tfctt<«g»<^ 5S
3 1. fcLfc. '<oK RA em a(cw #e6 s  t  v' 0
îra€-L <£É la^tt6 .
^£fc^OlM t®â;^âH^L J: ô A',
1.
2. ^ # f T 6 6  9
3.
4. 8 ^ L T # $ % l'-e t6 -)
3 2. Ù L Ù .  Jb<CA:;><:<:^ttlSSt-eJ£t,>®{CSSa-&SÆç«:«-&i5iC'9 
f f% e L % A'-,/=$(%# L. {RRmctîi \ T # e e t î  < ®m® ti i  x. ir 
A<*/£A:^0)##(D±e^L/t6 Lfc^x e (D # # (it/£ ^ (z 6  -, T 6 ' 
fc®T:-r*'o
l-
2. aX,(0f(;Lm(âA<6^
3 . t '<
4 . 6 T k * g A (A 6
5 . c m -) ;L L < C (e A A (A 5
fcLfiJC. iôtifzt<znc3<DZ,t^Ltzm^ ± 5 H cE ^ * ‘in-S<tS
9 A 'i' 9 < fc'ÿ t'o 5 c .  t  LÆ #* ^ n .  ®fléFn<5 <î: L/- «i.
h tj tz iZ t  o HR^A/Z-4-TA^ 9 A'tÆ;L < fc'51.
3 3. L L L .  A fitzi}<t^WiL t c g ^ H O S ô .  6 - , / : 6 L / z ^
,5,41.6 6 muÊTA'o
1. ^ - ,6 .  .^#A#5,a6TA69o
2. m »A 5,a6T & 6 9o
3 . a § * « i n / £ t 'T 'Æ 6  9 ,
4 . z ^ L T . m & * 6 a / £ l 'T A 6 9 o
8
154
im i t i i> tL t z ^ ^  ^<DKtwmiôtitz\ztr,xi£<r>&. 
s t ^ à  fc-TèSv't-ré'o
1. A<MH(CL
2. {ii//iTaW<CL
3 . d>L|g|me&A:f
4. i^â^craa^èfc-r
5 . < t r ( , * â t t B i a « - è f c - r
3 5 . k L L .  X r t^ i â L / : : ^  L fc b .
iS W 'it'J i'*
1.
2. g ;e . m #A 6 4 i6 -c6 6 ô .
3. m # * 6 4 i< [L ^ T $ 6 ô .
4 .  & L T .  a S a î ) - ^ n t tU 7 ? * 6 ^ o
3 6- L fc , $(C/::A<3fW %LfcgM. 6 i ' i f f a e m # a 6
4lx ir<DÜ!inu^f£fz(Zt-,r<t'<^mSt^êr£l!SI
1. ± < M a% L
2 .
3. il?LW a«rà^1-
4 . : ^ t < ï r 4 a ^ è f c - r
5 .  < i : - C f c ;^ è ^ £ H a « r è f c - r
3 7 . t, L t>x -yfzàu
"3416ami
1. m e A 6 a 6 T t6 ô .
2 .
3 . m » * 'E ,4 T .'Z L 'T 6 6 ? .
4 . z t L T .
155
3 8. i iL b .  a 5  <t t '  ■? 
(omatkÈ  « raa« -è  / t i - è s u t  -#-*'0
1. &<Mg%L
2 . (i6A,^Mm<LL
3. 'P LfSm ^itz.-t
4 .
5 . 6T&*&(LlB|ae#/:-4-
%IC. b L g ic . ktitzi)<Z.ix^ai^t^UHr^^tztiy>{t^ ±g(z1
(A a . ^üncéf) e^^65Td&406m9A'2f9A'e%F;L<Af$u. » c .  e<0#
-,T . <h'<0lgjggg<pfes k<DT&5A'6^;L < /i'$ I ',
3 9 . L fc, h titzt< }!^ W i H cê^ Æ C D Sè. 5 L litm ^ t  5 1  u  -3 ( f ^
^ L ( c A ' If.  6 # 6  6 m i' ^ f  A'.
1. # ;L 64i3-C ^69.
2. #;L'&fia-C66ô.
3 . # ;L 6 a (L U -C 6 6  7 .  -
4 .  % L T x  & ; L ^ 4 l / Z U T ^ 6 ô o
4 0 .  (j L f c ,  é t l c g ^ H < O g ô x  6 3 i i ' 9 f T %
Ç - L ^ ia ^ S t r i t U  m*ie#;L6jT.'56L/:'&x -e(D«@N(±A/ZA: 
«Ci oT i'<O gffffitt® *S  LfOTTA'o
1. ±<@mA<(îl'
2. (i/,0)d^LamA<$6
3 . L\< #3A'mmA<^3
4 .  i r ( , « e d < ^ 4
5 . z(bôKt>fi<amfi<^i>
4 1. tiL fcx  A (iA :A #ôT/Z<g$lx 6 i i ' i  rr
fcnc^,(i\ "S # 6  i  m i ' $  f  A'.
1.  ^ Â . y , t l i T ' ^ ^ ô o
2. # ;l'3 a6 -eA 6  7 .
3 . ^ 4 x
4 .  z^ L T x  ^ ; t b n t t i . ' r * - 5 - 7 o
l 0
156
4 2 . t,L4>.
Lv « W e # ; L ^ a 5 t L / : 6 .  oT<î:<Dgfl[«
Ü<0*5(><0'î?-r3i'.
i-
2 .
3. L'<6A'mmaf$6
4 .
4 3 .  (> L  (>. «  % 0 ) c # % e a a i z * e e 6  s  i  10
î fô ^ u ç ^ io fc n c è tf . m n ^ ^ Â . ^ n s
l- #<,6x
2. 4:;L64i^-CA6 9 .
3 . 4 : ;L 6 a % l'T t6 9 o
4 . % LT. ^ ;L ÿ a C V '-C $ 6 ô o
4 4 . L L t .  $  % /* l  '<D C # a e @  A è  6 11 ' ô
îfâ5-L^»i2^it<cjfcfu ^<Dmm
1. ±<@mA<(cu
2 .
3 . i'<  6A4E#A<$6
4.
5.
At£.tzm SH t<Ztii(D Ztfr-tiZiit)< fyih S i ^ t ^ E ô </ i $ t '„ 
ËlT3o<D«Kl3iStcîtLT. rtiy .j ttz \.i «DmiRRufftA'^igo:. AT'
a x /T < AféFt»„ à '-7Ax ^g(cmÆ&t)iwiA'e< i ',
4 5 . lfôr/ïL«cg^P«1<0êâx % ( i* m e 6  6 C 6 A<A6
(hSl'^TA'o
l. ( i l ' 2. l ' i ' t
4 6 . SFâr/iL(ca$if. # m -4 -6 c 6 A<A6 6 S i ' ^TA'.
1 .  ( i l '
2. l ' i ' t
l l
157
4 7. g â ^ t t / t e s - x  5$A<
1. ( I l '
2. l ' i ' t
* l:x a A lc t i 'T x  A c  6  e  L A: c  t  6  *'6S;L ( /: # i
4 8 .  a t ( c 6 l ' T x  M < k L (c m % H < 0 # A x  X ( l * » e 6 ',A :C 2 : A < t O
1. A l'
2 . l ' i ' i L
4 9- m t ( c 6 l 'T x  S^^<ÏL(C«SIx X  A ^ m e  L /:  c  6  ^
1. A l '
2. l 'I 'X
5 0. ü^(cfc-i'Tx :<:^(i3fiar'n»:i'<D»c. # a e @ m c * e e 6  r,
-xKHjjx:
1. A l'
2. l 'I 'X
%IZx g ^ 5 ^ M (Cx t  % C # 6 0 C 6 e L /cc a A < ^ 6 /) '^ - i ( /: $ i
5 l .  g A 5 m « ï ( C 6 l 'T x  *5 r'tL L (C ëK M «< D ## . X A ^ iK - E t - ^ / c C i  
A<Ai)$-4-A'o
1. A l '
2. l 'I 'X
5 2- g t 5 ^ K l A 6 l 'T x  Î^^^»:L{C«5I|x X A # m e L / :C 6 A < * » ) ^ f  
A'o
1. A l '
2. l 'I 'X
I 2
158
5 3. igjËsgBatcfca^Tv m a ^ a a i z ^ e e t
l- l i t '
2. t 'i 'X
m .
)X<r>mSH. «ttA:£0iSJR<0±^ICÎrt-5M»«^l»fefcfc®-C-r„
5 -30)g*RK<O4%A' 1 o«Cf. ATm//T< Af$t',
5 4 .  $ ( C ^ 0 i g j K m ± m ^ .  R K h x  é 'O .  -A <O flA <i: L r« t lc W /f< i :S
1. ±<eômt)<LL\
2. aA®Ü?L®ffiiwiîlxT^:-5S-3
3. l'<
4 .
5. ^<i*4>4ffi-e'Ç--5S9
IV-
%(o 3 o<oj®B t t .  L'T&/zA:(Demeim 9 h<r>x'to ^n^'tKD
S H C M L T . 4 1 -93C f. A trffl//T 'T3?<.'o
L T l'-B o
1. :è<-eôIiS^D/ït'
2. -e-jflS lU ït'
3. -Ç-9S9
4 . ^ I^ C -E rô m a
5 6. m z& eS% L T L '6.
1. ± < iô liS iiy ti\.^
2. f  iU S d /Z u
3. 6'S.SA'6U9 6 . f  i S i
4.
l 3
159
5 7 . O r îfc-51 . % A 'e@  b tfr J: -5 è .
$ej:i6LTL\6j:ô «cm^ t 5»
I.
3. t^imô
4 .
V.
t<omm<oRme3j<i:RL. « t  
h f i t z i z t  -,T a r m r n a e ^ ' z 3 o<d 
u r a c j tL . « « i n c a ^ i o a c f .  A t?H //-c< fe '$ i'o
5 8 .  ^ n tfc flA x  4 - e * i% m e a <
tlJw L T < n « 8 t « : ^ o |P { l ,  &<C/:(Z6 -o
1. c < o ± k < c ( A % - c $ a
2. <hrfcA«ir*d65
3 . t x ^ - v h i
5.
5 9 . 0  Afi%A<6 Ü : $ e C/IT/f(7(D@m&MF
^ < ïA :« cto T t'® ëfiE A G J T -r /i'o
I- c® ± t< “i<AtO'e^-5
2 . 6 -C t)A % -eA ^
3.
4. t t iA i'A tO tfJ ittu
5 .
6 0. -e<o(t$emCT@Amc#A'^'zuag(f
^ n t f c i c i  oT i'< ^SB £^ W C -r/i'o
1. c < o ± { ,n c < A « -C '* 4
2 . t T L A t q - c t e
3. ^ fS -^A 'ti'iaA W T A ^
4 . J ii^ < k 'A 0 jr '{ i< 4 i'
5 . A < A W m C ii '
è'ô  -7r é r i '^  Lfco
I 4
160
Appendix B; Questionnaire in English
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The University of Oklahoma
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION
May 19. 1997
Dear U n iv e rs ity  H o s p i ta ls ' Employee:
As an  OU Ph.D. s tu d e n t  in  the Departm ent o f  Communication, my d i s s e r t a t io n  
in v o lv es  conducting  a  survey o f  m edical w orkers in  both  the US and Japan . 
My re s e a rc h  p r o je c t ,  e n t i t l e d  "C ro ss -C u ltu ra l Study o f  O rg an iza tio n a l 
Behavior" and rev iew ed  and approved by 0 0 's  I n s t i tu t io n a l  Review Board 
(325-4757), seeks to  le a r n  how w orkers in  th e  US and Japan fe e l  abou t a 
v a r ie ty  o f  is s u e s  in  t h e i r  w orkplace : o rg a n iz a t io n a l  r u le s ,  o rg a n iz a tio n a l 
b e h a v io rs , q u a l i ty  o f  r e la t io n s h ip s  w ith  o th e r s ,  e t c .  My hope i s  t h a t  my 
d i s s e r t a t io n  w i l l  advance knowledge and u n d ers tan d in g  o f  both s im i l a r i t i e s  
and d if fe re n c e s  in  th e  o rg a n iz a tio n a l behav io rs  o f  th e  two n a tio n s .
You have been s e le c te d  as p a r t  o f  my US sample which includes 1.000 
in d iv id u a ls .  To o b ta in  m eaningful d a ta ,  I need, and w il l  g re a t ly  
a p p re c ia te ,  your h e lp .
I t  w i l l  take  ab o u t 15 minutes o f  your tim e to  answ er the  61 q u e s tio n s  on 
my q u e s tio n n a ire . I hope cha t you w i l l  respond to  a l l  q uestions  so th a t  I 
can o b ta in  a more a c c u ra te  p ic tu re  o f  US o rg a n iz a t io n a l  beh av io r.
There a re  s e v e ra l  s e n s i t iv e  q u e s tio n s  on my q u e s tio n n a ire  and I a s su re  you 
th a t  a l l  d a ta  o b ta in e d  from my su rv ey  w i l l  be t r e a te d  as  c o n f id e n tia l .
Your name w il l  n o t  be recorded  anywhere on th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  and, a f t e r  I 
e n te r  th e  d a ta  from  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  in to  a  com puter f i l e ,  I w i l l  d e s tro y  
th e  o r ig in a l  q u e s tio n n a ire s .
I hope you w il l  f in d  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  sh a re  your b e l i e f s  and o p in io n s  
e n jo y a b le . I f  you would l ik e  a  summary o f  th e  f in d in g s  from the  su rvey , 
p le a se  send me a  n o te  and I w i l l  send you th a t  summary upon the com pletion  
o f  my d i s s e r t a t io n .
I f  you would l i k e  to  know more ab o u t t h i s  p r o je c t ,  you may c a l l  e i t h e r  me 
o r  th e  two c h a ir s  o f  my com m ittee: D rs. F r ie d r ic h  and Chen in  OU's 
Departm ent o f Communication (325-3111).
I would a p p re c ia te  i t  i f  you would m ail th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  to  me by May 
31. I am e n c lo s in g  a  r e tu rn  envelope  f o r  your u s e . P lease p lace  in  
CAMPUS HAIL and I  w i l l  rece iv e  i t  on th e  OU Norman Campus.
In  advance. I  would l i k e  to  th a n k  you v e ry  much f o r  h e lp ing  me com plete 
what I hope w i l l  be a  w orthw hile d i s s e r t a t i o n  p r o je c t .
S in c e re ly ,
Emiko Kobayashi
<10 Efen A«Mm. Rom «01. Nonmr. orntama noiMSH mONE: (40S) aisat 11 FAX: (MSI 32s-7es
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r.
P le ase  p rov ide  che fo llow ing  Infocfflaclon a bouc y o u r s e l f .
01 . Gender (p le a se  c i r c l e  e i t h e r  1 o r  2)
1. male
2. fem ale
02. Race: (p le a se  c i r c l e  an  a p p ro p r ia te  number)
1. Black
2. American In d ian
3. H ispanic
4 . A sian
5. Caucasian
6. o th e r  (p le a se  SPECIFY: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
03 . How o ld  were you on your l a s t  b ir th d a y ?  
___________  y e a rs  o ld
04. what i s  your c u r re n t  m a r ita l  s ta tu s ?  Are you c u rre n tly  m arried , 
widowed, d iv o rced , s e p a ra te d , o r  have you n ev e r been m arried? 
(p le a se  c i r c l e  an a p p ro p r ia te  number)
1 . m arried
2. widowed
3. d ivo rced
4 . se p a ra te d
5. never m arried
OS. what i s  the  h ig h e s t  le v e l  o r  g rad e  o f  ed u c a tio n  you com pleted in  
school? (p le a se  c i r c l e  an a p p ro p r ia te  number)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11 12
(12 -  com pleted h ig h  sch o o l)
13 14 15 16 (16 -  com pleted c o lle g e )
17 18 (18 -  com pleted M a s te r 's  deg ree)
19 20 (20 -  com pleted P h .D .. law d e g re e , medical d eg ree )
21 (21 -  p o s t h ig h  school t r a in in g  such  a s  tra d e  sc h o o l, 
s e c r e t a r i a l  sc h o o l, e t c . ,  b u t no c o lleg e)
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0 6 . How Long have you beeir working f o r  che c u rre n t  h o sp ita l?  
___________ years
0 7 . Which o f che fo llow ing  b e s t  d e s c r ib e s  your c u rre n t  occupation?  
(p le a se  c i r c l e  an a p p ro p ria te  number)
1. work f o r  someone and ^  noc su p e rv ise  che work o f anyone
e ls e
2. work f o r  someone and i a  su p e rv is e  che work o f ocher
employees
3. och er (PLEASE SPECIFY: _________________________________)
0 8 . How long have you held your c u rre n c  s p e c i f ic  job ( in  ocher w ords, 
job c ic le )  a t  che currenc h o s p ita l?
___________  years
0 9 . AC any tim e d u rin g  che p a s t  f iv e  v e a rs  have you ever been o u t o f  
work because you could n o t f in d  a  job? (p le a se  c i r c le  an 
a p p ro p r ia te  number)
1. yes
2 . no
II.
The n e x t  group o f item s concerns your view s ab o u t th re e  types of 
o rg a n iz a t io n a l  r u le  v io la t io n s .  These a r e  th in g s  which many employees d o . 
but w hich  a re  c o n tra ry  to  o rg a n iz a tio n a l id e a l s  and e x p e c ta tio n s . I would 
l ik e  t o  know your o p in io n s  about th e s e  th in g s .
A lthough a  p a r t i c u la r  a c t i v i t y  may be a g a in s t  your h o s p i t a l 's  p o l ic ie s  and 
norms, you p e rs o n a lly  m ight no t c o n s id e r  i t  wrong to  do i t .  That depends 
on y o u r  own p e rso n a l b e l i e f s  about w hat i s  r i g h t  and wrong. So do i
these th in g s  may cause  you to  f e e l  g u i l t y  o r  re m o rse fu l, o r  Xt^may n o c . jf 
Again, t h a t  depends on how wrong you c h in k  th e  a c t i v i t y  is. now I  w i l l  
ask you w hether yjm ch in k  ysu  would f e e l  a u i l t v  i f  you engaged in  th e s e  
b e h a v io r s . I  w i l l  a l s o  a sk  you b i g  A problem  any g u i l t - f e e l in g s  g g  
s e lf - re m o rs e  would c r e a te  f o r  jg g  I f  you d id  t h i s .  P lease  respond to  e a ch  
q u e s t io n  by choosing a  number t h a t  b e s t  r e p r e s e n ts  your op in ions.
10 . G en era lly , i n  most s i tu a t io n s  I  would f e e l  g u i l ty  i f  I took  a  
long  lunch  o r  b reak  w ith o u t a p p ro v a l.
1. d e f i n i t e l y  would
2. p robab ly  would
3. p robab ly  would n o t
4 . d e f i n i t e l y  would n o t
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LI- I f  you d id  f e e l  g u i l t y  fo e  caking  a  Long Lunch o r break  wichouc 
ap p ro v a l, how big  a  problem  would i c  c r e a te  f o r  you?
L. no problem ac  a l l
2 . h a rd ly  any problem  '
3. a  LiccLe problem
4 . a b ig  problem
5. a  v e ry  b ig  problem
12. G en e ra lly , in  oosc s i t u a t i o n s  I would f e e l  g u i l ty  i f  I came to 
work l a t e  o r  l e f t  e a r ly  w ith o u t a p p ro v a l .
1. d e f i n i t e ly  would
2. p robab ly  would
3. p robab ly  would noc
4 . d e f i n i t e ly  would no t
13. I f  you d id  f e e l  g u i l t y  f o r  coming to  work l a t e  o r le a v in g  e a r ly  
w ithou t a p p ro v a l, how b ig  a  problem  would i t  c re a te  f o r  you?
1. no problem ac a l l
2 . h a rd ly  any problem
3. a  l i c c l e  problem
4 . a  b ig  problem
5. a  ve ry  b ig  problem
14. G e n e ra lly . I n  most s i t u a t i o n s  I  would f e e l  g u i l ty  i f  I  used s ic k  
leave  when I  was n o t r e a l l y  s ic k .
1 . d e f i n i t e ly  would
2. p robab ly  would
3. p robab ly  would n o t
4 . d e f i n i t e ly  would n o t
IS . I f  you d id  f e e l  g u i l t y  f o r  u sin g  s ic k  le a v e  when you were no t 
r e a l ly  s ic k ,  how b ig  a  problem  would i t  c r e a te  fo r  you?
1. no problem a t  a l l
2 . h a rd ly  any problem
3. a  l i t t l e  problem
4 . a  b ig  problem
5. a  v e ry  b ig  problem
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N'ow, I would Like co know w hether you would have increased  f e e l in g s  o f  
p rid e  in  y o u r s e lf  i f  you d id  noc engage in  th e se  behav io rs . So now fo e  
each a c t i v i t y ,  in d ic a te  w hether you chink you would f e e l  ocfiud â f  v o u r s e l f  
i f  you k e p t  y o u rs e lf  from  do ing  t h i s .  I w i l l  a ls o  a sk  you how rew arding 
YOU ch ink  aoZ f e e l in g s  a f . o r id e  i a  v o u rse lf  wQuIii bfi. i f  you re f r a in e d  from  
doing t h i s .  P lease  u se  th e  ch o ic e s  l i s t e d  below each q u e s tio n .
16. G e n e ra lly , in  m ost s i tu a t io n s  my f e e l in g s  o f p rid e  in  m yself 
would be in c re a s e d  i f  I re f ra in e d  from tak in g  a long lunch  o r 
b reak  w ith o u t a p p ro v a l .
1 . d e f i n i t e l y  would
2 . p ro b ab ly  would
3. p ro b ab ly  would not
6 . d e f i n i t e l y  would not
17. I f  you d id  f e e l  proud f o r  r e f ra in in g  from caking a  long lunch  o r  
b reak  w ith o u t a p p ro v a l, how rew arding would t h i s  f e e l in g  be f o r  
you?
1. noc rew ard in g  a t  a l l
2 . j u s t  a  l i t t l e  rew arding
3 . somewhat rew arding
4 . v e ry  rew ard ing
5 . e x tre m e ly  rew arding
18. G e n e ra lly , in  m ost s i tu a t io n s  my f e e l in g s  o f p rid e  in  m yself
would be in c re a s e d  i f  I  r e f ra in e d  from coming to  work l a t e  o r
le a v in g  e a r ly  w ith o u t ap p ro v a l.
1 . d e f i n i t e l y  would
2 . p ro b ab ly  would
3. p ro b ab ly  would no t
4 . d e f i n i t e l y  would not
19. I f  you d id  f e e l  proud f o r  r e f r a in in g  from coming to  work l a t e  o r
le a v in g  e a r ly  w ith o u t ap p ro v a l, how rew arding would t h i s  f e e l in g
be f o r  you?
1 . n o t rew ard in g  a t  a l l
2 . j u s t  a  l i t t l e  rew arding
3. somewhat rew arding
4 . v e ry  rew ard in g
5 . e x tre m e ly  rew arding
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20. G enera lly , in  nose s ic u a c io n s  my f e e l in g s  o f  p r id e  in  myself 
would be in c re a se d  i f  I r e f r a in e d  from u s in g  s ic k  leave  when I 
was n o c .re a l ly  s ic k .
1. d e f in i t e ly  would
2 . probably  would
3. probably would noc 
U.  d e f in i t e ly  would noc
21. I f  you d id  f e e l  proud fo r  r e f r a in in g  from u s in g  s ic k  leave when
you were no t r e a l ly  s ic k , how rew arding would th is  fe e lin g  be f o r  
you?
1. noc rew arding a t  a l l
2 . j u s t  a  l i c c l e  rew arding
3. somewhat rew arding 
U . very  rew arding
5. ex trem ely  rewarding
Now. I would l ik e  you co chink o f che w orkers you know w ith in  your 
h o s p i ta l  whose op in io n s about you m accer che most co you. Think about how 
th e y  would f e e l  about you i f  you engaged in  each o f  che th re e  b e h a v io rs . 
P lease  in d ic a te  w hether you th in k  t h a t  m ost o f  chose employees whose 
o p in io n s  you va lue  would lo se  re sp e c t f o r  you i f  you engaged in  each 
b e h a v io r . I a ls o  want to  know how b ig  a, problem anv lo s s  s £  re sp e c t f o r  
vou from o th e r  employees would c re a te  f o r  you i f  you d id  t h i s .  P lease 
co n tin u e  to  choose your answer from th e  o p tio n s  l i s t e d  below each 
q u e s tio n .
22. Would most o f  th e  employees whose op in io n s you value lo se  r e s p e c t  
fo r  you i f  you took  a  long lu n c h  o r  b reak  w ith o u t approval?
1. d e f in i t e ly  would
2 . p robably  would
3 . p robab ly  would n o t
4 . d e f in i t e ly  would n o t
23. I f  most o f  th e  people whose o p in io n s  you v a lu e  w ith in  your
h o s p ita l  d id  lo se  re s p e c t  f o r  you tak in g  a  lo n g  lunch  o r b reak  
w lthou t ap p ro v a l, how b ig  a  problem  would I t  c re a te  fo r  you?
1 . no problem a t  a l l
2 . h a rd ly  any problem
3 . a l i t t l e  problem
4 . a  b ig  problem
5. a  v e ry  b ig  problem
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24. VouLd «ose o£ che employees whose o p in io n s  you value lo s e  r e s p e c t  
f o r  you I f  you caae- co work l a c e  o r  l e f t  e a r ly  wichouc app rova l?
L. d e f i n i t e ly  would
2. probably  would
3. p robab ly  would noc
4 . d e f i n i t e ly  would noc
23. I f  most o f che people  whose o p in io n s  you v a lu e  w lchin  your
h o s p ita l  d id  lo s e  re s p e c t  f o r  you  coming to  work la c e  o r  le a v in g  
e a r ly  wichouc a p p ro v a l, how b ig  a  problem  would ic  c r e a te  fo r  
you?
1. no problem  ac  a l l
2 . h a rd ly  any  problem
3. a l i t t l e  problem
4 . a b ig  problem
5. a  very  b ig  problem
26. Would most o f  che employees whose o p in io n s  you value lo s e  respecc  
f o r  you i f  you u sed  s ic k  le a v e  when you were noc r e a l ly  s ic k ?
1. d e f i n i t e l y  would
2 . p robab ly  would
3 . p robab ly  would noc
4 . d e f i n i t e l y  would noc
27. I f  most o f  che peop le  whose o p in io n s  you v a lu e  w ith in  your
h o s p ita l  d id  lo s e  r e s p e c t  f o r  you  u s in g  s ic k  leave  when you were 
noc r e a l ly  s ic k ,  bow b ig  a  p rob lem  would i t  c re a te  f o r  you?
1 . no problem  a t  a l l
2 . h a rd ly  any  problem
3 . a  l i c c l e  problem
4 . a  b ig  problem
5. a  v e ry  b ig  problem
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A gain , chink about che w orkers ac  y o u r workplace whose op in ions ab o u t you 
m accer most Co you. T hink ab o u t how th e y  would f e e l  abou t you i f  you d id  
noc engage in  th e se  b e h a v io rs . So now I w i l l  a s k  you w hether you th in k  
c h a t most o f  th o se  em ployees whose o p in io n s  you v a lu e  would e x p ress  
a d m ira tio n  o r  o ra is e  f o r  vou i f  you d id  no t do th e s e  th in g s . I w i l l  a lso  
a sk  you hfiï rew arding %g|l ch ink  goy ex p re ss io n  Q t  gdajjraCiOO SL o r a is e  
you from o th e r  emolovees would be i f  you re f r a in e d  from doing th e s e  
th in g s .  P lease  use th e  c h o ic e s  l i s t e d  below each  q u e s tio n .
28. Would most o f  th e  employees whose o p in io n s  you value e x p re ss
p ra is e  fo r  you i f  you r e f r a in e d  from ta k in g  a long lunch  o r  b reak  
w ith o u t app rova l?
1 . d e f i n i t e l y  would
2 . p ro b ab ly  would
3. p robab ly  would no t
6 . d e f i n i t e l y  would noc
29. I f  most o f  th e  employees whose op in ions you value  ex p ressed
p ra is e  fo r  you r e f r a in in g  from  tak ing  a  long  lunch  o r  b reak
w ith o u t a p p ro v a l, how rew ard ing  would t h i s  p ra is e  be f o r  you?
1. n o t rew ard ing  a t  a l l
2 . j u s t  a  l i t t l e  rew arding
3. somewhat rew arding
U .  v e ry  rew ard ing
S. ex trem e ly  rew arding
30. Would most o f  th e  employees whose o p in io n s  you value e x p re ss
p ra is e  fo r  you i f  you r e f r a in e d  gggg coming l a t e  o r le a v in g
e a r ly  %rlthout app rova l?
1 . d e f i n i t e l y  would
2 . p ro b ab ly  would
3. p robab ly  would no t
4 . d e f i n i t e l y  would n o t
31. I f  most o f  th e  employees whose op in ions you va lue  expressed
p ra is e  f o r  you r e f r a in in g  from  coming to  work l a t e  and le a v in g  
e a r ly  w ith o u t a p p ro v a l, bow rew arding would t h i s  p ra ise  be f o r  
you?
1. n o t rew ard ing  a t  a l l
2 . J u s t  a  l i t t l e  rew arding
3. somewhat rew arding
4 . v e ry  rew arding
3. ex trem e ly  rew arding
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32. tfould a o s t  o f  th e  employees whose c p in io a s  you value ex p re ss
p ra is e  f o r  you I f  you re f r a in e d  from u s in g  sick, leave when you 
were noc r e a l l y  sick?
1. d e f i n i t e l y  would
2. p ro b ab ly  would
3. p robab ly  would no t
4 . d e f i n i t e l y  would no t
33. I f  most o f  th e  employees whose o p in io n s  you value  expressed
p ra is e  f o r  you re f ra in in g  f f g a  u s in g  s i c k  le a v e  when you were not 
r e a l ly  s ic k ,  how rew arding would t h i s  p r a i s e  be fo r you?
1. n o t rew arding a t  a l l
2. j u s t  a  l i t t l e  rew arding
3. somewhat rewarding 
c . very  rew arding
5. ex trem ely  rew arding
Since th e se  behav io rs  a r e  a g a in s t o rg a n iz a t io n a l  id e a l s  and e x p e c ta tio n s , 
th e re  i s  a  chance t h a t  you would g e t  caugh t and  p u n ish ed  by people in  
a u th o r i ty  i f  you d id  th e s e  th in g s . Some em ployees, however, m ight th in k  
th ey  co u ld  g e t away w ith  I t ,  w hile o th e r  m ight th in k  they  would g e t  
c a u g h t. I  want to  know i f  you th in k  you would g ee  caugh t by people  in  
a u th o r i ty  I f  you v io la te d  each o f  th e s e  r u l e s .  I  would a lso  l ik e  to  know 
how & problem g a y  punishment jgc people  i a  a u th o r i t y  would jtg f o r  you 
i f  you d id  t h i s .  Im agine you had been caugh t an d  th in k  about what th e  
punishm ent p robab ly  would be. How b ig  a  problem  would th is  punishm ent 
c r e a te  f o r  you? P le a se  choose your answer from one o f  the  o p tio n s  l i s t e d  
below each  q u e s tio n .
34. Do you th in k  you would g e t  caugh t i f  you  took  a  long lu n ch  o r 
b reak  ir lth o u c  approval?
1. d e f i n i t e ly  would
2. p ro b ab ly  would
3. p ro b ab ly  would n o t
4 . d e f i n i t e ly  would n o t
35. I f  you were caugh t and th e  people I n  a u th o r i t y  had d e c id e d  what 
your punishm ent would be f o r  ta k in g  a  lo n g  lu n ch  o r b reak  
w ith o u t a p p ro v a l, how b ig  a  problem  w ould  i t  c re a te  f o r  you?
1. no problem a t  a l l
2 . h a rd ly  any problem
3. a  l l t c l e  problem
4 . a  b ig  problem
5. a  v e ry  b ig  problem
170
36. Do you chink you would gee caughc if you came co work lace or 
lefc early wichouc approval?
1. d e f ln ic e ly  would
2 . probably  would
3. probably  would noc
4 . d e f ln ic e ly  would noc
37. If you were caughc and che people in auchoricy had decided vhac 
your punishmenc would be for coming co work lace or leaving 
early wichouc approval, how big a problem would ic creace for 
you?
1. no problem ac  a l l
2 . h a rd ly  any problem
3 . a l i c c l e  problem
4. a big problem
5. a very big problem
38. Do you chink you would gee caughc if you used sick leave when 
you were noc really sick?
1. d e f ln ic e ly  would
2 . probably would
3 . probably  would noc
4 .  d e f ln ic e ly  would noc
39. I f  you were caughc and che peop le  in  auchoricy  had decided vhac 
your punishmenc would be f o r  u s in g  s ic k  leave when you were noc 
r e a l ly  s ic k , how b ig  a  problem would ic  creace  f o r  you?
1. no problem a c  a l l
2 . h a rd ly  any problem
3. a l i c c l e  problem
4 . a b ig  problem
5. a  v e ry  b ig  problem
171
10
There Ls a chance you would gee rewarded by p eo p le  in  auchoricy  over you 
i f  you re f ra in e d  from  engaging in  chese a c c s .  I  wane co know i f  you  chink  
you would gee rew arded by peop le  wich au c h o ricy  o v e r you i f  you re f ra in e d  
from doing chese c h in g s . I would a ls o  l ik e  co know how rew arding you 
ch ink  any rewards from people i n  auchoricy  would fo r  ysu . i^  you kepc 
y o u r s e lf  from engaging  in  chese  a c c s . P le ase  choose your answ er from che 
L ise  below each q u e sc io n .
40. Do you Chink you would gee rewarded by peop le  in  au c h o ricy  i f  you 
re f ra in e d  from cak ing  a long lunch  o r  b reak  wichouc approval?
1. d e f in ic e ly  would
2 . p robab ly  would
3. p robab ly  would noc
4 . d e f ln ic e ly  would noc
4L. I f  you were rew arded by che people in  au ch o ricy  fo r  r e f r a in in g
from cak ing  a  long lu n ch  o r  break w ichouc app rova l, how rewarding 
would c h is  be fo r  you?
L. noc rew arding ac a l l
2. ju s c  a  l i c c l e  rew arding
3. somewhac rew arding
4 . v e ry  rew arding
3. exccem ely rew arding
42. Do you ch in k  you would gec rewarded by people in  a u c h o ric y  i f  you 
re f ra in e d  from coming la c e  o r le a v in g  e a r ly  wichouc approval?
1. d e f ln ic e ly  would
2 . p robab ly  would
3 . p robab ly  would noC
4 . d e f in ic e ly  would noc
43 . I f  you were rew arded by che people i n  au ch o ricy  f o r  r e f r a in in g  
fz a a  coming Co work la c e  o r  lea v in g  e a r l y  wichouc a p p ro v a l, how 
rew arding would c h is  be f o r  you?
p  1 . noc rew ard ing  ac  a l l
>  2 . ju s c  a  l i c c l e  rew arding
3. somewhac rew arding
4 . v e ry  rew arding
5 . excrem ely  rew ard ing
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66. Do /o u  ch ink  /o u  would gec rew arded  i f  /o u  re f r a in e d  from u s in g  
s ic k  Leave when /o u  were noc r e a l l /  s ick?
1. d e f i n i c e l /  would
2. p robab ly  would
3. p robab ly  would noc
6 . d e f in ic e ly  would noc
65. I f  you were rew arded by che p eo p le  in  au c h o ricy  fo r  r e f r a in in g  
from u s in g  s ic k  le a v e  when you w ere noc r e a l l y  s ic k , how 
rew ard ing  would c h is  be fo r  you?
1 . noc rew ard ing  ac a l l
2 . ju sc  a  l i c c l e  rew arding
3 . somewhac rew arding
6 . ve ry  rew ard ing
5 . excrem ely  rew arding
As you know, many people v io la c e  che k in d s  o f  o c g an izac io n a l ru le s  abouc 
which we have been a sk in g  your o p in io n s . Sow, I would l ik e  you co 
in d ic a c e , f i r s c ,  whecher you chink you e v e r  would d a  chese chings in  che 
fu c u re ■ P le a se  c i r c l e  e ic h e r  YES o r  KS fo e  each o f  che chree a c c i v i c i e s . 
So one w ill e v e r  know vour answers s in c e  you r name i s  noc recorded 
anywhtM ■
66. In  che fu cu re  w i l l  you ever cake a  long lu n c h  o r break wichouc 
a p p ro v a l?
1. YES
2 .  NO
67. In  che fu cu re  w i l l  you ev e r come co work l a t e  o r  leave e a r ly  
wichouc app rova l?
1 .  YES
2 .  NO
68. In  che fuCure w i l l  you ev e r u se  s ic k  le a v e  when you a re  noc 
r e a l l y  s ic k ?
1 .  YES
2 .  NO
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N’« x c .  I would l ik #  CO know i f  you have done chese chings w ith in  che o a s t  
y e a r . Again, p le a se  c i r c l e  YES o r  co answ er each  o f che fo llo w in g  
chree q u esc io n s .
69 . In che pasc y e a r ,  have you e v e r  tak en  a  long Lunch o r  b reak  
wichouc ap p ro v a l?
1 .  YES
2 . MO
50. In che p a s t  y e a r ,  have you e v e r  come co work la c e  o r  l e f c  e a r ly  
wichouc ap p ro v a l?
1 .  YES
2 -  NO
51. In che pasc y e a r ,  have you e v e r  used s ic k  leave  when you were noc 
r e a l ly  s ic k ?
1 .  YES
2 .  NO
Now. I would l i k e  co know i f  you have done chese chings w ith in  th e  p as t 
f iv e  v e a r s . P le a se  c i r c l e  YES o r  Co answ er each  o f che fo llo w in g  chree
q u e s t io n s .
52. In  che pasc f iv e  y e a rs , have you ev e r tak e n  a  long  lu n ch  o r  b reak  
w ithou t app ro v a l?
1 .  YES
2 . NO
S3. In  che pasc  f i v e  y e a rs , have you e v e r  come co work la c e  o r  l e f c  
e a r ly  %richouC approval?
1 . YES
2 . NO
54. In  che pasc  f iv e  y e a r s . have you e v e r  u sed  s ic k  lea v e  when you 
were noc r e a l l y  s ic k ?
1 . YES
2 . NO
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I I I .
Th« nex t ic e a  concerns your view s abouc your d i r e c t  s u p e r io r s .  P lease  
respond co che fo llow ing  q u esc io n  by choosing one o f  che f iv e  o p tio n s .
55. Do you p e rce iv e  your d i r e c t  s u p e r io r  ( o r .  s u p e r io rs )  a s  a  ro le  
model bo th  p r o fe s s io n a l ly  and p e rso n a lly ?
1. noc ac a l l
2. on ly  in  a  few ways
3. in  some ways
4 . in  nose ways
5. in  every  way
IV.
Tlie nex t ch ree  icems concern  some o f  your view s abouc management a c t i v i t y .  
P lease  respond co each q u e s tio n  by choosing one o f  che fo u r  o p tio n s  l i s t e d  
below.
56. «lienever I see people in  a u th o r i ty .  I f e e l  l ik e  th ey  a re  ju s t  
w a itin g  fo r  me to  do something so th ey  can b o th e r  me.
1. s tro n g ly  d isa g re e
2. somewhac d isa g re e
3. somewhac ag ree
4 . s tro n g ly  ag ree
5 7 . People i n  auchoricy keep Cheir eye o n  me.
1. s tro n g ly  d is a g re e
2. somewhac d isa g re e
3. somewhac ag ree
4 . s tro n g ly  ag ree
58. When people in  a u th o r i ty  come in to  my work a re a ,  th ey  u s u a lly  
a re  ju sc  look ing  f o r  someone co b ocher.
1. s tro n g ly  d isa g re e
2 . somewhac d is a g re e
3. somewhac ag ree
4 . s tro n g ly  ag ree
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V.
F in a l ly .  I would l ik e  to  know your v iew s abouc an  id e a l  jo b . P lease  ch ink  
o f  an id e a l  jo b  - d is r e g a rd in g  your p r e s e n t  jo b . In  choosing an  id e a l  
jo b . how im p o rtan t would each  o f  che folIo% ring c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  be to  you? 
P lease  respond to  each  o f  th e  chree q u e s t io n s  by choosing  one o f  th e  f iv e  
o p tio n s  l i s t e d  below.
59. How im p o rtan t would i t  be to  you to  have a  job  t h a t  lea v e s  you 
s u f f i c i e n t  tim e f o r  your p e rs o n a l o r  fam ily  l i f e ?
1. ex trem e ly  im portan t
2 . v e ry  im p o rtan t
3 . o f  m oderate im portance
4 . o f  l i t t l e  im portance
5. o f  no im portance a t  a l l
60. How im p o rtan t would ic  be to  you co have c o n s id e ra b le  freedom co 
ad o p t your otm approach to  th e  jo b ?
1. ex trem ely  im portan t
2 . ve ry  im p o rtan t
3 . o f  m oderate im portance
4 . o f  l i t t l e  im portance
5 . o f no im portance a t  a l l
61. How im p o rtan t would i t  be to  you t o  have c h a lle n g in g  work to  do. 
from which you co u ld  g e t a  s e n se  o f  p e rso n a l accom plishm ent?
1. ex trem ely  im portan t
2 . very  im p o rtan t
3 . o f m oderate im portance
4 . o f  l i t t l e  im portance
5 . o f  no im portance a t  a l l
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION
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